To strengthen the Supreme Court, divide it

1. At a Glance

• The proposal: split the Supreme Court of India into two tiers. A small Constitutional Court of about 11 judges would sit in Delhi and hear only constitutional cases and substantial questions of law. Four or five regional Courts of Appeal would take the ordinary appeals that now crowd the apex court [1].
• The problem it targets: pendency of 92,318 cases at the end of 2025, the highest ever and nearly 10,000 more than a year earlier. The authors argue that adding judges cannot outrun this growth [1].
• The idea is old: the Law Commission's 229th Report (2009) proposed something similar, and the Supreme Court Full Court rejected it in 2010 [2][3].
• Why it matters for UPSC: it touches judicial reform, access to justice (distance from Delhi), the Article 130 framework, separation of powers, and the appellate versus constitutional role of the apex court.

2. Why in the News

• 14 November 2026: The Hindu (Page 6) carried the op-ed "To strengthen the Supreme Court, divide it" by Pradeep S. Mehta (Secretary-General, CUTS International) and Vijay L. Kelkar (Vice President, Pune International Centre) [1].
• Its argument is that adding judges "without sorting the work risks enlarging the same overburdened court". The task is "not to move the same work faster, but to sort it" [1].
• In 2016, three Supreme Court judges framed 11 questions on whether the court had drifted from its constitutional role and referred them to a larger Bench. The op-ed notes that, ten years later, the reference is still unheard [1].
• The Government said in July 2024 that there was no proposal for regional benches, and restated its position in April 2025 [3][4].

3. Background & Evolution

• Constitutional basis: under Article 130, the Supreme Court sits in Delhi or at any other place the Chief Justice of India appoints, with the approval of the President [3][4].
• Milestones:
• August 2007: the CJI told the Government he did not favour benches outside Delhi [2].
• 2009: the Law Commission's 229th Report recommended a Constitution Bench at Delhi and four cassation benches at Delhi, Chennai/Hyderabad, Kolkata and Mumbai. These zonal benches would hear all appeals from High Court orders and judgments in their regions [2][3].
• 2010: the Full Court of the Supreme Court found "no justification" for benches outside Delhi and rejected the proposal [2][3].
• 2019: Vice President M. Venkaiah Naidu publicly called for splitting the Supreme Court and setting up regional benches [7][8].
• 2020: the Government told Parliament that the Supreme Court did not favour a bench outside Delhi [9]. It also reported 60,603 pending cases, of which 49,088 were civil [5][6].

• 13 July 2016: in a writ petition seeking a National Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court referred the issue to a Constitution Bench for an authoritative ruling [4]. The matter was still sub judice in 2024 [3].

• Older ideas of the same kind: a National Court of Appeal, cassation benches, and regional benches, as distinct from adding more judges.

4. Core Static Facts

• Terms to know:
• Cassation bench / Court of Cassation: a court that hears appeals on points of law, following the civil-law model.
• Constitution Bench: a bench of at least 5 judges, which Art. 145(3) requires for substantial questions on interpreting the Constitution. (Standard constitutional text; not from the retrieved sources.)
• Court of Appeal: an intermediate appellate tier between the High Courts and the apex court.

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Legal / Constitutional

• The Supreme Court's broad appellate jurisdiction (Art. 136 special leave petitions) has turned it into a general court of appeal. The op-ed says this has weakened its role as constitutional guardian [1].
• Art. 130 already permits sittings outside Delhi, so regional benches may not need an amendment [3][4]. A separate Court of Appeal tier, however, would probably need a constitutional amendment, which raises basic-structure questions.
• The 2016 Constitution Bench reference on a National Court of Appeal is still pending, which blocks a decision from the judiciary itself [1][3].

Governance / Institutional

• Who controls the process: under Art. 130 the CJI's initiative is decisive. The Government has consistently deferred to the 2010 Full Court decision, which leaves no forum for change [3][4].
• Risks: inconsistent rulings across regional benches, a weaker unified precedent under Art. 141, and pressure from regional Bars.

Social / Access to Justice

• Litigants from the South, East and North-East pay higher travel and lawyer costs to reach Delhi. Regional benches would make access fairer, in line with Art. 39A.
• Vice President Naidu framed regional benches as a matter of access and pendency [7][8].

