Trace the evolution of India's nuclear liability law from the CLND Act, 2010 to the SHANTI Act, 2025, and assess whether it addresses concerns raised after the Fukushima and Chernobyl disasters.

India's nuclear liability law has shifted from the post-Bhopal, deterrence-heavy Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (CLND) Act, 2010 to the investment-oriented SHANTI Act, 2025, which repealed both the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the CLND Act [1]. The change strengthens regulation but only partly answers the Chernobyl–Fukushima lesson that catastrophic costs dwarf statutory caps.

Phase I — The CLND regime (2010)

• Capped operator liability at ₹1,500 crore for reactors above 10 MW, with the Centre's residual liability limited to 300 million SDR [3].
• Its Section 17(b) right of recourse and Section 46 tort exposure gave suppliers open-ended risk — a genuine safety incentive, but one that deterred foreign vendors and stalled reactor build-out [3].

Phase II — The SHANTI Act, 2025

• Passed in December 2025, it consolidates nuclear law and opens generation to private and foreign operators under licence, while enrichment, heavy water and spent-fuel management stay with the Department of Atomic Energy [1][2].
• Grants the AERB statutory status as an independent regulator for the first time [1].
• Replaces the flat cap with a sliding scale (₹100–₹3,000 crore) by plant capacity and dilutes supplier liability [4].

Assessment against Fukushima–Chernobyl concerns

• Addressed: Fukushima's central finding was regulatory capture; a statutory, autonomous AERB separates the regulator from the promoter and marks real institutional progress [1].
• Not addressed: the maximum ₹3,000 crore cap is under 0.1% of Chernobyl or Fukushima damage costs, and diluted supplier liability weakens the incentive for equipment quality — grounds on which the Supreme Court, in August 2026, issued notice to the Union and AERB, observing that statutory caps cannot fetter constitutional courts from awarding just compensation [4].

The evolution thus trades liability-based deterrence for capacity-building: safety governance has improved faster than compensation adequacy. Indexing caps to real damage, mandatory insurance pooling and a narrow recourse against grossly negligent suppliers would align the Act with the polluter-pays and absolute-liability principles. With an empowered regulator and judicial review intact, India can pursue its 100 GW-by-2047 clean-energy goal without diluting victims' rights [2].