Why do responses to central legislation vary among States? Illustrate with the recent mining amendment.

The Seventh Schedule (Article 246) divides powers between the Union and the States, but a single central law does not affect every State equally. How a State responds depends on what it stands to lose or gain, and only partly on constitutional principle. The MMDR Amendment Act, 2026 shows this clearly [1].

Why State responses vary

• Fiscal stake: States that depend heavily on the revenue a law touches resist it most.
• Political alignment: States ruled by the Centre's party tend to accept its reasons. Opposition-ruled States tend to see the law as central overreach.
• Constitutional reading: States differ on whether a law encroaches on the State List.
• Development priorities: some States want investors and value uniform rules. Others put their own welfare spending first.
• Consultation: States that were not consulted are more likely to oppose the law.

Illustration: MMDR Amendment Act, 2026

• Background: in MADA v. SAIL (2024), a nine-judge bench held by 8:1 that royalty is not a tax. States could therefore tax mineral rights under Entry 50 and mineral-bearing land under Entry 49, List II [2]. A later order let them recover dues from April 2005 in phased instalments [3].
• What the Act does: the Centre sets the parameters that define "mineral-bearing land". States cannot levy taxes on mineral rights or mineral-bearing land except under conditions the Centre sets. Unpaid past dues are deemed invalid [4].
• Mineral-rich States such as Jharkhand and Odisha lose both their future tax base and arrears they had only just become able to collect. Their opposition is the strongest [1][4].
• States with few minerals lose mainly a principle, so their reaction is milder [1].
• The political divide: opposition-ruled States call the Act an attack on their fiscal autonomy. States aligned with the Centre stress the Centre's case: a uniform, predictable tax regime with no new levies imposed after mining has begun [1][4].
• Legal grounds for challenge: PRS flags three issues [5]:
• Parliament may lack the power to limit State taxes on land (Entry 49).
• Firms that already paid get no refund while defaulters are let off, which raises an Article 14 concern.
• The Act gives no guiding principles for the Centre's conditions, which may amount to excessive delegation.

Each State's response therefore comes from its revenue dependence, its politics and its reading of the Constitution. The Act's goal of predictability is valid. It would draw wider acceptance if Parliament wrote a rate band into the law, honoured the Court's phased-recovery plan [3] and agreed limits with States through forums like the Inter-State Council (Article 263). That would keep the reform within cooperative federalism.