"The Speaker's role as a Tribunal under the Tenth Schedule has undermined the anti-defection law." Critically examine this in light of recent judicial pronouncements.

The Tenth Schedule makes the Speaker a quasi-judicial Tribunal for deciding disqualification petitions [1]. On 28 September 2026, the Supreme Court asked the West Bengal Speaker to decide the Trinamool factional petitions by 8 October [1]. That request shows the design flaw. A presiding officer who belongs to a party controls both what the decision is and when it comes.

How the Tribunal role has weakened the law

• No deadline in the law: the Schedule gives no time limit, and courts cannot step in until the Speaker decides [2]. A Speaker who does nothing therefore faces no review.
• Delay as a tool: a Manipur petition against a defector who became a minister stayed pending for three years. The Supreme Court removed him in 2020 [3].
• Partisan pressure: Speakers have been pressured to delay petitions against MLAs who keep governments in power [2].
• Clash with the Election Commission: in Bengal, the petitions stayed pending while the EC froze the party symbol. Counsel called this a "pattern" that gives rebels interim relief [1].
• Politics over law: the Rajasthan defection litigation was simply abandoned once the political crisis ended [4].

Why the charge is only partly valid

• Judicial review survives: in 1992 the Supreme Court struck down the clause that barred courts from reviewing the Speaker's decision, in Kihoto Hollohan [2].
• Court-set timelines: Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) fixed three months as the "reasonable time" [1]. The 2026 order applies that standard.
• A workable limit: the Rajya Sabha Chairman decided the Sharad Yadav–Ali Anwar case within three months [3].
• Separation of powers: the Court only expressed "hope" that the Speaker would follow Meghachandra [1]. This shows respect for the legislature's autonomy.

Assessment and way forward The real problem is the Speaker's unchecked control over timing, not the Tribunal role itself. A court's "hope" with no consequence attached sends petitioners back to court.

• Write the three-month limit into the Tenth Schedule, as the Supreme Court and the Rajya Sabha Chairman have recommended [3].
• Set a consequence for missing the deadline, for example the court or an independent tribunal deciding the petition itself, as Meghachandra suggested.
• Limit the party whip to votes that decide whether the government survives. Fewer votes would then carry the penalty of disqualification [4].

The Tribunal model has been weakened mainly by Speakers delaying decisions, and courts have only partly corrected this. A legal time limit and a neutral decision-maker would restore the Schedule's purpose, which is stable and principled representation.