"Moral authority in international relations rests on consistency." Discuss in light of recent Western sanctions policy.
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Moral authority is a state's ability to persuade others by example rather than by force. It holds only when the rules a state preaches also bind its own conduct. Recent Western sanctions on Russian energy show how applying rules selectively wears that authority down.
Inconsistency in Western sanctions policy
- Penalising India: In August 2025 the US imposed an extra 25% duty on Indian goods because India was buying Russian oil [1].
- Exempting itself: In October 2026 the US Treasury licensed transactions in Russian-origin diesel, including imports into the US, until 7 April 2027 [2].
- Selective outrage: The MEA pointed out that the EU trades goods worth about €67.5 billion with Russia. It added that the US still imports Russian uranium hexafluoride, palladium and fertilisers [3].
- Unequal timelines: The EU proposed giving itself until end-2027 to phase out Russian gas [4]. India faced an immediate penalty.
- Discretionary coercion: The 2026 Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act allows tariffs of up to 100% on major buyers of Russian energy, plus a presidential national-interest waiver [5]. That leaves room for selective use.
Consequences for moral authority
- Global South scepticism: Sanctions look like geopolitics rather than principle, so fewer countries support them.
- Weaker rules-based order: In Russia – Traffic in Transit (DS512), a WTO panel held that the GATT Article XXI security exception is open to review. The US rejected that reasoning [6].
The counter-view
- Sanctions aim to cut Russia's war revenue. Time-bound licences [2] and phased exits [4] reflect real dependencies, not mere hypocrisy.
- Perfect consistency is rare in realpolitik. Interests, not virtue alone, decide whether states comply.
- India's own record is mixed. US tariff relief came only after India committed to stop importing Russian oil [7]. This tests its claim to strategic autonomy.
Consistency does not guarantee compliance, but inconsistency breeds scepticism. Sanctions should therefore be multilateral, with the same transition periods and published waiver criteria for every country. India, for its part, should seek the same waiver treatment the US gives itself, backed by a phased plan to diversify its crude suppliers. Together these steps would turn coercion into legitimate collective action, in line with the UN Charter's principle of sovereign equality.
Sources
- 1White House, Executive Order 14329 "Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation" (Aug 2025)additional 25% duty on Indian goods over Russian oil purchases
- 2US Treasury OFAC, Issuance of Russia-related General License 135 (9 Oct 2026)authorisation for Russian-origin diesel transactions, including US imports, until 7 April 2027
- 3Ministry of External Affairs, Statement on targeting of India over Russian oil imports (Aug 2025)EU goods trade with Russia; US imports of Russian uranium hexafluoride, palladium and fertilisers
- 4European Commission, "Commission proposes a plan to phase out Russian gas and oil imports" (17 Jun 2025)EU phase-out of Russian gas by end-2027
- 5Congressional Research Service, "Tariff Authorities in the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026" (LSB11474)tariffs of up to 100% on buyers of Russian energy; presidential discretion and waiver
- 6WTO, DS512: Russia — Measures Concerning Traffic in TransitArticle XXI held reviewable; US disagreement with the panel's reasoning
- 7White House, Executive Order 14384 "Modifying Duties to Address Threats to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation" (Feb 2026)25% duty removed after India committed to stop importing Russian oil