·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 words

UPI's zero-MDR model is fiscally unsustainable. Discuss the case for and against introducing MDR.

In this answer
  1. Case for introducing MDR
  2. Case against introducing MDR

Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) on RuPay debit cards and BHIM-UPI has been zero since January 2020, mandated through Section 10A of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 and Section 269SU of the Income-tax Act, 1961, with banks compensated by a Cabinet-approved incentive scheme [2]. With MDR set to go live on 15 October, the cost question has reopened [1].

Case for introducing MDR

  • Widening fiscal gap: digital transactions rose from 8,839 crore (FY22) to 18,737 crore (FY24) — 46% CAGR, UPI alone 69% [4] — while the outlay moved only from ₹1,500 crore (FY25) to ₹2,000 crore [1][3]. Volumes outpace the subsidy.
  • Partial compensation: the 0.15% incentive applies only to small-merchant transactions up to ₹2,000; above that, and for all large merchants, banks earn nothing [3]. Zero MDR is not free — the cost merely shifts to banks and payment service providers.
  • Under-investment risk: annual, one-year approvals discourage spending on fraud control and grievance redress [2].
  • Regulatory logic: RBI's Discussion Paper on Charges in Payment Systems (August 2022) sought public views on cost-recovery pricing [7].

Case against introducing MDR

  • Digital public infrastructure: ₹2,000 crore is a modest fiscal cost for a system carrying over 18,000 crore transactions [1][4].
  • Inclusion setback: the scheme deliberately targeted small merchants [3]; a counter-level charge may push vegetable sellers and kirana shops back to cash.
  • Enforcement gap: Section 10A binds banks, not shopkeepers [2], so the Ministry's plan to prevent pass-through via the IBA and CAIT rests on persuasion [1].
  • Demonstrated gains: DFS's own socio-economic impact study affirms the scheme's benefits [5].

The real choice is not "free versus paid" but who is openly told they are paying. Brazil's Pix — free for individuals, about 0.33% for firms against 1.13% on debit cards — shows a small, permanent, published fee can coexist with mass adoption [8]. India should pair a formula-based subsidy for small merchants with transparent cost disclosure by RBI and a clear statutory amendment, keeping UPI both financially viable and inclusive.

Sources

  1. 1Govt. to hold talks with banks and decide subsidy amount for UPI after charges kick in, The Hindu (26 Sept 2026)15 October MDR go-live, ₹2,000 crore budget, IBA/CAIT talks, MDR will not cover full cost
  2. 2Cabinet approves the incentive scheme for promotion of RuPay Debit Cards and low-value BHIM-UPI transactions (P2M), PIBzero MDR from January 2020; Sec 10A PSS Act, Sec 269SU Income-tax Act; one-year scheme approvals
  3. 3Cabinet approves Incentive scheme for promotion of low-value BHIM-UPI transactions (P2M), PIB0.15% incentive up to ₹2,000 for small merchants; nil above that and for large merchants; ₹1,500 crore FY25 outlay
  4. 4Total digital payment transactions grow by 46% from 8,839 crore in FY 2021-22 to 18,737 crore in FY 2023-24, PIBtransaction volumes and UPI's 69% CAGR
  5. 5DFS releases Report on Socio-Economic Impact Analysis of the Incentive Scheme at Chintan Shivir 2026, PIBofficial assessment of the scheme's benefits
  6. 6RBI releases Discussion Paper on Charges in Payment Systems (17 August 2022)regulator's public consultation on payment-system charges including UPI
  7. 7Pix: Brazil's Successful Instant Payment System, IMF Staff Country Report 2023/289Pix merchant cost 0.33% versus 1.13% debit and 2.34% credit cards

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