Modern warfare is moving beyond land, sea and air to space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum. Discuss what this means for India's force structure and indigenisation priorities.

At Exercise Tarang Shakti 2026, the Raksha Mantri said that warfare now extends to space, cyber, the electromagnetic spectrum and information, beyond land, sea and air. He added that future military power will depend on "the speed of sensing, understanding, deciding, and acting", not on the number of platforms [1]. This changes both what India fields and what India must build at home.

Implications for force structure

• From platforms to networks: capability now rests on sensors, integrated networks and precision weapons [1]. Forces must be organised around data shared across domains, not service silos.
• New force mix: unmanned systems, drones, AI and electronic warfare now decide military power [1]. They need their own units, doctrine and training.
• Numbers still count: the IAF has 31 fighter squadrons against an authorised 42. The Standing Committee on Defence says it needs at least 180 fighters [2]. Sensors and jammers still need aircraft to carry them.
• Jointness and interoperability: operating across several domains requires integration among the services and with partners. Exercises such as Tarang Shakti train for this [1].

Implications for indigenisation priorities

• Own the electronic and software layer: imported cyber and EW systems can be denied in a crisis. The test is domestic ability to "design, develop, manufacture, maintain and upgrade" [1]. AESA radars, electronic systems and unmanned technologies are already on India's list [1].
• Close the engine gap: the RM named aero-engine development as a critical gap [1]. The Tejas Mk1A still depends on 113 GE F404 engines delivered 2027–2032 [3]. AMCA's fifth-generation ambitions depend on solving this [1].
• Co-development, not just licensed assembly: partnerships in research, co-production and training [1] count as self-reliance only if design knowledge comes to India.
• Funding: capital outlay has averaged 27% against a recommended 40%. Defence spending excluding pensions is 1.6% of GDP, against the committee's recommended 3% [2]. This squeezes long-gestation R&D.

Multi-domain warfare therefore needs a force that is networked, joint and large enough, backed by an industry that owns critical technologies rather than just assembling them. India should raise capital outlay steadily towards 40%, run engine and EW programmes in mission mode, and pursue co-development with trusted partners. Together these can turn Atmanirbharta into real strategic autonomy, so that India can act independently when needed and alongside partners when interests converge [1].