The 'rarest of rare' doctrine has been criticised as judge-centric. Examine how the Supreme Court has tried to structure sentencing discretion from *Bachan Singh* (1980) to *Manoj* (2022).

In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980), a Constitution Bench upheld the death penalty. It made life imprisonment the rule and kept death for the "rarest of rare" case [1]. Critics call the test judge-centric because it depends on case-by-case judicial balancing. The Court has responded by giving that discretion more structure, not by abandoning it.

Why the doctrine is called judge-centric

• Bhagwati J.'s dissent in Bachan Singh warned that without standards, sentencing would suffer from "arbitrariness and freakishness". He held this violates Articles 14 and 21 [1].
• The Law Commission's 262nd Report (2015) found death sentencing inconsistent and inadequate [2].
• Manoj itself noted a "retributive response to the brutality of the crime" in most cases that reach the appeal stage [2].

How the Court has structured discretion

• Bachan Singh (1980): a death sentence needs recorded "special reasons". The court must weigh the circumstances of the crime and the criminal together [1].
• Machhi Singh (1983): set out categories of crime and a balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating factors.
• Separate hearing on sentence: the Law Commission's 48th Report (1972) led to Section 235(2) CrPC. Allauddin Mian (1989) required the sentencing hearing to be held on a later date [1].
• Manoj (2022): set "practical guidelines". The State must give the trial court a psychiatric evaluation, a social history and a jail-conduct report of the accused [2].
• Dupare (2025): under Article 32, a death sentence passed in clear breach of Manoj can be reopened [2].

Trajectory: principle (1980) → categories (1983) → hearing (1989) → evidence about the accused (2022) → enforcement (2025)

Persisting gaps

• Conflicting benches: the Dagdu line of cases allows sentencing on the day of conviction. The question was referred to a five-judge bench in 2022 and is still undecided [1].
• Mitigation neglected: Manoj found "little to no policy-driven change" in how mitigating material is collected, four decades after Bachan Singh [1].
• Capacity gaps: in Dupare, the legal-aid lawyer was absent and the accused's brain injury was never diagnosed, so no court ever considered either [2].

The Court has moved from an abstract principle to an evidence-based procedure, steadily narrowing subjective discretion. Next, the Constitution Bench should settle when the sentencing hearing must happen. Parliament should write Manoj's framework into law, as the Court itself urged [2], and back it with legal aid and prison reform. Only then will "rarest of rare" keep Article 21's promise of fair procedure and respect for the dignity of human life.