Israel’s Parliament sworn in as Eisenkot tries to forge a govt.

1. At a Glance

• Israel's newly elected Knesset took its oath without a government in place. The October 27 general election was deadlocked: PM Benjamin Netanyahu lost his parliamentary majority, but his rivals had no clear path to power either [1].
• President Isaac Herzog gave the first mandate to form a government to Gadi Eisenkot, a former general. Eisenkot and his allies also lack a majority [1].
• If both Eisenkot and Netanyahu fail to form coalitions, Israel could go to another (repeat) election [1].
• Why it matters for UPSC:
• It is a working example of a parliamentary system under proportional representation, where fragmented mandates and coalition dependence are the norm.
• It shows the President's role as head of state in government formation, which you can compare with Article 75 of the Indian Constitution.
• It is relevant to West Asia stability and India–Israel ties (GS-II).

2. Why in the News

• 27 October 2026: Israel holds its general election. The result is deadlocked, and Netanyahu is stripped of his majority [1].
• Sunday, 8 November 2026: Israel's President tasks Gadi Eisenkot with forming a government [1].
• Tuesday, 10 November 2026: The new Knesset is sworn in, still without a new government. President Herzog presides over the ceremony [1].
• Herzog's message to lawmakers: "You must do everything to avoid a repeat election." [1]

3. Background & Evolution

• The Knesset is Israel's unicameral parliament and the supreme authority of the state [2].
• It is elected every four years [2].
• The electoral system gives proportional representation even to quite small parties [2]. This structurally produces multi-party coalitions and frequent deadlock.
• Milestones:
• The First Knesset was elected/convened in 1949, after the State of Israel was proclaimed in 1948 [NV].
• Israel has no single codified constitution. A series of Basic Laws works as its constitutional framework [NV].
• The qualifying threshold has risen over time, from about 1% at first to 1.5% and later to 3.25% [NV].

• 2019–2022: Israel went through a cycle of repeated elections caused by coalition deadlock [NV]. That precedent is why Herzog warned against a repeat poll [1].

• 2026 continuation: The October 27 vote again produced a hung outcome, with neither bloc holding a majority [1].

4. Core Static Facts

Item	Fact
Legislature	Knesset, unicameral [2]
Constitutional status	Supreme authority of the state [2]
Term	4 years [2]
Electoral system	Proportional representation; small parties get seats [2]
Strength	120 members [NV]
Seat allocation	National party lists; D'Hondt method [NV]
Electoral threshold	3.25% of valid votes, roughly 4 seats [NV]
Majority needed for government	61 of 120 [NV]
Head of State	President, currently Isaac Herzog [1]; largely ceremonial but assigns the mandate to form a government [1]
Head of Government	Prime Minister; Benjamin Netanyahu is the incumbent, having lost his majority [1]
Designated PM-candidate (Nov 2026)	Gadi Eisenkot, former general [1]
Time to form a government	28 days, extendable by up to 14 days [NV]
Constitutional basis	Basic Laws, including Basic Law: The Knesset and Basic Law: The Government [NV]

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Legal / Constitutional (comparative)

• A parliament can be sworn in before a government exists. Swearing in the legislature and forming the executive are separate steps [1].
• The President chooses whom to invite to form a government. India works similarly: under Article 75(1) the President appoints the PM, and the President's discretion matters most in a hung House (precedents include 1989, 1996 and 1998).
• The legislature is supreme and there is no codified constitution [2]. Contrast India's written constitution with judicial review, a sharp question for Mains.

Governance / Political Systems

• Proportional representation [2]:
• It brings more voices into parliament.
• But it fragments the vote and makes kingmaker small parties powerful.

• The deadlocked result of October 2026 is the outcome [1].

• India uses first-past-the-post (FPTP), which tends to produce clearer majorities but can turn a minority of votes into a majority of seats. This is a classic comparison in debates on electoral reform.

• A repeat election costs money, policy continuity and voter trust. That is why the head of state appealed publicly to lawmakers [1].

Geopolitical / Strategic

• Political instability in Israel affects how decisions get made in a volatile West Asia. The Hindu's topic tags at the time included "Israel-US strikes on Iran" [1].
• A change of leadership, from the incumbent Netanyahu to former general Eisenkot, could shift policy on security, regional normalisation and relations with the US [1].

India-specific

• India and Israel established full diplomatic relations in 1992 [NV]. The relationship covers defence, agriculture/water technology and the I2U2 grouping [NV].
• A stable government in Tel Aviv/Jerusalem matters for IMEC, defence supplies and the welfare of the Indian diaspora and workers in Israel [NV].

