·PIB·15 marks·250–350 wordsS&TDefence

Quasi-ballistic missiles like Pralay mark a shift in India's conventional deterrence. Discuss their strategic utility below the nuclear threshold.

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In this answer
  1. Shift in conventional deterrence
  2. Strategic utility below the nuclear threshold
  3. Limitations

Pralay is an indigenous, solid-propellant quasi-ballistic surface-to-surface missile built by DRDO's Research Centre Imarat. Its user-evaluation trial on 5 November 2026 met all objectives, and the release says induction is imminent [1]. The government officially calls it a conventional missile [2]. It gives India a precise strike option between artillery and strategic missiles, which strengthens deterrence without nuclear signalling.

Shift in conventional deterrence

  • Fills a gap: India's options sat between short-range rockets and the Prithvi/Agni family, which was tied to strategic roles. Pralay adds a dedicated conventional tactical layer [2].
  • Hard to intercept: It flies a low, flat path and can manoeuvre in flight. This cuts warning time and makes enemy missile defence harder.
  • Flexible strike range: The July 2025 trials validated both its maximum and minimum range [3]. It can carry "multiple types of warheads against various targets" [4].

Strategic utility below the nuclear threshold

  • Calibrated response: It allows precise strikes on airbases, logistics hubs, command posts and terror launch pads. This suits limited-war situations without crossing the nuclear threshold and stays consistent with No First Use.
  • Deterrence by denial: The threat of fast strikes on forward airfields and bridges raises the cost of salami-slicing along the LAC.
  • Saturation: A salvo launch of two missiles from one launcher [4] can overwhelm air defences.
  • Jointness: Both the Army and the IAF watched the salvo trial [4]. This strengthens the case for an integrated rocket-missile force under theatre commands.
  • Aatmanirbharta: DRDO designs it and BDL produces it as a Development-cum-Production Partner [1]. This secures supply in a long conflict.

Limitations

  • Warhead ambiguity: An adversary may read "multiple warheads" [4] as nuclear, which raises escalation risk when decision time is short.
  • Delays: Induction is still pending five years after the December 2021 maiden test [2], although "near future" induction was promised in 2025 [3].
  • Arms race: Adversaries may build matching tactical missiles, which could destabilise deterrence.

Pralay therefore adds credible, precise rungs to India's escalation ladder below nuclear use. MoD should publicly confirm its conventional-only role, keep it separate from the Strategic Forces Command, place it under joint command and plan BDL production during trials. Done this way, it would strengthen credible minimum deterrence and No First Use while advancing Aatmanirbhar Bharat.

Sources

  1. 1PIB: DRDO conducts successful flight-test of quasi-ballistic missile 'Pralay' (Nov 2026)RCI development, user-evaluation trial, induction imminent, BDL as DcPP
  2. 2PIB: DRDO successfully conducts second flight-test of indigenously developed conventional Surface-to-Surface missile 'Pralay' (Dec 2021)"conventional" designation; December 2021 flight-tests
  3. 3PIB: DRDO successfully conducts two consecutive flight-tests of Pralay missile (Jul 2025)maximum/minimum range validated; "near future" induction
  4. 4PIB: DRDO successfully conducts salvo launch of two Pralay missiles in quick succession (Dec 2025)salvo from one launcher; multiple warhead types; Army and IAF present
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