Joint military exercises do more than build operational interoperability. Discuss their strategic significance in the Indian Ocean Region.

The 12th edition of India–Sri Lanka MITRA SHAKTI is under way at Maduru Oya (13–26 November 2026). Its stated aim is interoperability for counter-terrorism operations under a UN mandate [1]. In the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), however, such exercises are equally tools of trust, presence and influence.

Strategic significance beyond interoperability

• Defence diplomacy (Neighbourhood First): exercises build army-to-army trust. MITRA SHAKTI's venue alternates between India and Sri Lanka, which makes it reciprocal rather than donor-recipient [1][2].
• Institutionalising ties: the April 2025 MoU on Defence Cooperation gives exercises an umbrella framework. Joint training becomes harder to drop when relations cool [3].
• Strategic hedge: a regular presence keeps India the preferred security partner at a time when extra-regional powers are courting Colombo. Sri Lanka has reaffirmed that its territory will not be used against India's security [4].
• Net security provider: naval drills such as SLINEX and the multilateral Malabar signal India's commitment to secure sea lanes under SAGAR/MAHASAGAR.
• UN peacekeeping readiness: the 2025 edition rehearsed sub-conventional operations under UN Charter Chapter VII, which prepares troops for mixed-contingent missions [2].
• Technology and jointness: the 2025 edition used drones and Counter-UAS [2]. In 2026, IAF personnel joined the army contingent [1].
• HADR potential: the MoU lists humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) exchanges [3]. Heliborne and convoy skills carry over to the region's frequent cyclones and tsunamis [2].

Limitations

• Disputes remain untouched: 591 Indian fishermen were released by Sri Lanka from 2024 to March 2025 [5]. Palk Bay friction lies beyond army-to-army goodwill.
• Assurances, not treaties: the joint statement only agreed to explore a binding framework agreement on defence cooperation [4].
• Normative concerns: training with a partner force does not clear its human-rights record, and UN deployments still depend on vetting.

Conclusion

Joint exercises therefore work as instruments of diplomacy, deterrence and norm-building, not just tactical drills. India should turn MoUs into binding agreements, fix multi-year exercise calendars, and add HADR and international humanitarian law (IHL) modules. Exercises like MITRA SHAKTI can then support a secure, inclusive Indian Ocean as envisioned under MAHASAGAR.