Administrative

• Pendency rose from 60,603 (2020) to 92,318 (end of 2025) [5][1].
• The authors say that adding judges alone produces a larger court with the same mixed docket. Sorting the work by type is the structural fix they propose [1].

Comparative / Historical

• The op-ed says Constitution Benches decided many more cases in the early 1960s than now, which shows how far the court's docket has drifted [1].
• Models abroad: Germany, Italy and South Africa have separate constitutional courts; the US Supreme Court controls its own docket through certiorari. (Comparative context; verify.)

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

• April 2025: a Lok Sabha reply restated the Art. 130 position and the 2010 Full Court rejection, and noted that the 13.07.2016 reference is still pending [4].
• End of 2025: Supreme Court pendency reached 92,318, the highest ever and about 10,000 more year-on-year [1].
• 14 November 2026: the Mehta–Kelkar op-ed revived the split-court model of an 11-judge Constitutional Court plus regional Courts of Appeal [1].
• (The July 2024 Rajya Sabha "no proposal" reply [3] falls just outside this window but is the latest firm executive position.)

7. Prelims Hooks

• Art. 130 fixes Delhi as the seat of the Supreme Court; other places need the CJI's decision and the President's approval [3].
• The 229th Report of the Law Commission (2009) recommended cassation benches [2].
• Proposed cassation benches: Delhi, Chennai/Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai [2].
• The 229th Report also proposed a Constitution Bench at Delhi for constitutional matters [2].
• The Full Court of the SC rejected benches outside Delhi in 2010 [2][3].
• The CJI conveyed opposition to regional benches in August 2007 [2].
• On 13.07.2016 the SC referred the National Court of Appeal issue to a Constitution Bench [4].
• The 2016 reference framed 11 questions and remains unheard [1].
• SC pendency at the end of 2025 was 92,318, the highest ever [1].
• SC pendency in 2020 was 60,603, of which 49,088 were civil matters [5].
• In July 2024 the Government told the Rajya Sabha there was no proposal for regional SC benches [3].
• Vice President M. Venkaiah Naidu publicly backed splitting the SC [7].
• The 2026 split-court proposal came from CUTS International and Pune International Centre office-bearers [1].

8. Why Every Actor Is Waiting for Someone Else

• The reform has stalled because each actor waits for another to move first.
• Under Article 130, the CJI decides where the Supreme Court sits, with the President's approval [3]. So the judiciary has to start the change.
• The Full Court (a meeting of all the judges of the Supreme Court) met on 18 February 2010 and found "no justification" for benches outside Delhi [11].

• The Government keeps repeating that decision and says there is "no proposal" [3][11]. It treats the judges' refusal as the end of the matter.

• Parliament has recommended the change but cannot make it happen.

• In 2023 the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Law and Justice recommended regional benches at four or five places. Ordinary appeals would be heard there, and constitutional matters would stay in Delhi [10].

• Article 130 gives Parliament no role in choosing where the court sits. So the committee's report changes nothing unless the CJI acts on it.

• The court's own case on the question has not been heard.

• The National Court of Appeal petition was sent to a Constitution Bench on 13.07.2016 [4]. A Lok Sabha reply in 2026 says it is still sub judice (pending before the court) [11].
• While this reference is pending, the Government can say the matter is before the court. The court, in turn, has not listed the case for hearing. Each side's delay justifies the other's.
• So a reform meant to cut delay is held up by a delayed case in the same court.

9. The Strongest Case Against Splitting the Court

• Objection 1: one country should have one Supreme Court law.
• Under Article 141, law declared by the Supreme Court binds every court in India. This rule is called binding precedent (an earlier ruling that later courts must follow).
• Four or five regional Courts of Appeal could decide the same legal question in different ways. A trader in Chennai and a trader in Kolkata could then face different law.
• Settling those conflicts would fall to the Constitutional Court. That adds one more step of appeal, and so more delay.

• Honest answer: this risk is real. It can be reduced, not removed. A regional court could be required to refer the question upwards whenever it disagrees with another region, so a conflict reaches Delhi once instead of being argued again in every case. The 229th Report's idea of cassation benches (courts that decide only points of law) faces the same problem [2].

