·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 wordsPolityS&T

The role of NewSpace India Limited (NSIL) in commercialising India's space sector has been questioned following back-to-back PSLV mission failures. Examine the governance architecture of India's space sector and suggest reforms to ensure mission reliability.

In this answer
  1. Governance architecture: strengths
  2. Weaknesses exposed
  3. Reforms

India's space sector rests on a four-body architecture — the Department of Space, ISRO (research and launch), NSIL (commerce) and IN-SPACe (authorisation) — formalised by the Indian Space Policy, 2023 [3]. The failure of PSLV-C62 (12 January 2026), coming after PSLV-C61/EOS-09 (18 May 2025) with both anomalies in the solid-fuelled third stage (PS3), tests whether this architecture separates promotion from assurance [1][2].

Governance architecture: strengths

  • Functional separation: ISRO builds capability, NSIL — a Schedule 'A' company under the Department of Space since 2019 — monetises it, and IN-SPACe authorises private actors, ending ISRO's conflicted role as player and regulator [4][3].
  • Demand-driven commercialisation: NSIL's mandate to run end-to-end commercial missions has expanded industry participation and drawn foreign customers [4].
  • Accountability practice: ISRO constituted a Failure Analysis Committee promptly after C61, and its Chairman disclosed the C62 anomaly publicly the same day [2][1].

Weaknesses exposed

  • No independent mission-assurance regulator: IN-SPACe promotes and supervises; PSLV quality control remains internal to ISRO, so a repeat PS3 anomaly went uncaught [3].
  • Commercial cadence vs. rigour: a "one mission a month" target sits uneasily with unresolved root causes; C62 was itself the return-to-flight mission [2].
  • Strategic cost: EOS-N1 was built for strategic purposes, so reliability lapses erode surveillance capacity, not merely revenue [1].

Reforms

  • Create an independent mission-assurance authority, insulated from launch schedules, with power to clear each return-to-flight.
  • Make failure-committee findings and closure actions publicly reportable, as with aviation accident inquiries.
  • Institutionalise third-stage requalification and supplier audits across the private component chain before resuming cadence.

Two failures in a workhorse with over sixty successes reflect a governance gap, not technological decline. Aligning NSIL's commercial ambition with an empowered assurance function — and letting reliability, not the calendar, set launch dates — would restore confidence in India's bid to be a trusted global launch provider.

Sources

  1. 1PSLV-C62 strays from flight path, fails to launch satellite — The Hindu (13 Jan 2026)PSLV-C62 launch date, PS3 roll-rate anomaly, EOS-N1's strategic purpose
  2. 2ISRO forms probe panel after PSLV-C61 glitch leaves EOS-09 off target — News on Air (Prasar Bharati)Failure Analysis Committee; one-mission-a-month plan; C62 as return-to-flight
  3. 3Indian Space Policy 2023 — IN-SPACeroles of DoS, ISRO, NSIL and IN-SPACe; single-window authorisation and supervision
  4. 4About Us — NewSpace India LimitedNSIL incorporated 2019, Schedule 'A' company, end-to-end demand-driven commercial mandate
  5. 5PSLV-C61/EOS-09 Mission — ISROPSLV-C61 launch on 18 May 2025 and third-stage failure
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