The struggle to preserve a fair international law

1. At a Glance

• Core argument: Powerful, authoritarian leaders are wearing down the norms of international law and reshaping international institutions to serve their own interests. The Hindu op-ed by Prabhash Ranjan (Jindal Global Law School) frames the debate as the "struggle to preserve a fair international law" [1].
• Main trigger: The 2026 Nobel Peace Prize went to South African jurist Navi Pillay. The op-ed reads this as the Nobel Committee signalling that "international law matters" [1][2][3].
• The deeper question: The issue is not only whether international law survives, but what kind of international law survives. The concern is a selective, power-serving order replacing a universal, rules-bound one [1].
• UPSC relevance: The topic links the UN Charter's prohibition on the use of force (Art. 2(4)), the ICJ, international criminal accountability, and India's stake as a rule-taker that wants to become a rule-shaper (GS-II International Relations; GS-IV ethics in international relations) [1][5].

2. Why in the News

• October 2026: Navi Pillay, former UN human rights chief, was named the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize laureate [2][3][9].
• The Nobel Committee cited her work on accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide [3].
• 22 October 2026: The Hindu (Chennai edition, p. 10) carried the op-ed "The struggle to preserve a fair international law". It argues that the norm against the use of force has been "completely shredded", with multiple wars raging [1].
• The same newspaper page lists "Israel-US strikes on Iran" as a live topic tag. This is part of the use-of-force context [1].

3. Background & Evolution

• Charter foundation: Article 2(4) in Chapter I (Purposes and Principles) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force in international relations [5][7].
• 1970: UNGA Resolution 2625 (the Friendly Relations Declaration) reaffirmed the Article 2(4) prohibition [8].
• 1996: The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons held two things [6]:
• Article 2(4) must be read together with the Charter's other provisions.

• Force that is proportionate under self-defence law is still unlawful unless it also complies with international humanitarian law.

• 2003: The Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States) judgment dealt with the use of force and the limits of self-defence [7].

• 9 July 2004: The ICJ gave an advisory opinion that the UN Repertory of Practice records under Article 2(4) [7].
• 1998, ICTR: At the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Pillay was part of a landmark ruling. It held that rape and sexual violence can constitute genocide when committed with intent to destroy a protected group [3].
• July 2008: The UN General Assembly endorsed Pillay as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights [4].
• August 2014: Pillay's term as High Commissioner ended [2].
• Biden-era wording: Former US President Joe Biden relied heavily on the ambiguous term "rules-based order" instead of "international law". The author treats this as a sign of drift away from binding universal norms [1].

4. Core Static Facts

Item	Fact
Prohibition on use of force	Art. 2(4), UN Charter, in Chapter I "Purposes and Principles" [5][7]
Interpretive resolution	UNGA Res. 2625 (1970), the Friendly Relations Declaration [8]
Definitional problem	"Force", "aggression" and "armed attack" are used almost interchangeably. Lawyers complain that "force" is imprecisely defined [8]
ICJ Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion	1996. Self-defence must satisfy both proportionality and international humanitarian law [6]
Oil Platforms case	Iran v. United States. Covers use of force and self-defence [7]
2026 Nobel Peace laureate	Navanethem "Navi" Pillay, South Africa [2][9]
Pillay: tribunal role	Judge at the ICTR (Rwanda tribunal) [3]
Pillay: UN post	UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, endorsed by UNGA July 2008, served until Aug 2014 [2][4]
Nobel citation	Accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide [3]
Op-ed author	Prabhash Ranjan, Professor and Vice Dean (Research), Jindal Global Law School [1]

Key terms

• Jus ad bellum: the law on whether a resort to force is lawful (Art. 2(4) and self-defence) [6][7].
• Jus in bello / IHL: the law governing how force is used, which applies even when self-defence is lawful [6].
• "Rules-based order" vs "international law": the first is a vaguer, politically defined phrase. The second refers to treaty and customary norms [1].

