Opening Aadhaar authentication to non-government entities improves ease of living but raises privacy concerns. Critically analyse.

In 2018 the Supreme Court (Puttaswamy) struck down private use of Aadhaar based only on a contract. The Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019 replaced this with narrower access that UIDAI must approve for a stated purpose [1]. The SWIK Amendment Rules, 2025 and the new Sub-AUA/KUA LITE framework now put this route into practice for non-government entities [2][4]. The convenience gains are real, but they depend on privacy safeguards being enforced.

Ease of living: the gains

• Seamless services: residents can quickly verify their identity for e-commerce, travel, hospitality and health services [2].
• Proven scale: about 230 crore authentications in June 2025, 7.8% more than a year earlier, show that the platform is mature and widely trusted [3].
• Lower entry cost: under LITE, low-volume entities use an existing AUA/KUA's infrastructure and are onboarded in real time [4].
• Safer than the alternatives: one audited central system is better than many weak in-house KYC systems that store photocopies of ID documents.

Privacy concerns: the risks

• Function creep: permitted purposes such as "innovation" and "spread of knowledge" are broad [2]. A tool built to deliver subsidies to the right people could become a default gate for everyday services.
• Approval by the executive, not Parliament: MeitY approves entities on UIDAI's recommendation [2]. Individual uses are not set out by a law passed by Parliament, which tests the standard that uses must be backed by law.
• Unclear accountability: under LITE, it is not clear whether the parent AUA or the small entity is liable if data is misused [4].
• Opacity: no public register lists approved entities and their purposes.
• Consent under pressure: private providers may make Aadhaar mandatory in practice.

Assessment

• The safeguards are real. Biometrics may be used only for enrolment and authentication, and unauthorised access to the central database carries up to 3 years' jail and a fine of at least ₹10 lakh [5].
• Every application also passes a three-step check: Ministry, then UIDAI, then MeitY [2].
• However, these safeguards protect people only if the process is transparent and the rules are enforced.

On balance, opening up authentication improves ease of living, but it is legitimate only if each use is proportionate to its purpose. The way forward:

• publish all SWIK approvals with their purposes
• fix who is liable under LITE
• guarantee alternatives to Aadhaar
• align the framework with the DPDP Act, 2023

With these steps, Aadhaar can remain a trusted digital public infrastructure that respects the right to privacy under Article 21.