"Uncodified legislative privileges are a colonial residue inconsistent with a constitutional democracy." Critically examine this with reference to Articles 105 and 194.

Articles 105 (Parliament) and 194 (State Legislatures) protect freedom of speech in the House and give members immunity from court proceedings for what they say or how they vote there. Any other privileges are to be defined "by law." No such law has been passed, so in practice legislatures still follow British House of Commons precedents [1]. The charge is largely valid. What it describes as colonial is the open-ended, uncodified form of privilege, not privilege itself.

Why the statement holds

• Borrowed standard: Article 105(3) originally tied undefined privileges to the House of Commons as of 26 January 1950. The 44th Amendment (1978) changed only the reference date, not the source of the law [1].
• Temporary arrangement made permanent: Dr Rajendra Prasad expected Commons privileges to apply only until Parliament passed its own law [2].
• Judge in its own cause: the House decides both whether a breach occurred and what the punishment is. In 2003 the Tamil Nadu Assembly resolved to arrest editors of The Hindu over an editorial criticising the Chief Minister [3].
• No written limits: restrictions under Article 19(2) must be set by law and can be tested in court. "Contempt of the House" has no written definition and no maximum penalty, which has a chilling effect on the press.
• Outdated model: in 1999 a UK joint committee recommended a Privileges Act for Britain itself [2].

Why the indictment is overstated

• Core immunity is constitutional: freedom of speech in the House and immunity for speeches and votes are written into Articles 105(1)–(2), and Article 194 is in identical terms [1].
• Subject to the Constitution: privileges apply "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" [1], which leaves room for judicial review.
• Rarely used: the Lok Sabha Privileges Committee (2008) noted that punishment had been recommended in only five cases since the first Lok Sabha, and it rejected codification [2]. However, this figure covers only Lok Sabha punishments. It does not count State-level threats such as the one in 2003.
• Sovereignty concern: Presiding Officers have long held that codification could harm the prestige and sovereignty of legislatures [1].

Privilege itself is democratic, but its uncodified, open-ended form is a colonial leftover. Parliament and State Legislatures should use the power that Articles 105(3) and 194(3) already give them to pass a law. That law should keep the core immunity and draw on Australia's Parliamentary Privileges Act, 1987, which caps punishment at one year's imprisonment or a A$5,000 fine and states that criticism alone is not contempt [2]. Journalists facing privilege action should also get notice and a hearing. The 2003 resolution was withdrawn in 2004, but the larger question is still unsettled before a seven-judge Bench [3]. Codification would reconcile legislative dignity with Article 19(1)(a) and uphold constitutional supremacy.