"When the State becomes the seller of a harmful commodity, regulation becomes a conflict of interest." Discuss with historical and contemporary examples.

Article 47 directs the State to try to prohibit intoxicating drinks and drugs injurious to health, except for medicinal use [3]. When the State sells these goods itself, the regulator profits from the harm it is meant to reduce. History shows this conflict is real, but institutions can contain it.

Historical examples

• Colonial Malaya (1926): a Colonial Office report called government Chandu (smoking-opium) saloons a "successful experiment". Its proof was 14,00,000 dollars of extra revenue from immigrant tin and rubber workers. Success was measured by sales, not by fewer smokers [1].
• British India: India was the second-largest opium producer (~12% of world output), yet it announced only a gradual cut in non-medicinal exports in 1926 [2].
• Diluted treaties: after Hague (1912), the Geneva (1925) arrangements allowed prepared opium to be suppressed over 15 years. The US and China walked out when production cuts were refused [2].

Contemporary examples

• State liquor monopolies: TASMAC, a state corporation, holds liquor wholesale and retail rights in Tamil Nadu. It comes under the Home, Prohibition and Excise Department, so the department meant to promote prohibition also oversees sales [5].
• Fiscal dependence: state excise on alcohol makes up about 10–15% of own tax revenue in a majority of states [4]. As a result, prohibition debates turn on lost revenue rather than on health.
• Tobacco: the WHO FCTC Article 5.3 guidelines apply safeguards against industry interference equally to state-owned tobacco industries. This accepts that public ownership does not remove the conflict [6].

The counter-view

• Selling directly removes private profiteers. Tamil Nadu justified TASMAC's retail monopoly as a way to curb cartels and non-duty-paid liquor [5], and Malaya likewise ended private licences [1].
• However, the profit motive does not vanish. It moves to the treasury, as the 1926 report shows [1].

Way forward

• Separate the seller from the regulator: give health departments or independent bodies oversight of sale outlets.
• Measure harm, not revenue: track consumption and health outcomes, and earmark "sin" revenue for de-addiction.
• Set fixed-date reduction targets that include supply-side cuts, as the Geneva timeline began to do [2].

From Malaya's opium saloons to today's liquor counters, the State's revenue interest keeps undermining its role as regulator. The answer is not simply privatisation but separate institutions and success measured by harm reduced. That would honour Article 47 and SDG target 3.5 on preventing substance abuse, and keep the State a guardian rather than a dealer.