"Public trust is the real capital of the Election Commission of India." Discuss the challenges to the ECI's credibility and suggest measures to strengthen its institutional independence.

Article 324 gives the ECI superintendence, direction and control of elections, but its real authority comes from public trust. In October 2026, 42 former judges warned that a "calculated campaign" against the Commission risks "destabilising" democracy [1]. Trust is being worn down from two sides: allegations that are never proven, and gaps in how the institution is designed.

Challenges to the ECI's credibility

• Appointment design: Anoop Baranwal v. UoI (2023) held that appointments should not rest with the Executive alone. The 2023 Act's Selection Committee (PM, a Union Cabinet Minister, Leader of Opposition) gives the government a 2:1 majority, and a Search Committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary prepares the shortlist [2].
• Unequal tenure security: only the CEC has removal protection like an SC judge's (Art 324(5)). The Law Commission's 255th Report sought the same protection for all Election Commissioners [3].
• Unproven allegations: "vote theft" is alleged at press conferences, but no sworn declaration is filed when the ECI asks for one [1].
• EVM scepticism: EVMs are "blamed only after defeat", while victories on the same machines go unquestioned [1]. ADR v. ECI (2024) rejected a return to paper ballots and 100% VVPAT counting [4], yet doubts remain.
• Narrow remedies: election petitions are limited to one constituency and a fixed time window. The EVM memory check is paid for by the candidate [4], so system-wide grievances move to the media.

Measures to strengthen institutional independence

• Neutral selection panel: adopt the 255th Report's collegium of the PM, Leader of Opposition and CJI [3].
• Equal removal protection for all Election Commissioners by amending Art 324(5) [3].
• Permanent independent secretariat to insulate the ECI administratively [3].
• Verifiable transparency: publish electoral-roll deletion lists with reasons, and make the EVM memory check affordable so that ordinary voters and smaller parties can test claims [4].
• Responsible contestation: parties should use sworn complaints and election petitions instead of cycles of public allegation and denial [1].

Credibility is a shared responsibility. The ECI must be seen to be independent, and its critics must prove their claims in law. A neutral appointment collegium, equal tenure security and verifiable processes would turn public trust into an institutional guarantee, securing the constitutional promise of free and fair elections.