·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 wordsPolity

Judicial infrastructure deficits often trigger friction between the executive and judiciary. Examine the reasons for chronic vacancies in fast-track courts and suggest remedies.

In this answer
  1. Why vacancies persist
  2. Remedies

Fast Track Special Courts (FTSCs), operating as a Centrally Sponsored Scheme funded through the Nirbhaya Fund, were meant to deliver time-bound trials in rape and POCSO cases; 775 FTSCs were functional in 29 States/UTs as of April 2026 [1]. Yet sanctioned posts often stay unfilled, and the resulting blame-shifting strains executive-judiciary relations — as seen when the Bombay High Court initiated criminal contempt proceedings in September 2026 against Maharashtra's Law Department Secretary during a hearing on 179 vacant fast-track court posts [5][6].

Why vacancies persist

  • Shared but unclear responsibility: creation of posts and funds lies with the State executive, while selection and recommendation run through the High Court — neither side owns the delay [2][4].
  • Recruitment lag: the Standing Committee on Law and Justice (2021) noted prescribed timelines for initiating appointments are rarely adhered to, a pattern visible across the judiciary [2].
  • Thin parent cadre: FTSCs draw on a district judiciary already carrying heavy vacancies and 87.6% of India's case pendency, so filling one court empties another [3].
  • Scheme uncertainty: FTSCs run on short, repeatedly extended scheme cycles, discouraging States from creating permanent cadre posts [1].
  • Infrastructure and staff deficit: court halls, residential units and support staff lag, tracked under the Nyaya Vikas portal; a judge cannot be posted where no courtroom exists [4].

Remedies

  • Convert proven FTSC posts into permanent sanctioned strength with assured multi-year funding, removing scheme-cycle uncertainty [1].
  • Calendar-bound recruitment: annual, timeline-mandated selection cycles jointly monitored by the High Court and State, with vacancies notified before retirement dates [2].
  • Strengthen the infrastructure scheme's 60:40 Centre-State delivery and link fund release to timely post-filling [4].
  • Institutionalise regular State-level Judicial Infrastructure Committees, so grievances are aired administratively rather than escalating into contempt [5].

Chronic FTSC vacancies are less a resource problem than a coordination failure between two constitutional organs. Treating judicial infrastructure as shared national infrastructure — with permanent posts, predictable funding and structured consultation — would advance both Article 21's promise of speedy justice and SDG 16 on access to justice.

Sources

  1. 1PIB — Fast Track Special Courts (FTSCs), Ministry of Law & Justice775 FTSCs functional in 29 States/UTs (April 2026), Nirbhaya Fund financing, short scheme extensions
  2. 2PRS Legislative Research — Understanding vacancies in the Indian judiciaryappointment-timeline non-adherence flagged by the Standing Committee (2021); split recruitment responsibility
  3. 3PRS Legislative Research — Pendency and Vacancies in the Judiciary (Vital Stats)87.6% of pending cases lie in subordinate courts
  4. 4Department of Justice — Centrally Sponsored Scheme for Development of Infrastructure Facilities for the Judiciarycourt halls/residential units, 60:40 funding pattern, Nyaya Vikas monitoring
  5. 5The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Act No. 70 of 1971) — India Codecriminal contempt and High Court's jurisdiction over contempt of itself
  6. 6The Hindu — "SC declines relief to judicial officer over 'outburst' in HC" (11 September 2026)Bombay HC contempt proceedings arising from a hearing on 179 vacant fast-track court posts
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