Should courts decide constitutional/legal References that have been rendered academic by subsequent legislative repeal? Discuss with reference to the BWSSB Reference.

A Reference turns "academic" when the statute it interprets ceases to exist. The nine-judge Bench in State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh (20 August 2026), decided after the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 stood repealed, shows that such References should still be answered — but only to the extent live rights survive the repeal [1].

Why courts should answer such References

• Repeal is rarely retrospective: thousands of disputes filed under the old law remain pending, so the Bench held the triple test of Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa (1978) will continue to govern all pending disputes under the repealed ID Act [1].
• Institutional duty to settle doubt: the correctness of BWSSB was doubted in 2005 and escalated to a nine-judge Bench in 2017; leaving a precedent doubted-but-unreviewed for two decades breeds litigation and inconsistent tribunal rulings [1].
• Doctrinal continuity: successor statutes borrow older concepts, so reasoned clarity aids interpretation of the new Industrial Relations Code, 2020 [3].

Why restraint is argued

• Courts decide a lis, not hypotheticals; ruling on a dead provision risks pronouncements without real adversarial stake.
• It sits uneasily with legislative supersession — the IRC, 2020, enforced from 21 November 2025, repealed the ID Act 1947, Trade Unions Act 1926 and Standing Orders Act 1946 as a deliberate policy choice [2][3].
• Nine judges' time is a scarce constitutional resource amid heavy pendency.

The calibrated middle path adopted

• By a 5:4 majority, the Court preserved the triple test's core, confined its refinements to prospective operation, and left concluded and pending matters undisturbed; it expressly directed that "industry" under the IRC be read independently of BWSSB [1].

Thus the answer is neither a blanket yes nor no: courts should decide such References where transitional rights, doctrinal certainty or pending litigation demand it, while disclaiming authority over the new law. This balance respects both judicial finality and Parliament's legislative supremacy — the essence of separation of powers.