Phase 2 of the fisheries subsidies negotiations tests the principle of Special and Differential Treatment at the WTO. Discuss India's key demands and their justification.

On 20 July 2026, India became the 123rd WTO Member to accept Phase 1 of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (AFS) [2]. Phase 1 bans subsidies for IUU fishing and for fishing overfished stocks. Phase 2 will decide which fuel, gear and vessel subsidies count as harmful, and it is the stage where Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) faces its real test [1].

Why Phase 2 tests S&DT

• Phase 2 targets overcapacity and overfishing. That brings in exactly the input support that developing countries give their small fishers [1].
• Under Article 12, the AFS ends if comprehensive disciplines are not agreed within four years of entry into force. Ministers at MC14 asked for recommendations to be made to MC15 [3].

India's key demands and their justification

• A 25-year transition inside the EEZ for developing countries that do not fish in distant waters. India's fisheries are still developing and need policy space to grow [1].
• A per-fisher subsidy benchmark in place of national totals. India spends about US$15 per fisher, while EU, US and Chinese fleets get US$1,000 or more. A cap on totals would punish India only for having many fishers [1].
• A carve-out for small-scale and artisanal fishers. For them, support pays for safety, subsistence and livelihood security, not industrial expansion [1].
• The strictest rules for distant-water fleets. India has sought a moratorium of at least 25 years on subsidies for fishing beyond the EEZ by Distant Water Fishing Nations, which are mostly the big subsidisers [2].
• Disciplines on non-specific fuel subsidies. Fuel makes up about 22% of global fisheries subsidies, and most of it is non-specific (available to all users, not only fishers). Draft texts that ban only fisher-specific fuel support would let rich fleets escape the rules [4].

Limits of India's position

• A 25-year phase-out does not fit a 4-year sunset clause [3].
• The OECD finds that fuel subsidies are the least effective way to raise fishers' income and the most likely to increase fishing effort [5].

India's demands rest on equity: they separate subsistence support from industrial overcapacity. India would strengthen its case by linking longer transitions to stock assessments and by shifting PMMSY-type support towards safety and monitoring. Leading a coalition of coastal developing countries, starting with BOBP-IGO members, would carry more weight than a single veto. That approach would make S&DT a tool for meeting SDG 14.6 fairly rather than an escape from it.