Should assurances given by the government on the floor of Parliament bind later governments? Discuss with reference to parliamentary accountability mechanisms.

Under Article 75(3) the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha. Assurances given on the floor of the House are a daily form of that responsibility. In 2003 the government promised to keep at least 50% of IDBI, but the promise was never made law. That promise now faces a 60.72% sale to Fairfax [1][2], which tests whether such pledges bind later governments. They should bind politically, though not legally.

Why assurances should bind successors

• The State continues across governments: Parliament deals with "the Government", not with a party. As the Opposition put it, a promise to Parliament is "a promise made to the people" [1].
• Legislative trust: Members often drop a question or a demand because a minister has given an assurance. If successors can ignore those assurances, debate in the House loses its value.
• Institutional follow-up: The Committee on Government Assurances checks whether assurances are carried out and rules on requests to drop them. The Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs tables action-taken statements [3].
• Quiet erosion: By 2021 the government directly held only 45.48% of IDBI and LIC held 49.24% [4]. The House was never formally asked to account for the 2003 line being crossed.

Why they cannot bind absolutely

• Parliamentary sovereignty: No government can tie its successor's hands. Only a statute binds, and the 2003 assurance was never legislated [1].
• Changed circumstances: IDBI went from losses to a profit of over ₹9,000 crore [1]. The P.J. Nayak Committee (2014) recommended bringing the government's stake in banks below 51% [5].
• Democratic mandate: New governments are elected to change policy. The 2021 sale approval was a Cabinet decision [4], which lies within the executive's powers.
• Safeguards built in: The sale price of ₹81 a share was above the benchmark price. The government keeps 15% and LIC keeps 19%, and the RBI must still clear the buyer [2].

Strengthening accountability mechanisms

• When a policy assurance is reversed, the ministry should have to make a mandatory statement before the Committee.
• Assurances that change ownership or rights should be put into law.
• Question Hour, short-duration discussions and department-related standing committees should review such reversals within a fixed time.

Assurances bind as a matter of parliamentary morality, not law. They should not freeze policy, but no government should abandon one silently. A government that formally accounts before Parliament for every assurance it drops keeps the flexibility to govern and still honours collective responsibility and the constitutional value of executive accountability.