• Objection 2: the case-load might simply move to the new court.

• In India almost any dispute can be framed as a question of fundamental rights. A Constitutional Court that hears "substantial questions of law" could therefore fill up again.

• Honest answer: the op-ed's real fix is sorting the work, not geography [1]. If the Constitutional Court can freely refuse cases, it is protected. If it cannot, the split only moves the queue. The model works only with a strict filter on which cases may go up.

• Objection 3: the 2010 Full Court decision deserves weight.

• The judges who run the court judged that outside benches were not justified [2][11].
• Honest answer: that decision was taken when pendency was much lower. It has not been reviewed against the record 92,318 cases at the end of 2025 [1]. A 16-year-old view on a much smaller problem should be looked at again, not simply repeated.

10. What the Record Pendency Figure Does Not Tell You

• The growth rate matters more than the total.
• Pendency rose from 60,603 in 2020 [5] to 92,318 at the end of 2025 [1]. That is about 31,700 more cases, a rise of roughly 52% in about five years.

• The rise of nearly 10,000 cases in a single year [1] shows the backlog is growing faster each year. This supports the authors' view that adding judges alone cannot keep up.

• The figure does not say what kind of cases are waiting.

• In 2020, 49,088 of the 60,603 cases, about 81%, were civil [5]. Most of the backlog was ordinary private disputes, not constitutional questions.
• The headline number does not separate special leave petitions (SLPs) under Art. 136 that are still waiting to be admitted from cases waiting for a full hearing. SLPs are requests asking the court's permission to appeal.

• That split decides which fix works. Regional benches help if the problem is too many full appeals. A stricter admission filter helps if the problem is the flood of requests to appeal.

• How to use this in an answer: cite the trend (60,603 to 92,318). Then say that a reform plan needs case-type data before it chooses between geography and filtering.

11. The Court Already Backs Regional Benches Elsewhere

• The Supreme Court supports regional benches as a backlog fix for another body.
• In 2026 the Supreme Court asked the Centre to consider regional benches of the NCDRC to clear its backlog of cases [12]. The NCDRC (National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission) is India's top consumer court.

• So the court accepts that moving hearings closer to people can reduce pending cases.

• Why this matters for the debate

• The 2010 Full Court refusal [11] and the 2026 NCDRC suggestion [12] use opposite reasoning about the same tool.
• A Mains answer can use this to show that the objection to Supreme Court benches is about the court's unity and status, not about whether regional benches work.

12. Steps That Need No Constitutional Amendment

• The CJI and the Full Court should revisit the 2010 decision under Article 130.
• Article 130 already allows the court to sit outside Delhi with the President's approval [3]. No amendment is needed for this.

• A single trial bench, for example at one of the 229th Report's sites such as Chennai/Hyderabad [2], would show whether conflicting rulings actually happen. The judges could then decide on evidence, not fear.

• The Supreme Court should list the 2016 reference for hearing.

• The 11 questions framed in 2016 have been unheard for ten years [1][4]. A ruling would give the Government and Parliament a clear legal basis to act.

• Until the court rules, the Government will keep saying the matter is before the court [11].

• The Government should reply to the 2023 committee report on its merits.

• The Parliamentary Standing Committee's plan, with appeals in the regions and constitutional cases in Delhi [10], closely matches the 229th Report [2].

• Saying "no proposal" [3] does not answer either report. The Law Ministry should explain to Parliament why it accepts or rejects them.

• Only the full Court of Appeal model needs an amendment, so do it last.

• A separate tier between the High Courts and the Supreme Court would change Articles 124 and 136. It would also be tested against the basic structure doctrine.
• Benches under Article 130 can be tried first. The bigger change can wait until the 2016 reference is decided.