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Legal / Constitutional

• The norm against force (Art. 2(4)) is weakened in two ways: by open wars and by stretched self-defence claims. The ICJ's 1996 test, which requires both proportionality and IHL compliance, is the doctrinal answer to such claims [1][6].
• The imprecise definition of "force" leaves room for self-serving interpretations by powerful states [8].
• Pillay's ICTR jurisprudence shows how international criminal law can widen accountability, for example by treating sexual violence as a form of genocide [3].

Geopolitical / Strategic

• Authoritarian leaders are described as reshaping international institutions to serve their interests, which points to institutional capture rather than simple non-compliance [1].
• Replacing "international law" with "rules-based order" lets great powers keep the moral language while choosing which rules apply to them [1].
• Analysis: For India, a weakened Art. 2(4) affects its long-standing positions on sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its call for reformed multilateralism.

Ethical / Governance

• The rule of law versus the rule of power: a "fair" international law has to bind the strong as well as the weak [1].
• The op-ed observes waning compliance with international human rights law and a rise in war crimes and crimes against humanity [1].
• The Nobel award works as normative signalling: soft power used in support of legal accountability [1][3].

Social / Human Rights

• Pillay's work brought gender-based violence into the centre of international criminal law [3].
• Analysis: When accountability declines, civilians in conflict zones bear the cost: displacement, sexual violence, impunity.

Historical

• The author says the normative decline has been going on "for quite some time" but has become precipitous in recent years [1].
• The Rwanda genocide gave rise to the ICTR. That tribunal is the precedent for the accountability model the Nobel Committee has now honoured [3].

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

• Oct 2026: Navi Pillay was awarded the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize [2][3].
• Oct 2026: The UN in South Africa congratulated Judge Pillay on the award [9].
• 2026 (ongoing): Strikes on Iran attributed to Israel and the US are a headline topic, part of the "multiple wars raging" context [1].
• 22 Oct 2026: The Hindu op-ed linked the Nobel award to the wider crisis in compliance with international law [1].

7. Prelims Hooks

• The prohibition on the threat or use of force is in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, inside Chapter I (Purposes and Principles) [5][7].
• UNGA Resolution 2625 (1970) reaffirms the Article 2(4) prohibition [8].
• The ICJ Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion was delivered in 1996 [6].
• Under that opinion, proportionate self-defence must also comply with IHL to be lawful [6].
• Oil Platforms case parties: Iran v. United States [7].
• The ICJ gave an advisory opinion on 9 July 2004 that is recorded under Article 2(4) in the UN Repertory [7].
• 2026 Nobel Peace Prize: Navi Pillay of South Africa [2][9].
• Pillay served as a judge at the ICTR (Rwanda), not the ICTY (former Yugoslavia) [3].
• An ICTR ruling in 1998 recognised rape and sexual violence as possible acts of genocide [3].
• The UNGA endorsed Pillay as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in July 2008 [4].
• Pillay's tenure as High Commissioner ended in August 2014 [2].
• The Nobel citation highlighted accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide [3].

8. Why the Veto Lets a Law-Breaker Block Its Own Punishment

• Article 2(4) has no automatic enforcer
• The Charter bans force. But only the Security Council can act against a state that uses it.
• Any of the five permanent members (the P5: US, UK, France, Russia, China) can stop Council action with one 'no' vote. This is the veto.

• So when a P5 member is itself using force, it can block any action against itself.

• The Ukraine case shows this clearly

• In February 2025 the Council voted on two amendments about Ukraine's territorial integrity and a 'just' peace.

• They got 9 and 11 votes in favour. They still failed because Russia voted against them [10].

• It is not one country's problem

• On 13 April 2026 a draft resolution on the Middle East got the votes it needed. It failed because two permanent members voted against it [11].

• So the blockage comes from more than one side of great-power politics. This is the 'institutional capture' the op-ed warns about, written into the Charter itself.

• The veto is being used more, not less

• The President of the General Assembly noted in March 2025 that vetoes have become more frequent since 2022 [12].

9. Court Rulings Without a Police Force

• ICJ judgments are binding, but enforcement goes back to the same Council
• Under Article 94(1), every UN member promises to obey ICJ decisions in cases where it is a party [15].
• Under Article 94(2), if a state does not obey, the other side can only go to the Security Council. The Council 'may' make recommendations or decide on measures [15].

