Ministerial accountability to Parliament is a cornerstone of parliamentary democracy. Critically evaluate this principle in light of recent demands for a minister's resignation over alleged executive excesses.

Article 75(3) makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha, and convention adds individual responsibility of each Minister for their department [1]. The principle remains the spine of executive answerability, but its working — as the 2026 Monsoon Session showed — depends less on the rule than on whether the House actually functions.

Instruments that give the principle teeth

• Question Hour and Zero Hour compel ministries to answer on record; no-confidence motions operationalise Article 75(3) [1].
• Rule 267 (Council of States) lets a member move suspension of listed business to debate an urgent matter, forcing a ministerial reply [2].
• Departmentally Related Standing Committees, PAC and CAG audit sustain scrutiny beyond the floor.

Why the principle underperforms

• Chair's discretion is absolute: on 31 July 2026 the Rajya Sabha Chairman disallowed the Leader of Opposition's Rule 267 notice on alleged Ayodhya temple land-fund irregularities and ruled out further notices; the House was adjourned amid uproar, with Opposition also demanding the Home Minister answer for police action on 20 July protesters [3]. Accountability shifted from debate to disruption.
• The forum itself collapses: in Monsoon Session 2026 Lok Sabha functioned for 15% and Rajya Sabha 33% of scheduled time; Question Hour ran for 1% and 12% respectively [4].
• Resignation is convention, not enforceable law — a secure majority insulates ministers, so individual responsibility has weakened into collective survival.
• Demands for resignation raised outside the House risk becoming political theatre rather than scrutiny.

Accountability, therefore, is constitutionally robust but procedurally fragile: it fails not because ministers are immune, but because the deliberative space is forfeited by both Chair and Opposition. Fixing minimum sitting days as the NCRWC recommended — 100 for Rajya Sabha and 120 for Lok Sabha [5] — reasoned, recorded decisions on Rule 267 notices, and the 2nd ARC's emphasis on transparency and codes of conduct [6] can restore the floor as the real site of answerability. A Parliament that debates is the surest guarantee that Article 75(3) means what it says.