What is the Governor’s role in a hung Assembly?

Governor's Role in a Hung Assembly — UPSC Prelims + Mains Study Note

1. At a Glance

• A hung Assembly arises when no single party or pre-election alliance wins an outright majority (> 50% of seats) in a State Legislative Assembly. [S1]
• The Governor is the constitutional pivot at this juncture — Article 164 vests the power of appointing the Chief Minister exclusively in the Governor. [S1]
• Because the Constitution provides no codified procedure for this scenario, the Governor's discretion is quasi-judicial and bounded only by constitutional conventions, commission recommendations, and Supreme Court rulings. [S1]
• High-frequency exam topic: tested under GS-II (Polity — Governor's constitutional role, federalism, judicial review of gubernatorial discretion).

2. Why in the News

• Tamil Nadu, 2026: The Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK), led by actor-turned-politician C. Joseph Vijay, emerged as the single largest party in the 234-seat Tamil Nadu Assembly elections (May 2026) but without a clear majority (majority mark: 118). [S2]
• Governor Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar refused to swear in Vijay as CM for several days, insisting on physical letters of support from ≥ 118 MLAs before recognising his claim. [S2]
• Vijay met the Governor four times; was finally scheduled to take oath on 10 May 2026 after the fourth meeting (9 May 2026). [S2]
• The episode reignited the long-standing debate on gubernatorial overreach vs. constitutional propriety in government formation. [S1]

3. Background & Evolution

4. Core Static Facts

Constitutional Provisions

• Article 163: Governor acts on the aid and advice of Council of Ministers (CoM) except where the Constitution requires him to act in his discretion.
• Article 164(1): CM appointed by Governor; other ministers appointed by Governor on advice of CM. Ministers hold office during the pleasure of the Governor.
• Article 164(1A) (inserted by 91st Amendment, 2003): Total ministers including CM ≤ 15% of total Assembly strength (minimum: 12). [S1]
• Article 174: Governor's power to summon, prorogue, dissolve Assembly.
• Article 356: President's Rule if constitutional machinery fails — must be tested on floor of Parliament within 2 months.
• 10th Schedule (52nd Amendment, 1985): Anti-defection law — disqualification of MLAs for defection relevant to majority calculation.

Sarkaria Commission Order of Preference (Hung Assembly): 1. Pre-election alliance/coalition with clear majority → leader invited first. 2. Single largest party with support of others → invited to form government. 3. Post-election coalition with majority → invited. 4. Single largest party without formal majority → invited to attempt government. 5. If none viable → fresh elections / President's/Governor's Rule. [S1]

Punchhi Commission (2010) Key Recommendations: - Governor should not be removed at the "pleasure of the President" arbitrarily; removal only by a resolution of the State Legislature. [S1] - Governor should not be a recent active politician from the state. - Floor test to be conducted within the shortest time possible after oath.

Key Terms

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Legal / Constitutional

• Article 164 grants Governor the appointment power but not the power to adjudicate majority — Bommai (1994) categorically bars the Governor from acting as a "one-person electoral college." [S1]
• Governor's discretion is justiciable: SC in multiple cases has set aside gubernatorial invitations to minority parties that were politically motivated.
• The floor test is the constitutionally mandated and only valid mode of testing majority; SC can direct a floor test on a time-bound basis (even within 24 hours in exigent cases). [S1]
• Demanding physical letters of support (as in the Tamil Nadu 2026 case) has no constitutional basis — the Constitution does not prescribe this format. [S2]

Governance / Federalism

• Governor is a Central appointee (Article 155 — appointed by President), creating structural tension with elected State governments, especially under different-party rule at Centre and State.
• PRS India analysis notes a pattern of Governor–State tensions increasing whenever Opposition parties govern States. [S1]
• The Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions both emphasised the Governor must act as a neutral constitutional functionary, not as an agent of the Central government. [S1]

Historical

• Goa, 2017: Governor invited BJP (not single largest party, Congress was) — widely criticised.
• Karnataka, 2018: Governor gave BJP 15 days to prove majority; SC curtailed it to 24 hours.
• Maharashtra, 2019: Governor swore in Devendra Fadnavis at 5 a.m. covertly; SC ordered floor test, government fell within 80 hours.
• Tamil Nadu, 2026: Governor demanded physical letters — unprecedented procedural demand; no prior SC ruling specifically on this format requirement. [S2]

Ethical / Accountability

• Governor's actions in hung assemblies are opaque — no mandatory disclosure of criteria used.
• SC in Nabam Rebia (2016) acknowledged the risk of partisan Governors destabilising elected governments through procedural delays.
• Demand for physical MLAs' letters creates risk of horse-trading and inducements — contrary to the spirit of the Representation of People Act. [S2]

