The veto is both the cornerstone and the stumbling block of UNSC reform. Discuss, with reference to the Intergovernmental Negotiations process.

Under Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, substantive decisions need the "concurring votes of the permanent members". In practice, this is the veto [2]. The veto brought the great powers into the UN in 1945. It is also why the Council's structure has hardly changed since then.

Veto as the cornerstone

• P5 buy-in: the veto guarantees that the major powers stay inside the collective-security system and do not act outside it [2].
• Precedent of change without touching the veto: the 1963 amendment, in force from 1965, raised membership from 11 to 15 and the voting threshold from 7 to 9. The veto was left intact [1].
• Gatekeeper of reform: every enlargement needs Charter amendments that member states must ratify [4]. Under Article 108, ratification must include all P5, so the veto-holders control their own reform.

Veto as the stumbling block in the IGN

• A core theme: the "question of the veto" is one of five themes in the reform talks, alongside size, categories, regional representation and working methods [3].
• Consensus rule: the IGN works under Decision 62/557 and seeks the "widest possible consensus" [5]. This lets any bloc stall a text.
• Opposite camps: the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group opposes any new permanent seat. It calls abolishing permanent membership only an "ideal" and backs 3–5-year re-electable seats instead [5].
• The model deferral: Liechtenstein's intermediate model proposes six renewable 8/10-year seats. It leaves veto restrictions "for further discussion" and pushes the veto question to a 16/20-year review [4].
• Paralysis: India links the Council's failure in the "gravest" conflicts to its legitimacy deficit [6]. The dilemma is that new members with a veto would add more ways to block decisions, while new members without one would be second-class.

Way forward

• Sequencing: enlarge now with long-term seats and settle the veto at the review stage [4].
• Working-method reforms, such as a presidency for every elected member, would build trust with smaller states [4].

The veto anchors the UN's authority but also freezes its structure. Separating enlargement from the veto question, as the intermediate model does, offers a realistic path. It would advance the "sovereign equality" principle of Article 2(1) and SDG 16.8, a greater voice for developing countries in global governance. It would also strengthen India's case for reformed multilateralism.