Ethical / Governance

• Caretaker governments raise the question of how far an executive without a fresh mandate may legitimately take major decisions. This connects to India's caretaker convention and the Model Code of Conduct.

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

• 27 Oct 2026: General election. Netanyahu loses his majority and the result is deadlocked [1].
• 8 Nov 2026 (Sunday): The President tasks Gadi Eisenkot with forming the government [1].
• 10 Nov 2026 (Tuesday): The new Knesset is sworn in with Herzog presiding. He urges lawmakers to avoid a repeat election [1].
• Ongoing: Eisenkot has not yet struck deals with the parties that could bring him to power. If both he and Netanyahu fail, Israel faces a fresh election [1].

7. Prelims Hooks

• The Knesset is unicameral; Israel has no upper house [2].
• Britannica describes the Knesset as the "supreme authority" of the State of Israel [2].
• The Knesset is elected for a four-year term [2].
• The electoral system is proportional representation, under which even small parties win seats [2].
• The Knesset has 120 seats; a majority is 61 [NV].
• The electoral threshold is 3.25% [NV].
• Israel has no single written constitution; Basic Laws serve in its place [NV].
• Israel's President (Isaac Herzog) assigns the task of forming a government [1].
• The 2026 general election was held on 27 October 2026 [1].
• Gadi Eisenkot, a former military general, received the mandate on 8 November 2026 [1].
• The new Knesset was sworn in on 10 November 2026, with no new government in place [1].
• Benjamin Netanyahu lost his parliamentary majority in the 2026 election [1].
• The Knesset is named after the Knesset HaGedolah (Great Assembly) of ancient Jewish tradition [NV].

8. Why Small Parties Hold the Key to Who Rules

• A coalition partner with a few seats can still bring the government down
• Israel's governments often survive by one or two votes. The Bennett–Lapid government won its confidence vote by just 60–59 on 13 June 2021 [4].
• With a margin that thin, any single partner can walk out and end the government. So a small party's real power is its power to leave, and that is far bigger than its share of the vote.

• The government did fall. It lost its majority in April 2022, and the Knesset was dissolved for early elections [4].

• Partners use that power to set the government's agenda

• In 2023, Bezalel Smotrich pushed Netanyahu to rewrite the Basic Laws so that the judiciary would come under legislative oversight (control by the Knesset) [5].
• When Netanyahu paused the plan in March 2023 because of nationwide strikes, Itamar Ben-Gvir threatened to quit the coalition [5][6].

• So the plan was driven by what the coalition partners wanted, even though it set off mass protests [3].

• Coalition deals can reach constitutional-level law

• Just before the 2026 election, the outgoing coalition rushed through a Basic Law declaring Torah study a fundamental value of the state [3].

• Basic Laws act as Israel's constitution. That makes them the price paid for coalition support, not rules set above day-to-day bargaining.

• Why this matters for Eisenkot's bid

• He lacks a majority and has not yet made deals with the parties he needs [1].
• Whoever gives him the last few seats gets the most bargaining power. That is the same pattern that brought down the government in 2022 [4].

9. Why a Hung Knesset Is Riskier Than a Hung Lok Sabha

• In Israel, a simple majority can change the 'constitution'
• Most Basic Laws can be amended or repealed by a simple Knesset majority. Only some clauses need a supermajority (a larger-than-normal majority, like two-thirds) [3].
• So whoever puts together 61 seats controls ordinary laws and can also change the basic rules of the state.

• This is why the coalition question carries constitutional stakes, not just a question of who becomes PM.

• Courts are the only real check, and that check was itself under attack

• The High Court of Justice can strike down ordinary laws that clash with Basic Laws [3].
• Israel has no upper house that could slow a coalition down, because the Knesset is unicameral (it has only one chamber) [2].

• Critics said the 2023 overhaul would let the Knesset override High Court rulings. That would remove one of the only checks on the ruling coalition [5].

• India has more layers of protection

• Changing India's Constitution under Article 368 usually needs a special majority (two-thirds of members present and voting, plus a majority of the total strength) in both Houses. Some amendments also need approval by half the states.
• The basic structure doctrine (Kesavananda Bharati, 1973) means even a valid amendment cannot destroy the Constitution's core features.

• So a fragile Indian coalition can block bills, but it cannot rewrite the rules of the game alone. A fragile Israeli coalition can.

• The head of state has limited power to stop this

• During the 2023 protests, President Herzog could only offer an alternative reform plan. He had no veto [10].
• His warning against a repeat election [1] is moral pressure, not legal power. This is similar to how the Indian President's discretion under Article 75 rests mostly on convention.

