"Notice-and-takedown under Section 79(3)(b) has emerged as a parallel blocking regime." Critically examine this in light of Section 69A safeguards and *Shreya Singhal*.

Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000 gives intermediaries "safe harbour" from liability for what users post. Section 79(3)(b) takes this protection away if a platform does not remove unlawful content after gaining "actual knowledge" of it. Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules, 2021 puts this into practice [2]. The route is now used widely to get content removed, so it raises the question of whether it has quietly replaced Section 69A, the formal blocking power.

Why it resembles a parallel blocking regime

• Safeguards bypassed: Section 69A blocking needs written reasons, committee scrutiny and review. Shreya Singhal (2015) upheld Section 69A because it had these safeguards [1]. Section 79(3)(b) notices have none of them.
• Many issuing authorities: Ministries, departments and States/UTs can all send notices [3]. MHA's Sahyog portal automates them, which raises their volume without any central check.
• Coercive in effect: platforms risk losing safe harbour, so they comply instead of contesting. A "notice" therefore works like an order.
• Opacity: notices are not published and users are not heard. MeitY's Oct 2026 advisory asked platforms to prioritise government complaints and "limit reach" of content "likely to cause public disorder" [5]. That amounts to invisible, pre-emptive down-ranking.
• Official admission: MeitY's Secretary warned that Section 79(3)(b) notices containing directions similar to Section 69A "must be carefully avoided" [3].

Why the charge is overstated

• Recognised by the Supreme Court: Shreya Singhal itself read "actual knowledge" to mean a court order or government notification relating to Article 19(2) grounds [1]. The notice route was always intended.
• Different legal nature: Section 69A blocks content directly. Section 79 only removes immunity, and courts decide final liability [3].
• Judicial backing: the Karnataka HC (Sept 2025) dismissed X Corp's challenge and treated Sahyog as a facilitation mechanism, not censorship [4]. However, part of its reasoning was that a foreign company cannot claim Article 19 rights. This leaves Indian citizens' claims open.
• Need for speed: cyber fraud, deepfakes and intimate-image abuse need faster action than committee procedures allow.

Way forward

• Use Section 69A, including its emergency provision, wherever the aim is blocking. Limit Section 79 notices to content that is clearly unlawful under Article 19(2) grounds.
• Publish data on notices by issuing agency, inform affected users, and allow appeals to the Grievance Appellate Committee.

Overall, the notice route is lawful in principle but has drifted into blocking by other means. If it is tied back to the safeguards in Shreya Singhal, the State can keep its speed while respecting Article 19(1)(a) and the rule of law.