"The power to punish for contempt is necessary to protect the majesty of courts, but it must not become a tool to silence legitimate dissent." Discuss with reference to Articles 129 and 215 and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Articles 129 and 215 make the Supreme Court and the High Courts courts of record, each with the power to punish contempt of itself [1]. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines and limits this power [2]. The power is justified when it protects the administration of justice. It is not justified when it protects the personal dignity of judges.

Why contempt power protects the majesty of courts

• Enforcing judgments: civil contempt (Sec. 2(b)) punishes wilful disobedience of court orders. Without it, decrees would stay on paper [2].
• Order in the courtroom: criminal contempt (Sec. 2(c)) covers obstructing justice. Sec. 14 allows quick action against contempt "in the face of the court" [2]. For example, the Karnataka HC recently began suo motu contempt proceedings after advocates entered the Chief Justice's court hall and forced out lawyers who were appearing despite a boycott call [3].
• Protecting subordinate courts: the Law Commission's 274th Report kept criminal contempt. It warned that removing it would leave a legislative gap and leave subordinate courts without a remedy [4].

Risks of silencing dissent

• Vague "scandalising" clause: "lowering the authority" of a court is a subjective test. It can discourage honest criticism [2].
• Judge in own cause: the court acts as victim, prosecutor and judge. In the Karnataka case, the Bench includes the Chief Justice whose court was disrupted [3].
• Few outer limits: powers under Articles 129 and 215 exist independently of the Act [4], so statutory safeguards may not fully bind courts.
• Free speech: Article 19(2) allows only reasonable restrictions on speech on the ground of contempt [1].

Safeguards that draw the line

• Sec. 5: fair criticism of a decided case is not contempt. Sec. 13: punishment is allowed only for substantial interference with justice, and truth is a defence if it is in the public interest and raised in good faith [2].
• Sec. 14(2): the accused may ask to be tried by another judge [2].
• Sec. 15: a private person needs the Advocate-General's consent to move criminal contempt, which filters out frivolous cases [2].
• Test: staying away from court is protest. Stopping others from working is obstruction.

Contempt power is therefore a shield for justice, not a sword against critics. Courts should apply the "substantial interference" test strictly, send cases to a different Bench when the judge is personally involved, and narrow the scandalising clause. The State should also address the grievances behind protests, such as advocates' safety. Public confidence earned through restraint upholds the majesty of law and access to justice better than fear does.