"Separation of powers in India is functional, not watertight." Examine this with reference to the advisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and to interaction between Parliament and the judiciary.

The Constitution never expressly states the separation of powers. Article 50 separates only the judiciary from the executive. The Supreme Court read the doctrine into the Basic Structure in Kesavananda Bharati (1973). India therefore follows a functional model: each organ keeps its core function, but the organs check and cooperate with one another.

Why the separation is functional, not watertight

• Overlaps that the Constitution allows: Parliament can remove judges (Art. 124(4)), courts review laws (Art. 13), and the executive makes delegated legislation.
• Limits that protect each core function: Arts. 121/211 bar legislatures from discussing a judge's conduct, and Art. 122 stops courts from questioning parliamentary proceedings.

Advisory jurisdiction: a structured overlap

• Under Art. 143, the President can seek the Supreme Court's opinion on questions of public importance. This lets the judiciary help even before a law is made [1].
• It comes with safeguards. Only the President can refer a question, a Bench hears arguments, and the opinion is reasoned and public. It is also non-binding (e.g., In re Kerala Education Bill, 1958).

Parliament–judiciary interaction: the ONOE JPC row

• The JPC on the simultaneous polls Bills planned a study tour to meet the CJI and Supreme Court judges. It was cancelled after Kapil Sibal called it unconstitutional [1].
• DMK MP P. Wilson defended the visit. He said the Constitution "does not establish three isolated islands" and cited the 1948 consultation with Federal Court judges on the Draft Constitution, as well as Art. 143 [1].
• Judicial expertise is available without involving sitting judges. The Kovind Committee invited former CJIs and former High Court Chief Justices [2], and the JPC met former CJI B.R. Gavai [3].

Where functionality ends

• PRS has flagged weak points in the Bill: a lower threshold for postponing elections than Art. 356, and the risk of a State being left without an Assembly [4]. These make a Basic Structure challenge likely. Sitting judges who give views informally beforehand may later face calls to step aside from the case (recusal).
• The 1948 precedent came before the Constitution's text could be reviewed by the courts. Art. 143 actually shows that contact is allowed only through a formal, open channel.

The separation of powers in India is functional: the organs cooperate through set channels while court decisions stay protected from outside influence. Going forward, the Presiding Officers should write rules for how committees engage the judiciary, for example consulting only retired judges on pending Bills, and the government should use Art. 143 when it wants the Court's formal view. This would protect judicial independence, itself part of the Basic Structure, while still allowing well-informed law-making.