·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 words

Trace how Indian railway finance evolved from the Acworth Committee's recommendations to the present. What were the arguments for and against a separate Railway Budget?

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In this answer
  1. Evolution of railway finance
  2. Arguments for a separate budget
  3. Arguments against it

For 92 years, Indian railway finance was a special case. The Acworth Committee (1920–21) recommended separating it from general finances, and the 1924 Separation Convention put this into effect [1]. That split was ended in 2016. Today railways sit inside the Union Budget but depend heavily on the state for money.

Evolution of railway finance

  • 1924 Separation Convention: Railways paid general revenues a fixed contribution. This was 1% of capital-at-charge plus one-fifth of surplus profits. They also got their own depreciation fund and reserves [1].
  • 1949 Convention: After Independence, this became a fixed 4% dividend on capital, with no dividend due on unremunerative strategic lines [1]. The Railway Convention Committee, an ad hoc parliamentary committee, kept reviewing the dividend rate [2].
  • 2016 merger: The Cabinet approved merging the Rail Budget into the Union Budget on 21 September 2016. Railways kept functional autonomy as a departmentally run commercial undertaking [3]. The merger followed the Bibek Debroy Committee and took effect from 2017-18. Capital-at-charge was written off, so the dividend liability ended [4]. Railway spending is now examined through Demands for Grants, like any other ministry [5].
  • Present: The operating ratio is projected at 98.4% for 2026-27. Budget support funds about 95% of capital expenditure [6].

Arguments for a separate budget

  • It gave civil estimates stability because the railway contribution to general revenues was assured [1].
  • It gave railways commercial flexibility. They no longer had to "restart" their finances every 1 April and could build depreciation funds and reserves [1].
  • It allowed focused parliamentary scrutiny of a large commercial enterprise, including through the Railway Convention Committee [2].

Arguments against it

  • Populism: A government release admitted that populism in starting projects had contributed to a "severe fund crunch" [7].
  • Dividend burden: Railways paid about ₹10,000 crore a year in dividend. Scrapping it gave a net gain of about ₹5,000 crore [3].
  • Poor cost transparency: The accounts could not show what new trains or stops cost. Money went into projects that had no traffic [8].
  • Commercial self-sufficiency was never achieved: An operating ratio near 100% shows the separate budget did not make railways pay their own way [6].

Separating the budget in 1924 gave railways stability. Over time, the separate budget became a platform for populism. The merger was a sound fiscal correction, but it only solves part of the problem. Railways still need accrual accounting, an independent regulator [8] and stronger internal revenues to become the self-financing enterprise that Acworth had in mind.

Sources

  1. 1Indian Railways Code/Manual (Admin & Finance), Ch. 7: Separation of Railway Finances: Acworth Committee, 1924 Convention formula, 1949 4% dividend
  2. 2Lok Sabha: Railway Convention Committee (ad hoc committees): RCC as the parliamentary committee reviewing railway finance
  3. 3PIB: Cabinet approves merger of rail budget with general budget (2016): date, functional autonomy, dividend saving
  4. 4PIB: Merger of Rail Budget with Union Budget: Debroy Committee basis, 2017-18, capital-at-charge written off
  5. 5PRS: Demand for Grants 2017-18 Analysis: Railways: railway expenditure examined like other ministries' Demands for Grants
  6. 6PRS: Demand for Grants 2026-27 Analysis: Railways: operating ratio 98.4%, budget support funding 95% of capex
  7. 7PIB: Rail Budget Seeks Course Correction, Avoids Populism: populism in starting projects, fund crunch
  8. 8PRS: Report Summary, Debroy Committee on Restructuring Railways (2015): accounting gaps, investment in projects without traffic, regulator, accrual accounting

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