Quantum computing threatens today's cryptography while quantum technology offers its remedy. Examine India's preparedness through the National Quantum Mission.
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A large enough quantum computer could break the RSA/ECC encryption that protects UPI, banking, defence and power grids. Adversaries can already "harvest now, decrypt later". Quantum physics also supplies the cure. India's National Quantum Mission (NQM) has made a credible start, but its preparedness is uneven.
Threat and Remedy
- Threat: public-key encryption relies on maths problems such as factoring. Classical computers find these hard, but quantum computers can solve them. Secrets with a long shelf-life are therefore exposed today.
- Quantum Key Distribution (QKD): keys travel as photons, so any attempt to intercept them disturbs the photons and can be detected. It suits fixed, high-value links.
- Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC): new mathematical algorithms that quantum computers cannot break. Because they are software, they can be rolled out to phones and websites.
India's Preparedness: Strengths
- Mission scale: NQM has about ₹6,003 crore for 2023-24 to 2030-31. Its targets include 2,000 km inter-city QKD and computers with 50–1000 physical qubits [1].
- Field results: QNu Labs ran a 500+ km QKD network on existing Army fibre in Rajasthan [2]. NQM has since reached 1,000 km and now supports 17 startups [3].
- Indigenous hardware: single-photon detectors, quantum random number generators and hardware security modules cut import dependence and backdoor risk [4].
- Migration planning: DST's Task Force recommends hybrid PQC + QKD and a phased migration with critical information infrastructure first [5]. C-DOT is building a tool to find quantum-vulnerable algorithms [6].
Gaps
- QKD alone is not enough: it cannot protect billions of end-devices. Most of the work is PQC migration in software, and that is still at the draft-roadmap stage (Feb 2026) [5].
- Certification: a sub-group led by TEC (Telecommunication Engineering Centre, DoT's standards body) is still building testing and certification standards. Until they exist, buyers cannot trust "quantum-safe" claims [5].
- Fragmented governance: NQM funding sits with DST, while certification (TEC) and C-DOT's own product work sit under DoT [5][6].
NQM has given India a real lead on the remedy side: QKD milestones ahead of schedule and indigenous hardware. Being quantum-safe, however, depends on a nationwide PQC migration. The way forward is to finalise the Task Force roadmap with binding sector deadlines set by regulators such as RBI and CERT-In. India also needs working certification labs and one DST–DoT coordination mechanism. Together these would advance Atmanirbhar Bharat and SDG 9, making India both quantum-capable and quantum-secure.
Sources
- 1PIB – National Quantum Mission: India's Quantum LeapNQM outlay, duration, 2,000 km QKD and qubit targets
- 2PIB – Startup supported by DST under NQM demonstrates 500 km Quantum-Safe Network500+ km QKD on existing Army fibre
- 3PIB – National Quantum Mission achieves 1,000-km secure communication milestone1,000 km milestone; 17 startups supported
- 4DST – Quantum Startup: QNu Labs working to build world's first end-to-end quantum-safe heterogeneous networkindigenous SPDs, QRNG, QHSM
- 5DST – Implementation of Quantum Safe Ecosystem in India: Report of the Task Force.pdf) — hybrid PQC+QKD, phased migration, TEC-led certification sub-group
- 6PIB – C-DOT signs agreement with Synergy Quantum for quantum-vulnerable crypto algorithm discovery toolDoT-side PQC migration tooling