·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 words

Recorded dissent within the Election Commission raises questions about collegial decision-making in multi-member constitutional bodies. Discuss.

In this answer
  1. Why collegiality matters
  2. Questions raised by the dissent
  3. Wider implications

Article 324(2) makes the Election Commission of India (ECI) a multi-member body. The CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023 requires the Commission to decide unanimously "as far as possible", and otherwise by majority [3]. Two Election Commissioners recorded objections 14 times in 10 months to decisions on the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) [1]. This shows a gap between how the ECI is meant to decide and how it actually decides.

Why collegiality matters

  • Check on concentrated power: in T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995), the Supreme Court upheld a multi-member ECI that decides by majority, so that one officer does not control elections alone.
  • Better decisions on high-stakes matters: the SIR is carried out under Art. 324 and Sec. 21 of the RP Act, 1950. It decides who is on the roll, so it directly affects the right to vote [2]. Several members deliberating together reduces errors.

Questions raised by the dissent

  • The majority was never used: ECs Sandhu and Joshi objected to changes in Form 6 and to an ECINet declaration about voters' ancestry [1]. They were two of three members, yet the decisions stood. Former CEC O.P. Rawat said they should have annulled the decisions at the next meeting instead of stopping at dissent notes [1].
  • Unequal protection: under the Art. 324(5) proviso, the CEC can be removed only like a Supreme Court judge. An EC can be removed on the CEC's recommendation. An EC who outvotes the CEC therefore takes a personal risk, which discourages dissent.
  • Opacity: the ECI lists transparency as an SIR objective [2]. Yet the split became public only through the media [1].
  • Correction shifts to the courts: in ADR v. ECI (2026 INSC 564), it took the Supreme Court to secure publication of the lists of excluded voters [4]. The ECI's internal checks had not done this.

Wider implications

  • Many multi-member bodies depend on collective judgment, such as the UPSC, the Finance Commission and the Information Commissions. If the chairperson dominates, they work like one-member bodies in practice.
  • Dissent itself is healthy, as dissenting judgments show. The problem arises when dissent has no effect on the decision.

Way forward: frame written rules of business by unanimous decision, as the 2023 Act allows [3]. Publish dissent notes. Give ECs the same protection from removal as the CEC, as the Law Commission's 255th Report recommended.

Recorded dissent shows that the ECI still debates internally. However, shared decision-making is real only when the majority actually decides and dissent is made public. Clear procedures, equal protection for all members and openness would restore the plural ECI that Article 324 intended. That, in turn, protects free and fair elections, which are part of the Constitution's basic structure.

Sources

  1. 1The Hindu, "SIR made so many eligible electors lose vote for the first time, says former CEC" (1 Oct 2026, news/interview)14 objections by ECs Sandhu and Joshi over 10 months; Form 6 and ECINet issues; Rawat's view that the majority should have annulled the decisions (the article page could not be fetched, so this links to the domain root)
  2. 2PIB, "ECI to begin Special Intensive Revision of Electoral Rolls in Bihar"SIR under Art. 324 and Sec. 21 of the RP Act, 1950; transparency as a stated objective
  3. 3The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 — India Codedecisions unanimous "as far as possible", otherwise by majority; rules of business set by unanimous decision
  4. 4Supreme Court of India, *Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India*, 2026 INSC 564 (27 May 2026)court scrutiny of the Bihar SIR, including publication of the excluded-voter lists

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