Selective enforcement of judicial directives risks undermining cooperative federalism. Analyse in the context of the recent dispute over DGP appointments.

Under the Constitution, police is a State subject [2]. Even so, in Prakash Singh v. Union of India (2006) the Supreme Court set rules for appointing the DGP to keep police leadership free of political influence [3]. The Centre has now challenged only Jharkhand's 2025 Head of Police Regulation [1]. This shows how enforcing a neutral reform against some States but not others can make it a source of Centre–State conflict.

The dispute: where selectivity arises

• The directive: the DGP must be chosen from the three senior-most UPSC-empanelled officers and serve at least two years, whatever the retirement date [3].
• Centre's case: Jharkhand's Regulation and its appointment of Tadasha Mishra, its first woman DGP, breach Prakash Singh [1].
• Jharkhand's reply: the Centre shows "special affection" for Jharkhand while Bihar has "worse" laws. West Bengal's DGP was appointed by the ECI in March 2026 [1].

How selective enforcement erodes cooperative federalism

• Trust deficit: if only Opposition-ruled States are targeted, the reform looks like a political weapon. States then become less willing to cooperate.
• Shared control over the IPS: the Centre already handles All India Services matters (Art. 312). Selective challenges therefore deepen fears of central overreach.
• Weaker directives: whether a State complies comes to depend on who chooses to sue, not on a common standard.
• Neglected priorities: State police had 24% of posts vacant (about 5.5 lakh) in 2016 [2]. The Centre and States need to work together on capacity, not fight in court.

The counterpoint

• Another State's violation does not make Jharkhand's legal. Every State had compliance deadlines from 2006–07 [3]. Selectivity is a federalism problem, not a legal defence.
• The Second ARC found that ministers misused police "for personal and political reasons" [2]. Checks on the executive therefore remain necessary.

Way forward

• Uniform judicial scrutiny: the SC's move to examine DGP laws across States [1] should test each one against the same tests: the UPSC panel and the two-year tenure [3].
• Statutory insulation: States should pass police laws that limit executive control, as the Second ARC urged [2].

Selective enforcement turns a shared goal, neutral policing, into a contest that one side must lose. Even-handed scrutiny led by the Court, together with police laws that States themselves own, can rebuild trust. This would reconcile the federal design of the Seventh Schedule with the rule of law and advance SDG 16 (strong institutions).