Does the shift from MGNREGA to VB-G RAM G mark a move from a rights-based to a scheme-based welfare model? Discuss its implications for rural workers and Centre–state relations.

MGNREGA (2005) turned the Article 41 goal of a right to work into a demand-driven, justiciable guarantee, with open-ended central funding for wages. The VB-G RAM G Act, 2025 raises the guarantee to 125 days but ties it to a normative allocation [1]. The shift is substantial, though not complete: a legal right is moving towards a budget-bound scheme.

Rights-based to scheme-based: the shift

• Supply-capped: the Centre fixes state-wise allocations, and states bear any spending above them [1]. Demand no longer automatically brings funds.
• Centrally sponsored design: cost-sharing replaces the Centre's near-full liability for wages [1].
• Executive discretion: states notify a pause of up to 60 days in the sowing and harvest seasons, so work is not available on demand all year [1].
• Rights retained: statutory status, unemployment allowance, Gram Sabha social audits and automatic escalation of grievances not resolved within 15 days [1][2]. The model is therefore a hybrid, not a full replacement.

Implications for rural workers

• Positive: more days guaranteed (100 to 125) [1], and complaints are logged digitally within fixed timelines.
• Negative: once the allocation runs out, demand may go unmet, especially during the lean season.
• Weaker accountability: the final grievance rules dropped the draft's mandatory FIR for financial irregularities and the requirement to place action-taken reports (ATRs) before local bodies [3]. Social audits covered only 67% of Gram Panchayats in 2024-25 [4].
• Unpaid entitlements: in Assam, most of the approved compensation for delayed wages was still unpaid [5].

Implications for Centre–state relations

• Fiscal burden: a 60:40 cost split (90:10 for North-eastern and Himalayan states) [1] puts pressure on states with weaker finances. Poorer states face the highest demand and have the least fiscal room.
• Centralised design, decentralised liability: the Centre sets the allocations, but states run the grievance and audit machinery and absorb any overruns [1].
• Political friction: some opposition-ruled states have objected to the Act, which strains cooperative federalism.

In short, VB-G RAM G keeps the wording of a guarantee while adding fiscal limits that make it work more like a scheme. To keep the rights-based character, the allocation should be adjusted to actual demand, the FIR clause restored with a clear threshold, ATRs placed before Gram Sabhas, and Social Audit Units fully staffed [4]. Together these would protect the dignity of labour under Article 41 and support SDG 8 (decent work) through genuinely cooperative federalism.