10. What the 2019–2022 Election Cycle Teaches About Repeat Polls

• Repeat elections did not break the deadlock
• After the April 2019 election, Likud and Blue and White each had 35 seats, and no coalition could be formed [7].
• The elections of September 2019 and March 2020 also failed to give a clear winner [7].

• Voters gave roughly the same answer each time. Holding another election changes nothing if people do not change how they vote.

• The deadlock ended through crisis or a patchwork coalition, not a clear win

• In 2020, the COVID-19 outbreak pushed Benny Gantz into an emergency unity government under Netanyahu [7].

• In 2021, after the fourth election in two years, Yair Lapid got the mandate. He built a broad coalition with a rotation deal (two leaders taking turns as PM): Naftali Bennett first, then Lapid [4][8].

• Coalitions held together only by opposing one leader are fragile

• The Bennett–Lapid coalition joined parties with very different ideologies [4].
• It lasted under a year before losing its majority in April 2022 [4]. Lapid then served as PM only from July to December 2022 [8].

• The November 2022 election finally gave Netanyahu's right-wing bloc a clear majority [7].

• The lesson for November 2026

• If Eisenkot builds a government only from Netanyahu's opponents, it risks the 2021–22 problem: enough votes to take power, but no shared programme to govern with.
• That is why Herzog asked lawmakers to avoid a repeat election [1]. Each extra election costs money and time, and the 2019–22 record shows it may not solve the problem.

11. The Strongest Case for Keeping Proportional Representation

• The objection: PR is not the cause, it only shows how divided the country is
• Israeli society is split on religion and the state, on security, and on the courts, as the 2023 protests and strikes over the judiciary showed [3][5].
• Under FPTP (first-past-the-post: the candidate with the most votes in a seat wins), these groups would still exist. They would just be hidden inside two big parties, or left without any representation.

• So, the argument goes, fixing the electoral system would not fix the disagreement. It would only hide it.

• What is right about this objection

• This deadlock comes from real disagreement among voters. The three inconclusive elections of 2019–2020 show voters stayed split, not that the counting formula failed [7].

• PR also gave minorities and small groups a voice in parliament, which FPTP might deny them.

• Where the objection falls short

• Israel raised its threshold over time and still has fragmented parliaments. So the vote cut-off alone has not produced stability.
• The real problem is less the number of parties and more how easily a partner can leave or hold the government hostage, as Ben-Gvir's threat in 2023 showed [6].
• That means the better fix is to make coalitions more stable, for example with pre-poll alliance rules. Scrapping PR is not needed for that.

12. What India Can and Cannot Borrow From This

• India has already studied a list system and stopped short of adopting it
• The Law Commission's 170th Report, Reform of the Electoral Laws (1999), studied whether India should adopt a list system (seats given to parties in proportion to their vote) [9].
• It proposed that a party winning under 5% of valid votes should get no seats, even if it wins some. That cut-off is higher than Israel's [9].

• Israel's case shows why a threshold is needed if India ever moves towards PR, and also why a threshold alone is not enough.

• India's anti-defection law targets a different problem

• The Tenth Schedule (the anti-defection law) stops individual MPs from switching parties. Israel's instability comes from whole partner parties walking out.
• The 91st Amendment (2003) removed the split exemption, but a merger backed by two-thirds of a legislature party is still allowed [11].

• So the Tenth Schedule controls individual members, not coalition partners. It would not have saved the Bennett–Lapid government [4].

• The 170th Report has an idea aimed at the partner-walkout problem

• It proposed treating a pre-election front of parties as a single 'political party' under the Tenth Schedule [9].
• That would make it costly for a partner to leave a pre-poll alliance after the election. This is exactly the problem that brought down Israel's government in 2022.

• Parliament and the Election Commission of India could revisit this proposal. It addresses coalition instability without giving up FPTP.

• Decisions on defection should not be left to party insiders

• The same report recommended moving defection decisions from presiding officers (the Speaker or Chairman) to the President or Governor, acting on the Election Commission's advice [9][11].
• The goal is the one Israel lacks: a neutral referee when coalition loyalties break down.

13. Anchors for Answers

• Data: The Bennett–Lapid government won its confidence vote 60–59 (13 June 2021) and collapsed in April 2022. This shows how thin coalition margins are under PR [4]
• Data: Israel held four general elections in about two years (April 2019 – March 2021) because of coalition deadlock [7][8]
• Report/Committee: Law Commission of India, 170th Report, Reform of the Electoral Laws (1999): studied a list system, a 5% vote threshold, and treating pre-poll fronts as one party under the Tenth Schedule [9]
• Law/Case: Tenth Schedule as amended by the 91st Amendment (2003), which removed the split exemption [11]. Article 368 and Kesavananda Bharati (1973) protect India's Constitution from a simple majority, unlike Israel's Basic Laws [3]
• Comparison: Israel's Basic Laws can mostly be amended by a simple Knesset majority, so a 61-seat coalition can change constitutional rules. The 2023 judicial overhaul shows this risk [3][5]

14. Mains Relevance

• GS-II:
• Comparison of the Indian constitutional scheme with that of other countries.
• Effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India's interests.