13. Anchors for Answers

• Data: Supreme Court pendency rose from 60,603 cases in 2020 (49,088 civil) [5] to a record 92,318 at the end of 2025 [1], a rise of about 52%
• Report/Committee: Law Commission 229th Report (2009): a Constitution Bench in Delhi plus four cassation benches [2]; Parliamentary Standing Committee on Law and Justice, Judicial Processes and their Reforms (2023): regional benches at 4–5 locations for appeals [10]
• Law/Case: Art. 130 (seat of the Supreme Court); Art. 136 (special leave to appeal); Art. 141 (binding precedent); Full Court decision of 18 February 2010 rejecting outside benches [11]; National Court of Appeal reference of 13.07.2016, still pending in 2026 [4][11]
• Comparison: The Supreme Court itself asked the Centre to consider regional NCDRC benches to clear a backlog (2026) [12]

14. Mains Relevance

• GS-II: structure, organisation and functioning of the Judiciary; separation of powers; important constitutional provisions (Arts. 124, 130, 136, 141).
• GS-II: governance, meaning access to justice and judicial reforms.
• Possible question stems: 1. "The Supreme Court of India risks becoming a court of appeal rather than a constitutional court." Critically examine, and assess whether a Constitutional Court plus regional Courts of Appeal is the answer. (15 marks) 2. Discuss the constitutional and institutional obstacles to setting up regional benches of the Supreme Court, with reference to the Law Commission's 229th Report. (10 marks) 3. Adding judges does not address the nature of the Supreme Court's docket. Suggest structural reforms to reduce pendency while keeping precedent coherent. (15 marks)

15. Related Topics to Study Next

• Art. 136 Special Leave Petitions: the main source of the appellate flood.
• Judicial pendency and NJDG: the data behind the reform case.
• National Court of Appeal (V. Vasanthakumar case, 2016): the pending reference that blocks reform.
• Collegium and the NJAC verdict (2015): the judiciary controls its own structure and appointments.
• Basic structure doctrine: limits on amendments that redesign the Supreme Court.
• All India Judicial Service and lower-court vacancies: pendency higher up starts with weak lower courts.
• Tribunalisation (Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021): another route for sorting judicial work.
• Art. 39A and legal aid (NALSA): the access-to-justice side.

16. NCERT Concepts to Revise

• Supreme Court of India (Polity): The article proposes splitting this apex court into a Constitutional Court and regional appeal courts.
• Article 130 (Polity): It lets the CJI, with the President's approval, set Supreme Court seats outside Delhi, the basis for regional benches.
• Constitution bench (Polity): The proposed Constitutional Court would sit like a permanent Constitution Bench; the 2016 reference is pending before one.
• Appellate jurisdiction (Polity): Heavy ordinary appeals clog the apex court; the proposal shifts them to regional Courts of Appeal.
• Judicial pendency (Polity): Record backlog of 92,318 cases is the problem the split-court model targets.
• Chief Justice of India (Polity): The CJI's decision under Art. 130 is decisive for setting up benches outside Delhi.
• Basic structure doctrine (Polity): A new Court of Appeal tier would need an amendment, which must respect the basic structure.
• Separation of powers (Polity): Restructuring the apex court raises questions of judicial independence and the roles of government and judiciary.
• Judiciary (Polity): Gives the overall court hierarchy needed to place a new intermediate appeal tier.
• National Legal Services Authority (Polity): Linked to the access-to-justice argument for bringing the apex court closer to litigants.
• Sub judice (Polity): The 2016 National Court of Appeal reference is still pending before the court.
• Certiorari (Polity): The note contrasts the US Supreme Court's control of its own docket via certiorari with India's open appeals.
• Subordinate courts (Polity): Weak lower courts feed pendency upward, and reform of the court hierarchy must account for them.

17. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• Wrong authority: under Art. 130 it is the CJI with the President's approval, not Parliament or the Union Law Ministry acting alone [3].
• Wrong report: the regional cassation benches came from the 229th Law Commission Report (2009), not the 230th or the Malimath Committee [2].
• Benches versus a new court: benches under Art. 130 are not the same as a National Court of Appeal or separate Courts of Appeal, which would likely need a constitutional amendment.
• Year mix-ups: CJI opposition was in 2007, the report in 2009, the Full Court rejection in 2010, and the National Court of Appeal reference in 2016 [2][4].
• Wrong city list: Chennai/Hyderabad (one southern bench), Kolkata and Mumbai, plus Delhi. Bengaluru and Guwahati were not in the 229th list [2].