Should the test for restricting religious symbols in public institutions be based on 'essentiality to religion' or on 'reasonableness of restriction on individual rights'? Elaborate with examples.

Article 25 protects freedom of conscience and religion, subject to public order, morality and health [1]. Which practices qualify is filtered through the judicially-evolved "essential religious practice" (ERP) test of the Shirur Mutt case, 1954 [2]. Essentiality is a weak primary test; reasonableness of restriction should govern, with ERP left a narrow role.

Merits of the essentiality test

• Separates the core of faith from mere custom — only practices whose removal alters a religion's fundamental character get protection [2].
• Enables social reform under Article 25(2)(b): in Sabarimala (2018), exclusion of women was held not essential to the faith [4].
• Gives institutions predictability: the Karnataka HC (2022) upheld uniform prescriptions, and the Allahabad HC (21 August 2026) followed it, holding the hijab not essential to Islam and prior tolerance no vested right [5][3].

Why essentiality is unsatisfactory

• Casts judges as theologians, interpreting scripture rather than adjudicating rights.
• It is legally unsettled: the Supreme Court's split verdict in Aishat Shifa (2022) referred the matter to a larger bench, still pending [3].
• Justice Dhulia held the ERP test inapplicable to an individual's claim against the State [3].
• It is all-or-nothing — a practice is either absolutely protected or wholly unprotected, with no middle ground; and the burden of proving doctrine falls on a schoolgirl risking loss of education.

Why reasonableness is the better lens

• It locates the claim in individual autonomy — Articles 14, 19(1)(a) and 21; the Allahabad petitioner invoked Articles 14 and 19(1)(a), not 25 [1][5].
• Articles 19(2)–(6) supply a tested proportionality framework: legitimate aim (discipline, safety, order) and least-restrictive means [1].
• Reasonable accommodation is already constitutional practice — Explanation I to Article 25 deems the kirpan part of Sikh profession [1].

Thus, reasonableness should be the primary test, with essentiality confined to Article 26 disputes where a denomination's doctrine genuinely needs identification. An early larger-bench ruling would replace ad hoc litigation with a principled standard, harmonising institutional discipline with the constitutional promise of dignity and inclusive education.