• India and its neighbourhood / bilateral relations (India–Israel; West Asia).

• GS-II (Polity): Salient features of the Representation of People's Act; debates on electoral reform (FPTP vs PR).

• GS-IV (marginal): The ethics of caretaker governance.
• Possible question stems: 1. "Proportional representation ensures inclusiveness but often breeds instability." Examine with reference to recent political deadlock in Israel, and discuss whether India should consider a mixed electoral system. (15 marks) 2. Compare the role of the head of state in government formation in a hung parliament in India and Israel. How far is presidential discretion constrained by convention? (10 marks) 3. Political instability in West Asian states has implications for India's strategic and economic interests. Discuss in the context of India–Israel relations. (15 marks)

15. Related Topics to Study Next

• Article 75 and the President's discretion in a hung Lok Sabha. This is the direct Indian parallel to Herzog mandating Eisenkot.
• FPTP vs PR vs mixed systems (Law Commission's 170th Report, 1999, on electoral reforms). It explains why the Knesset fragments.
• Single Transferable Vote in India (elections of the President and Rajya Sabha). This is India's own use of PR.
• Parliamentary sovereignty vs constitutional supremacy (UK, Israel, India). It builds on the "supreme authority" description of the Knesset [2].
• India–Israel relations (1992 normalisation, defence, I2U2, IMEC). This is the strategic stake.
• West Asia security: Iran–Israel–US tensions and the Abraham Accords. These set the regional context for the new government.
• Caretaker governments and conventions. They govern Netanyahu's interim position.
• Anti-defection law (Tenth Schedule). It contrasts with coalition bargaining in PR systems.

16. NCERT Concepts to Revise

• Proportional representation (Polity): Israel's PR system gives small parties seats, fragmenting the Knesset and causing the deadlock.
• Coalition government (Polity): Eisenkot must assemble a coalition because no bloc has a majority, as often happens in India since 1989.
• Hung Parliament (Polity): The deadlocked Knesset is a hung house; India's 1989–98 precedents show how the head of state acts.
• Parliamentary system (Polity): Israel's executive depends on the legislature's majority, so government formation follows the Knesset's numbers.
• President of India (Polity): Herzog giving Eisenkot the mandate parallels the Indian President's role in appointing a Prime Minister.
• Prime Minister of India (Polity): Compares the Indian PM, who must command a majority, with Netanyahu losing his majority.
• First-past-the-post system (Polity): India's FPTP usually gives clearer majorities, the standard contrast with Israel's fragmented PR outcome.
• Electoral threshold (Polity): Israel's 3.25% threshold is meant to limit small parties, yet the Knesset still fragments.
• D'Hondt method (Polity): This is the formula used to turn party list votes into Knesset seats.
• Single transferable vote (Polity): STV is India's own form of PR, used for the President and Rajya Sabha elections.
• Parliamentary sovereignty (Polity): The Knesset is the supreme authority without a codified constitution, unlike India's limited Parliament.
• Written constitution (Polity): Israel relies on Basic Laws rather than one codified document, a common comparison with India.
• Electoral reforms (Polity): The FPTP versus PR debate and mixed systems are central to Mains questions drawn from this case.
• Convention (Polity): Presidential discretion and caretaker conduct in a hung house depend on convention rather than written rules.
• Anti-defection law (Polity): It contrasts with the free coalition bargaining and shifting loyalties in Israel's PR politics.

17. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• Bicameral vs unicameral. The Knesset is unicameral [2]; do not invent an Israeli "upper house".
• President vs PM. Israel's President (Herzog) is the head of state who assigns the mandate [1]. The PM (Netanyahu) is head of government. Don't swap the two.
• "Sworn in" does not mean "government formed." The Knesset was sworn in on 10 Nov 2026 without a government [1].
• Constitution. Israel has no single codified constitution; it relies on Basic Laws [NV]. Don't write "Constitution of Israel, Article X".
• Dates. Election on 27 Oct, mandate on 8 Nov, swearing-in on 10 Nov 2026 [1]. Don't confuse these with the print date (11 Nov).
• Eisenkot's background. He is a former general, not a former PM [1].