Redundancy without independence is no redundancy. Discuss this with reference to recent failure analyses of Indian space missions.

In engineering, redundancy means having a backup path that takes over when the main one fails. The backup only helps if it cannot fail for the same reason. When one fault knocks out both paths, it is a common-mode failure. ISRO's failure analysis of NVS-02 shows that this dictum is largely true.

How the dictum played out: the NVS-02 failure

• Shared part, double failure: the Apex Committee found that the drive signal never reached the oxidiser-line pyro valve of the orbit-raising engine. The likely cause was a loose contact in one connector shared by the main and redundant paths [1].
• Cost of the failure: NVS-02 was left in a 170 × 37,785 km transfer orbit and never reached its working orbit [1]. Its two paths offered only paper redundancy.
• The same weakness in the fleet: IRNSS-1F's procured atomic clock stopped on 13 March 2026, just after its 10-year design life ended [2]. Because NVS-02 was lost, no replacement was ready.
• Diversity as independence: NVS-02 carried a mix of indigenous and procured clocks [3], and NVS-01 flew India's first indigenous atomic clock [5]. Different designs are less likely to fail the same way.

Where the dictum needs qualification

• Partial value remains: paths that share a part still protect against random faults in the parts they do not share. The dictum overstates the case.
• Independence has costs: separate harnesses and connectors add mass and complexity. Engineers trade them off and cannot make every path fully separate.
• Removing the failure point: NVS-03 flew with three pyro valves already open. A committee chaired by A.S. Kiran Kumar cleared this only after vibration and shock tests [4]. The fix removes the single point of failure but brings a new risk that had to be tested.
• Institutional response: the Apex Committee's corrective actions flew on CMS-03 (2 November 2025), and its pyro systems worked as expected [1].

Way forward

• Audit every critical system for hidden shared parts, not just this valve.
• Keep spare satellites in orbit and use different clock designs.
• Publish failure findings faster.

Recent failure analyses show that redundancy is only as strong as the independence between its paths. ISRO should design paths that are physically and functionally separate, and build up spare satellites in orbit. That would give India's navigation system real resilience and support the strategic autonomy that NavIC is meant to provide.