·The Hindu

Governor’s role in govt. formation

In this note
  1. At a Glance
  2. Why in the News
  3. Background & Evolution
  4. Core Static Facts
  5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis
  6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)
  7. Prelims Hooks
  8. Mains Relevance
  9. Related Topics to Study Next
  10. Common Errors / Trap Areas
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UPSC Prelims + Mains Study Note


1. At a Glance

  • The Governor is the constitutional head of a State under Article 153 and exercises the formal power to appoint the Chief Minister under Article 164(1).
  • In a clear majority situation, the appointment is essentially mechanical; in a hung Assembly, the Governor exercises genuine discretionary powers — one of the few areas where gubernatorial discretion is constitutionally recognised.
  • This topic sits at the intersection of federalism, constitutional morality, and democratic accountability — perennially tested in GS-II. [1][S4]
  • Repeated misuse of discretionary powers has triggered Supreme Court interventions and multiple commission recommendations, making it a live constitutional controversy. [1]

2. Why in the News

  • Tamil Nadu Assembly Elections (May 2026): The Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK), led by actor-turned-politician C. Joseph Vijay, won 108 seats10 short of the majority mark of 118 in the 234-seat House. [2]
  • After "hectic parleys," TVK secured letters of support from 120 MLAs from smaller parties and independents, and submitted them to the Governor. [2]
  • Governor Rajendra Arlekar then invited Vijay to form the government; Vijay was sworn in as Chief Minister. [2]
  • The episode renewed debate on the Governor's discretion in inviting the largest party/alliance, and whether the Sarkaria/Punchhi Commission guidelines were followed. [2][1]

3. Background & Evolution

Year Milestone
1950 Constitution enacted; Articles 153–167 set out the Governor's role in state executive
1987 Sarkaria Commission (on Centre-State relations) first codified an order of preference for CM appointment in hung assemblies
2010 Punchhi Commission (on Centre-State relations) revisited and reinforced Sarkaria guidelines; added procedural safeguards
2016 SC in Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (Arunachal Pradesh) sharply curtailed Governor's powers to summon/prorogue assembly against CM's advice
2019 SC in Shiv Sena v. Governor of Maharashtra (Devendra Fadnavis episode) emphasised floor test as the ultimate arbiter
2023 SC in Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary (Maharashtra Shinde faction) laid down that the Governor must act on existing majority evidence, not on speculation

4. Core Static Facts

Constitutional Provisions

  • Article 153 — Every State shall have a Governor.
  • Article 154 — Executive power of the State vested in the Governor.
  • Article 163 — Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Governor; Governor acts in his discretion only where the Constitution expressly so provides.
  • Article 164(1) — Chief Minister appointed by the Governor; other ministers appointed by the Governor on the advice of the CM. [2]
  • Article 174 — Governor summons, prorogues, and dissolves the State Legislature.
  • Article 356 — Governor's report can trigger President's Rule.

Key Terminologies

  • Hung Assembly — No single party or pre-poll alliance commands an absolute majority (>50% of total seats).
  • Discretionary Powers — Governor's power to act without/against ministerial advice; constitutionally narrow, politically contested.
  • Floor Test / Composite Floor Test — Mechanism to prove majority on the floor of the House, considered the definitive proof of majority.
  • Anti-Defection Law — 10th Schedule; limits post-election switching, relevant to government stability.

Commissions & Their Order of Preference

Both the Sarkaria Commission (1987) and Punchhi Commission (2010) recommended the following priority for inviting a CM: [1]

  1. Pre-poll alliance/coalition with majority → its leader invited first.
  2. Single largest party staking claim with external support.
  3. Post-poll coalition — all partners joining the government.
  4. Post-poll alliance — some partners in cabinet, others supporting from outside.
  • Implementing authority: No statutory body — these are advisory commission recommendations, not enacted law.
  • Parent constitutional body: Governor (State); President (Centre) for analogous situation.