• That decision can also be vetoed. So a P5 member that loses in court can block action on its own ruling.

• Advisory opinions are weaker still

• The 1996 Nuclear Weapons test (proportionality plus IHL) comes from an advisory opinion. An advisory opinion is the Court's legal advice, not an order to any state [6].

• It is strong doctrine, meaning a settled statement of what the law says. But no state is legally forced to follow it.

• Why this matters for the op-ed's argument

• The law on force is fairly clear. The weak point is that applying it depends on the powerful states the law is meant to restrain.

10. Not Only Authoritarian States Are Bending the Rules

• The strongest objection to the op-ed
• The op-ed blames mainly authoritarian leaders. Critics can reply that the Charter was never fully 'fair'. It gave five powers a veto from the start, so the strong were never fully bound.

• On this view, there is no golden age of fair international law to 'preserve'.

• What is right about this objection

• The evidence fits it. The Ukraine vetoes came from Russia [10]. But the April 2026 Middle East veto came from two permanent members [11].
• The op-ed's own example of drift, the 'rules-based order' language, comes from a democratic US President [1].

• So the erosion is a great-power problem, not only an authoritarian one.

• Where the op-ed still holds

• The Charter was unequal in who enforces it. But Article 2(4) applied to everyone [5].
• Losing that common rule hurts weaker states most. They have no veto to protect them.

• So the honest answer is this: the task is to make the law fairer, not just to 'preserve' it.

• 'Rules-based order' is not always a retreat

• India itself uses the phrase. The 2025 India–Chile joint statement backs a rules-based order that 'respects sovereignty and territorial integrity' [17].
• The phrase becomes a problem only when it is cut loose from the Charter. Tying it to sovereignty and territorial integrity is one way to keep it honest.

11. What the General Assembly Can Do When the Council Is Stuck

• The 'veto initiative' makes vetoes cost something
• UNGA Resolution 76/262 (26 April 2022) says the General Assembly must meet within 10 working days after any veto [13].
• The Council is invited to send a special report on that veto at least 72 hours before the debate [13].

• The veto-casting state must then explain itself in front of all 193 members.

• It works, but only to a point

• Liechtenstein, speaking for a group of states, said the mechanism has made the Council more accountable to the wider membership [12].

• But the Assembly can only discuss and recommend. It cannot overturn a veto. The February 2025 Ukraine amendments still stayed blocked [10].

• Proposals to limit the veto itself

• In the March 2025 debate, several states supported the French–Mexican initiative, a proposal to restrict or limit the use of the veto [12].
• Ukraine argued that a permanent member should not be able to use its veto in a conflict it is itself part of [12].

12. India's Stand and the Choices It Has to Make

• India's stated position is clear
• At the BRICS Foreign Ministers' Meeting (14 May 2026), India said respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity 'must remain the foundation of international relations' [14].
• It said the multilateral system is weakening, and called for UNSC reform in both permanent and non-permanent seats [14].

• It also asked states to resist unilateral coercive measures and sanctions that go against the UN Charter [14].

• The Global South asks for the whole Charter, not selected parts

• The 2024 BRICS Kazan Declaration, which India joined, says states must follow the Charter's principles 'in their entirety and interrelation' [16].

• This is aimed at selective use: quoting one principle (such as human rights) while ignoring another (such as non-use of force), or the reverse.

• The gap India has to explain

• India wants a permanent seat. The G4 position seeks reform, not abolition of the veto.
• A reformed Council with more veto-holders could make the blockage described above worse, not better.

• India is also not a party to the Rome Statute of the ICC (the permanent court for genocide and war crimes). This limits how strongly it can lead on the accountability agenda that Pillay's Nobel honours.

• What India can do now

• MEA should use the Resolution 76/262 debates. It can speak against every veto that protects a use of force, whichever side casts it [13]. That makes its Charter position look neutral, not partisan.
• India should state its view on veto limits. It can do this while the French–Mexican proposal is being debated [12], so that its demand for reform also covers how the veto is used, not only who holds it.

