Iran remains central to India's energy security and connectivity strategy despite sanctions. Comment with reference to Chabahar port and INSTC.

Iran's geography — a Persian Gulf coastline plus a land bridge to Central Asia — keeps it structurally central to India's energy and connectivity calculus. Yet that centrality is today more strategic potential than realised gain, as unilateral US sanctions increasingly bind both state projects and private firms.

Energy security: an enduring but suspended stake

• Iran was among India's largest crude suppliers until the US exited the JCPOA (2018) and India's import waiver lapsed in May 2019; the basket has since shifted to Gulf and Russian barrels.
• Iran's short freight haul, favourable credit terms and heavy-crude fit with Indian refiners make it a natural swing supplier should sanctions ease.
• Meanwhile secondary sanctions now reach private Indian traders: in August 2026 the US Treasury's "Operation Economic Outcast" designated four India-based firms over Iranian petroleum and petrochemical imports [1], following earlier tranches naming India-linked "shadow fleet" operators [2].

Chabahar: connectivity anchor bypassing Pakistan

• India Ports Global Limited signed a 10-year contract with Iran's Ports and Maritime Organization for the Shahid Beheshti terminal on 13 May 2024, with about USD 120 million in equipment investment and a USD 250 million credit window [3][4].
• It gives India sea access to Afghanistan and Central Asia without transiting Pakistan, and has carried humanitarian consignments to Kabul.
• However, Washington revoked the Chabahar sanctions exception under IFCA, effective 29 September 2025 [5], raising banking, insurance and equipment-procurement risk.

INSTC: the cost-and-time logic

• The 7,200-km multimodal India–Iran–Russia corridor (2000) cuts transit time and cost versus the Suez route, and Chabahar's integration into it is an explicit policy goal [6].
• It hedges against Red Sea and Suez chokepoint disruption; progress is slowed by payment channels and pending Chabahar–Zahedan rail links.

Iran therefore remains indispensable to India's westward and northward reach, even as its energy role stays dormant. India's course lies in insulating Chabahar and INSTC as development-and-connectivity assets, seeking targeted carve-outs, guiding firms on compliance, and diversifying corridors — an approach consistent with strategic autonomy and with SDG-9's connectivity goals.