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Legal / Constitutional

  • Article 164(1) is silent on criteria for CM selection in hung assemblies — this constitutional gap is filled only by commission guidelines and judicial precedents. [2]
  • SC in SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994) held that the floor of the House is the only legitimate venue to test majority; Governor cannot dismiss a CM on subjective satisfaction without a floor test.
  • SC in Nabam Rebia (2016) held that Governor cannot summon the Assembly to conduct a floor test when the CM has not advised dissolution — limits unilateral gubernatorial action.
  • Governor's actions in hung assemblies are subject to judicial review, narrowing the earlier view of "absolute discretion." [1]

Ethical / Governance

  • Governors are appointed by the President on the advice of the Union Cabinet (PM) — creating an inherent conflict when the ruling party at the Centre differs from the state. [1]
  • Punchhi Commission (2010) recommended: Governor should be a distinguished person from outside the state, not recently active in politics, and should have a fixed 5-year tenure removable only through an impartial process. [1]
  • Repeated partisan conduct — delaying oath-taking, refusing bills, misusing Article 356 recommendations — has been criticised by the SC as undermining constitutional morality.

Historical / Comparative

  • Pre-1967 (Congress dominance), the question was moot as single-party majorities were routine.
  • Post-1967 (coalition era), hung assemblies became frequent in states — Governors' discretion became contentious in Goa (1979, 1994, 2017), Karnataka (2018), Maharashtra (2019), and Tamil Nadu (2026).
  • Westminster model (UK): The Crown invites the leader who can command confidence; conventions are clearer, less contested.

Administrative

  • The Governor acts on political intelligence, not verified numerical evidence — letters of support from legislators are often contested.
  • The oath of office administered before a floor test has been controversial: swearing in without verified majority (Karnataka 2018, BS Yediyurappa — 15-day deadline given by SC).
  • Raj Bhavan (Governor's secretariat) lacks an independent verification mechanism for claims of majority.

Federalism

  • Governors as Centre's agents: appointment process makes them susceptible to partisan use; repeated complaints from Opposition-ruled states (Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal 2021–26) about Governors sitting on Bills and withholding assent.
  • Punchhi Commission recommended limiting the Governor's power to withhold assent to Bills, recommending a time-bound mechanism.

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

  • May 2026 — Tamil Nadu: TVK (108 seats) cobbled post-poll support to reach 120; Governor Rajendra Arlekar invited C. Joseph Vijay (sworn in as CM) — followed Sarkaria/Punchhi protocol of inviting the party with demonstrable majority support. [2]
  • 2023–24 — Maharashtra: SC in Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary (May 2023) held that the Governor erred in calling Uddhav Thackeray's government to prove majority on the floor; SC ruled the Governor's action was not in conformity with constitutional provisions.
  • 2023–24 — Governors vs. State Governments: Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Punjab Governors drew SC censure for sitting on Bills; SC in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor (Nov 2023) held that the Governor cannot indefinitely withhold assent — must either assent, refer to President, or return the Bill promptly.
  • Rajasthan & Telangana elections (Dec 2023): Clear majorities produced routine appointments; no discretionary controversy.

7. Prelims Hooks

  1. Article 164(1) provides for appointment of the Chief Minister by the Governor; other ministers are appointed on the CM's advice. [2]
  2. The Constitution does not prescribe criteria for CM selection in a hung assembly — a notable constitutional silence. [2]
  3. Sarkaria Commission was constituted in 1983 and submitted its report in 1987 on Centre-State relations.
  4. Punchhi Commission was constituted in 2007 and submitted its report in 2010; chaired by Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi.
  5. Both commissions place a pre-poll alliance with majority as the first preference for CM appointment in a hung assembly. [1]
  6. SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994) — landmark SC ruling: majority must be proved on the floor of the House, not at Raj Bhavan.
  7. Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016) — SC held Governor cannot summon assembly for floor test when CM has not advised it.
  8. Governor is appointed by the President under Article 155; holds office at the pleasure of the President (Article 156).
  9. Article 163 — Governor acts in discretion only where the Constitution expressly provides for it; residual advice from CoM is binding.
  10. Governor's report under Article 356 recommending President's Rule is also a discretionary power, subject to judicial review post-Bommai.
  11. 10th Schedule (Anti-Defection Law, 1985) constrains post-poll floor-switching, indirectly shaping government formation arithmetic.
  12. Punchhi Commission recommended Governor's tenure be fixed at 5 years and removal be through an impartial process (not merely at President's pleasure). [1]
  13. The Tamil Nadu Governor (2026) followed the Punchhi priority sequence — inviting TVK after it demonstrated support from 120 MLAs (majority = 118). [2]
  14. A Composite Floor Test is ordered by the SC when multiple parties claim majority simultaneously (as in Karnataka 2018 — Yediyurappa episode).

