·PIB·15 marks·250–350 wordsPolityEconomyS&T

Technology-driven targeting in PDS reduces leakages but risks exclusion. Critically analyse with reference to Aadhaar seeding and e-KYC.

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In this answer
  1. How Aadhaar seeding and e-KYC reduce leakages
  2. How they risk exclusion

Technology-driven targeting in the TPDS works as a chain: digitised ration cards → Aadhaar seeding → biometric e-KYC at ePoS-enabled Fair Price Shops (FPSs). This chain has made NFSA, 2013 entitlements checkable and portable. But when the identity check fails, a legal right can become a denied meal.

How Aadhaar seeding and e-KYC reduce leakages

  • De-duplication: "Rightful Targeting" uses Aadhaar-linked data analytics to flag and delete duplicate or ineligible cards. This cuts inclusion errors [1].
  • Verification at the point of sale: ePoS devices cover 99.8% of FPSs, and e-KYC covers 71.52 crore beneficiaries (91%). This curbs ghost and proxy withdrawals [1].
  • Makes portability possible: one shared identity layer lets any FPS serve any cardholder under ONORC. Over 233 crore portability transactions have taken place [1].
  • Work still pending: duplicate and bogus cards are still flagged as weakening PDS reach, which justifies continued verification [2].

How they risk exclusion

  • Biometric failure: the 2026 Standing Committee found fingerprint checks repeatedly failing for elderly persons and manual labourers, the very people PDS exists for [3].
  • Connectivity: poor network stops online authentication, even for genuine claimants [3].
  • No diagnosis: CAG (2021) found that UIDAI had no system to analyse why authentication fails [4].
  • Remaining gap: about 9% of beneficiaries still lack e-KYC. Against 80.6 crore identified beneficiaries, that is several crore people. The deadlines have also been extended many times [1][2].
  • Premature gatekeeping: in 2021, some States had not even started biometric authentication [5].
  • Ethical asymmetry: wrongly rejecting a genuine person causes hunger, which cannot be undone. Leakage only costs money.

Assessment and way forward The real issue is how the system is designed, not whether to use technology. Its value lies in de-duplication and portability. The harm comes when a failed check has no fallback.

  • Every FPS should have a mandatory fallback: OTP, iris, a nominee, or a recorded manual sale with an audit trail.
  • UIDAI should analyse failure cases by age and type of work, as CAG recommended [4].
  • ePoS devices that can work offline are needed in areas with weak connectivity.

Aadhaar seeding and e-KYC have made PDS leaner and portable, but efficiency must not override entitlement. A rule that no genuine beneficiary is turned away would balance leakage control with the right to food under the NFSA and Article 21, and would advance SDG 2 (Zero Hunger).

Sources

  1. 1PIB, "Food Security Without Boundaries: From Portability to Inclusion" (Nov 2026)Rightful Targeting, ePoS 99.8%, e-KYC 91% (71.52 crore), 233 crore+ portability transactions
  2. 2PRS, Demand for Grants 2026-27 Analysis: Food and Public Distributionduplicate or bogus cards, 80.6 crore identified beneficiaries, repeated e-KYC deadline extensions
  3. 3PRS, Standing Committee Report Summary: Modernisation of PDS: Strengthening Technical Database (July 2026)biometric failures among the elderly and labourers, poor connectivity
  4. 4CAG, Performance Audit on Functioning of UIDAI (Report No. 24 of 2021), Executive Summaryno system to analyse authentication failures; recommendation to study failure cases
  5. 5PRS, Standing Committee Report Summary: Strengthening of Public Distribution System (2021)some States had not started biometric authentication
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