·PIB·15 marks·250–350 words

"Signing FTAs is necessary but not sufficient." Discuss with reference to preference utilisation and non-tariff barriers in India's trade with ASEAN members such as Thailand.

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In this answer
  1. Why signing is necessary
  2. Why it is not sufficient: low preference utilisation
  3. Why it is not sufficient: non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
  4. Way forward

A Free Trade Agreement (FTA) cuts tariffs on paper. The gains come only when exporters actually claim those cuts and regulatory barriers are removed. India–Thailand trade reached USD 21.49 billion in FY 2025–26 (+12.6%) [1]. It shows both what FTAs can do and how far implementation still lags.

Why signing is necessary

  • Market access: the bilateral Early Harvest Scheme and the ASEAN–India goods pact (AITIGA) give tariff preferences. Thailand alone accounts for 16.7% of India–ASEAN trade [1].
  • Institutional platform: FTAs create review forums such as the Joint Trade Committee (JTC), revived in 2020 after a 17-year gap [2].
  • Strategic anchor: FTAs give economic substance to the Act East Policy.

Why it is not sufficient: low preference utilisation

  • Exporters skip the concessions when rules of origin are complex and certificate-of-origin costs exceed the duty saved [3].
  • A Parliamentary Standing Committee found low FTA use, weak awareness, and imports from partners growing faster than Indian exports [3].
  • So rising total trade can hide a widening trade deficit. NITI Aayog reports weak exports to ASEAN and a growing gap with FTA partners [4].
  • India says the AITIGA review must correct inequitable tariff concessions that harmed domestic industry [5].

Why it is not sufficient: non-tariff barriers (NTBs)

  • Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) restrictions on India's marine, poultry and meat exports were raised at the 13th JTC [2] and are still on the 14th JTC's agenda [1]. Duties may be zero, yet the goods stay blocked.
  • Certification and regulatory requirements work as hidden tariffs [1].
  • Payment friction: the UPI–PromptPay link and local-currency settlement between RBI and the Bank of Thailand are still under discussion [1].

Way forward

  • Use the annual exchange of preference-utilisation data agreed at the 14th JTC [1], and publish it product by product for exporters.
  • Expand the Common Digital Platform for Certificate of Origin [6].
  • Seek mutual recognition of India's SPS certification, backed by science-based surveillance data as the WTO SPS Agreement requires.
  • Conclude the AITIGA review early, with tighter rules of origin to stop goods from third countries being routed through ASEAN.

FTAs open the door, but utilisation, regulatory alignment and payment connectivity decide whether Indian exporters use it. An implementation-first approach can turn India–Thailand trade into balanced, mutually beneficial growth. That approach means JTC monitoring based on data, digital origin certification and recognition of SPS standards. It would advance Act East and SDG 17's goal of fair trade partnerships.

Sources

  1. 1PIB: India and Thailand Review Bilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation at 14th Joint Trade Committee Meeting in Nonthaburi, Thailand (16 Nov 2026)trade figures, 16.7% share, NTB/SPS agenda, utilisation-data exchange, UPI–PromptPay, RBI–Bank of Thailand
  2. 2Department of Commerce: 13th Joint Trade Committee meeting of India and Thailand held in New DelhiJTC revived in 2020 after 17 years; restrictions on marine, poultry and meat exports
  3. 3Standing Committee on Chemicals & Fertilizers (2020–21), 16th Report, Digital Library of Parliamentlow FTA use, complex rules of origin, compliance costs, imports outpacing exports
  4. 4NITI Aayog: Trade Watch Quarterly (FY 2025–26 editions)weak exports to ASEAN, widening deficit with FTA partners
  5. 5PIB: 2024 Year End Review, Department of CommerceAITIGA review to address inequitable concessions and injury to domestic industry
  6. 6Department of Commerce Annual Report 2024–25Common Digital Platform for Certificate of Origin

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