8. Mains Relevance

GS Paper: GS-II

Syllabus Headings:

  • Appointment to various constitutional posts, powers, functions, and responsibilities of various constitutional bodies.
  • Functions and responsibilities of the Union and the States, issues and challenges pertaining to the federal structure.
  • Statutory, regulatory and various quasi-judicial bodies.

Plausible Mains Questions:

  1. "The Governor's discretionary powers in government formation are a necessary safeguard in a democracy or a recipe for partisan abuse." Critically examine in light of Supreme Court judgments and commission recommendations. (GS-II, 15 marks)

  2. Examine the order of preference recommended by the Sarkaria Commission and Punchhi Commission for appointment of a Chief Minister in a hung assembly. How far have Governors adhered to these guidelines in practice? (GS-II, 10 marks)

  3. Recent episodes involving Governors of several states have reignited debate on the constitutional role of Governors. Discuss the challenges to cooperative federalism posed by the Governor's office. (GS-II, 15 marks)


9. Related Topics to Study Next

Topic Connection
Article 356 — President's Rule Governor's recommendation triggers it; Bommai case governs both
Anti-Defection Law (10th Schedule) Shapes viability of post-poll coalitions; affects government stability
Sarkaria Commission — full recommendations Broader Centre-State relations framework; Governor is one chapter
Punchhi Commission — full recommendations Updates Sarkaria; covers Bills, Article 356, Governors' tenure
SR Bommai v. Union of India (1994) Constitutional foundation for floor test doctrine
Cooperative vs. Competitive Federalism Governor controversy is a symptom of Centre-State friction
Lieutenant Governor (Union Territories) Analogous discretionary role; frequent Delhi/Puducherry controversies
Speaker's role in disqualification Intersects with defection, government stability, Nabam Rebia ruling

10. Common Errors / Trap Areas

  1. "Governor acts entirely on advice of CoM" — WRONG. Article 163 explicitly carves out discretionary situations. In hung assemblies, CM appointment is one such case. The error: treating the Governor as a pure rubber stamp.

  2. Confusing Sarkaria (1987) and Punchhi (2010) years — Sarkaria Commission set up 1983, report submitted 1987. Punchhi Commission set up 2007, report submitted 2010. Both are on Centre-State relations, not specifically on Governors alone.

  3. Assuming post-poll alliance is preferred over single largest party — WRONG. Sarkaria/Punchhi place the single largest party (with external support) above post-poll coalition in the order of preference.

  4. SR Bommai is often misremembered as being about Governor's appointment power — It is actually about dismissal of state governments / Article 356, not about CM appointment in hung assemblies. Conflating these two contexts is a frequent trap.

  5. "Governor has no role once party has majority" — Technically the appointment is still the Governor's under Article 164(1); the discretion disappears, but the formal constitutional act remains. Prelims questions sometimes test this nuance.


Sources

  1. 1Sarkaria/Punchhi Commission recommendations on hung assemblies — search result synthesis from: StudyIQ, Bar & Bench, Barristery.in, Shankar IAS Parliament — retrieved via web search 18 June 2026tier 4
  2. 2"Governor's role in govt. formation" — The Hindu, 11 May 2026, Page 10, International Print Edition, by Rangarajan R. — `thehindu.com · tier 4
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