"The 'resign-and-recontest' strategy has rendered the Tenth Schedule toothless." Critically examine, and suggest reforms.

The Tenth Schedule (52nd Amendment, 1985) disqualifies legislators who voluntarily give up party membership or defy the whip. The presiding officer decides these cases [2]. In 2026, AIADMK MLAs from Dharapuram and Madurantakam resigned weeks after the April Assembly polls and joined the ruling TVK. The TVK then won both bypolls [1]. This shows a gap in the law, though it does not make the law fully toothless.

How the strategy weakens the law

• Pre-emptive exit: The law disqualifies only sitting members. A member who resigns before switching parties is never caught, so the "Aaya Ram Gaya Ram" problem has simply moved outside the House [2].
• No cooling-off bar: Nothing stops a defector from being renominated at once. The mandate voters gave to a party label can be reversed within months [1].
• Speaker's discretion: Under Art. 190(3)(b), a resignation takes effect only when the Speaker accepts it as voluntary and genuine [6]. Partisan Speakers accept resignations quickly or sit on petitions. The Supreme Court therefore set a three-month outer limit for disqualification petitions in Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) [4].
• Engineered majorities: Bypolls favour the ruling party. Resignations can thus be used to shift the balance of a House, while taxpayers pay for repeat elections.

Why the law still has teeth

• Voters decide: A defector must face the voters again. This is more democratic than switching parties while keeping the seat.
• Real costs: Resigning means losing the seat and risking defeat. This discourages large-scale floor-crossing.
• Judicial review: Kihoto Hollohan (1992) made the Speaker's decisions subject to review by the courts [3]. The whip and disqualification still hold members in check inside the House [2].

Reforms

• Bar members who resign from contesting by-elections, or from holding ministerial office, for the rest of the House's term.
• Follow the Law Commission's 255th Report: let the President or Governor decide on ECI advice instead of the Speaker [5].
• Set fixed deadlines for accepting resignations, and make reasons public.
• Make defectors bear the cost of the bypoll, and limit the anti-defection whip to confidence and money votes.

The strategy does not make the Tenth Schedule toothless, but it does expose a gap the law never addressed. Barring resigning members from re-contesting, plus an independent body to decide cases, would close that gap. That would make the law match its constitutional purpose: protecting the people's mandate.