Judicial propriety demands that judges recuse themselves from matters in which they have a personal interest. Critically examine this principle with reference to recent events.

Judicial propriety rests on nemo judex in causa sua — no one may judge their own cause. The Restatement of Values of Judicial Life, 1997 [5] codifies this as a norm of conduct, but recent events show the principle is neither absolute nor mechanically applicable.

The case for recusal

• Justice must be seen to be done: institutional legitimacy depends on perceived impartiality, not merely actual fairness; the Restatement bars judges from hearing matters in which they have a personal stake [5].
• Natural justice is read into Articles 14 and 21; a reasonable likelihood of bias vitiates a decision even without proof of actual bias.
• Recent illustration: after NALSAR students opposed CJI Surya Kant as convocation guest, the Bar Council of India on 13 August 2026 directed State Bar Councils not to enrol the 2026 batch, then withdrew it the same day [3][4]. A three-judge Bench headed by the CJI himself restrained coercive action and sought BCI's affidavit — a matter arising directly from a protest against that judge [3].

Limits of the principle

• Doctrine of necessity: in the NJAC case (2015), Justice Khehar declined recusal, holding that where all available judges share the same institutional interest, the court must still adjudicate.
• Institutional interest ≠ personal interest: criticism of a judge cannot become a device to disqualify them, else litigants engineer benches.
• Urgency of rights: the right to practise a profession under Article 19(1)(g) [1] of an entire graduating batch was at stake against a statutory regulator whose enrolment powers flow from the Advocates Act, 1961 [2] — delay itself would have caused injury.
• No codified procedure: recusal remains discretionary, with reasons rarely recorded, breeding perceptions of arbitrariness.

Recusal is thus a safeguard of confidence, not a veto in the litigant's hands. The balanced course is a written, reasoned recusal protocol, transparent roster allocation, and self-restraint by regulators like BCI in penalising dissent — measures that strengthen both judicial credibility and the fundamental freedoms the Court exists to protect.