Security of tenure of the Chief Election Commissioner is both a shield for independence and a hurdle to accountability. Critically examine in light of the 2023 Act and *Anoop Baranwal*.

Under Article 324(5), the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) can be removed only "in like manner and on the like grounds" as a Supreme Court judge [1]. This strong tenure protects the referee of Indian elections. However, it builds trust only when the appointment itself is seen as neutral.

Tenure as a shield for independence

• Insulation from the executive: removal needs proved misbehaviour or incapacity, an inquiry and a special majority in both Houses (Art. 124(4)). A government cannot remove a CEC whose decisions it dislikes.
• Protection for colleagues: Election Commissioners can be removed only on the CEC's recommendation [1], which shields the whole Commission.
• Statutory continuity: the 2023 Act keeps the judge-like removal protection [3].

Tenure as a hurdle to accountability

• Near-impossible threshold: disputed administrative choices, such as electoral-roll revisions, are hard to prove as "misbehaviour". A loss of public trust therefore has no formal remedy.
• Dissent moves to the street: the October 2026 Left-led campaign in Delhi to oust CEC Gyanesh Kumar [4] shows distrust spilling onto the streets when institutional remedies are effectively closed.
• Internal asymmetry: Election Commissioners have weaker protection than the CEC, which may create dependence within the Commission.

Appointment: the missing link

• Anoop Baranwal (2023): a Constitution Bench directed that a PM–LoP–CJI committee would advise on appointments until Parliament legislated [2]. This ended the executive's sole control over appointments.
• 2023 Act: replaced the CJI with a Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM [3]. This gives the government a built-in 2–1 majority, and PRS flagged the risk of executive dominance [3].
• Result: strong removal protection on top of a one-sided appointment ends up protecting the appointee rather than the independence of the office.

Neutral appointment   + secure tenure → independence + public trust
Executive-led choice  + secure tenure → entrenchment + distrust

Fig.: Tenure's effect depends on how the CEC is appointed

Security of tenure is therefore necessary but not sufficient. Its value depends on how the CEC is chosen. A balanced selection panel of the kind Anoop Baranwal envisaged [2] would let tenure remain a shield while public trust supplies accountability. So would equal removal protection for all Election Commissioners and reasoned, transparent ECI decisions. Together, these would uphold free and fair elections, which are part of the Constitution's basic structure.