13. Anchors for Answers

• Data: Feb 2025 UNSC amendments on Ukraine's territorial integrity got 9 and 11 votes but failed because of Russia's veto [10]. An April 2026 Middle East draft had enough votes but failed because two permanent members voted against it [11]
• Report/Committee: UNSC special report on the use of the veto under Res. 76/262, 27 Feb 2025 [13]; BRICS Kazan Declaration, 2024 [16]
• Law/Case: Art. 2(4) UN Charter [5]; Art. 94: ICJ decisions are binding, but enforcement is routed through the UNSC [15]; UNGA Res. 76/262 (2022) veto initiative [13]
• Comparison: French–Mexican initiative to restrict use of the veto, backed by several states in the March 2025 UNGA debate [12]
• India's position: EAM's BRICS statement, 14 May 2026: sovereignty and territorial integrity as the foundation of international relations, and UNSC reform in both categories [14]

14. Mains Relevance

• GS-II:
• Important international institutions, agencies and fora: their structure and mandate.

• Effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India's interests.

• GS-IV: Ethical issues in international relations; the rule of law versus power politics.

• Essay: Order, justice and power in world affairs.

Model questions

1. "The replacement of 'international law' with the 'rules-based order' is more than semantics." Critically examine with reference to the prohibition on the use of force under the UN Charter. (15 marks, 250 words)
2. Authoritarian assertion is eroding international legal norms and institutions. What role can middle powers such as India play in preserving a fair international legal order? (15 marks, 250 words)
3. "Accountability for atrocity crimes is the cornerstone of a just international order." Discuss in light of the evolution of international criminal tribunals. (10 marks, 150 words)

15. Related Topics to Study Next

• UN Security Council reform: The veto paralyses enforcement of Art. 2(4), and this is central to India's G4 position.
• International Court of Justice (jurisdiction, advisory opinions): It is the main judicial organ for interpreting Charter norms.
• International Criminal Court and the Rome Statute (India not a party): It is the permanent successor to ad hoc tribunals such as the ICTR.
• International Humanitarian Law and the Geneva Conventions: These provide the jus in bello test applied in the 1996 ICJ opinion.
• Responsibility to Protect (R2P): It creates tension with Art. 2(4) and with state sovereignty.
• UN Human Rights Council and OHCHR: These are the institutions Pillay headed and that monitor compliance with human rights law.
• West Asia conflicts (Israel–Iran, Gaza): These are live test cases for use-of-force norms.
• Reformed multilateralism and India's Global South leadership: This is India's diplomatic response to institutional capture.

16. NCERT Concepts to Revise

• Promotion of international peace and security (Polity): Directive Principle asking India to respect international law and settle disputes peacefully; anchors India's stake in the norm against force.
• Rule of law (Polity): The article's core worry: law should bind the strong as well as the weak, including powerful states.
• Sovereignty (Polity): Article 2(4) protects states' territorial integrity and independence, which India's foreign-policy positions rely on.
• Human rights (Polity): Pillay's Nobel and the op-ed highlight declining compliance with human rights law and atrocity-crimes accountability.
• Accountability (Polity): The Nobel citation honours accountability for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity through tribunals like the ICTR.
• Multilateralism (Economy): The op-ed worries about institutions being captured; this concept explains rule-based cooperation among nations, though NCERT frames it through trade.

17. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• ICTR vs ICTY: Pillay served at the Rwanda tribunal (ICTR), not the Yugoslavia tribunal [3].
• Article 2(4) vs Article 51: 2(4) is the prohibition. Self-defence is the exception and sits elsewhere in the Charter. Do not mix up the two.
• Advisory opinion vs contentious judgment: The 1996 Nuclear Weapons ruling is an advisory opinion and is non-binding. Oil Platforms is a contentious case between states [6][7].
• "Rules-based order" ≠ "international law": The op-ed treats the shift in wording as a substantive retreat, not a synonym [1].
• Pillay's nationality: She is South African. Her Indian-origin heritage often leads aspirants to mark India by mistake [9].