6. Recent Developments (Last 12–18 Months)

• May 2026 — Tamil Nadu: Governor Arlekar delays Vijay (TVK) swearing-in for several days despite TVK being single largest party; demands 118 physical support letters. Vijay meets Governor four times; oath finally on 10 May 2026. [S2]
• 2025 — Governor vs. States pattern continues: Multiple High Courts and SC dealt with governor-related disputes in Telangana, Kerala, and West Bengal regarding assent to Bills and university appointments. [S1]
• Punchhi Commission recommendations remain unimplemented as of 2026 — the question of reforming gubernatorial appointments/removal is pending legislative action. [S1]

7. Prelims Hooks

1. The Governor appoints the Chief Minister under Article 164(1) of the Constitution.
2. Article 164(1A) (inserted by 91st Amendment, 2003) caps the Council of Ministers at 15% of Assembly strength, with a minimum of 12 ministers.
3. The Sarkaria Commission (1983–87) laid down the first systematic order of preference for inviting parties in a hung assembly.
4. The Punchhi Commission (2010) recommended that Governors should be removed only by a State Legislature resolution, not at Presidential pleasure.
5. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) — 9-judge bench; held majority must be tested on the floor of the House, not by Governor.
6. The 10th Schedule (added by 52nd Constitutional Amendment, 1985) governs anti-defection and is directly relevant to majority calculations.
7. Governor acts on aid and advice of CoM under Article 163; discretion is the exception, not the rule.
8. Article 356 (President's Rule) invocation must be approved by Parliament within two months.
9. In Karnataka 2018, the SC reduced the time given to prove majority from 15 days to 24 hours (composite floor test ordered).
10. In Maharashtra 2019, a government lasted only 80 hours before a SC-mandated floor test toppled it.
11. A Governor cannot independently assess the majority of a party through letters or personal meetings — Bommai principle.
12. The single largest party convention (not the largest coalition) is the second fallback in the Sarkaria order of preference.
13. Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) emerged as single largest party in 2026 Tamil Nadu elections; majority mark in 234-seat assembly is 118. [S2]
14. The Governor's discretion under Article 163 is subject to judicial review — it is not absolute.
15. Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016): SC held Governor cannot summon Assembly for floor test while a notice for removal of Speaker is pending.

8. Mains Relevance

GS Paper: GS-II (Indian Constitution, Governance, Federalism)

Syllabus Heading: Appointment to various Constitutional positions, powers, functions and responsibilities of various Constitutional bodies; Separation of powers; Functions and responsibilities of the Union and the States.

Plausible Mains Questions:

1. "The Governor's role in a hung assembly is the most consequential and least regulated of all gubernatorial functions." Critically examine in light of recent controversies and Supreme Court jurisprudence. (250 words)

2. Discuss the recommendations of the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions on the appointment of the Chief Minister in a hung assembly. To what extent have these been followed in practice? (250 words)

3. "The floor test, not the Governor's personal assessment, is the only constitutionally valid mechanism to determine majority." Analyse in light of relevant constitutional provisions and judicial pronouncements. (150 words)

9. Related Topics to Study Next

10. Common Errors / Trap Areas

1. Confusing Article 163 and Article 164: Article 163 defines the general relationship (Governor acts on CoM advice); Article 164 specifically covers appointment of CM and ministers. Many aspirants conflate the two.

2. Thinking Governor has unfettered discretion: After Bommai (1994), the Governor's role is ministerial, not judicial. The Governor cannot personally determine majority — this is a classic trap question.

3. Misattributing the "15% cap" to the Sarkaria Commission: The 15% ministerial cap comes from the 91st Constitutional Amendment (2003), not any commission report.

4. Confusing Sarkaria (1983-87) with Punchhi (2007-10): Sarkaria was the First Commission on Centre-State Relations; Punchhi was the Second. Both made recommendations on Governors but in different contexts and with different emphases.

5. Assuming the single largest party always has a right to be called first: The Sarkaria preference gives priority to a pre-election coalition with a majority over the single largest party — order matters in MCQs.

11. Sources

• [S1] "Governors must be fair in inviting CMs" — PRS India — https://prsindia.org/articles-by-prs-team/governors-must-be-fair-in-inviting-cms — (Tier 1)
• [S2] "What is the Governor's role in a hung Assembly?" — The Hindu, 10 May 2026 (article excerpt provided as primary source) — https://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/2026-05-10/th_international/articleGK8FV8F80-14536941.ece — (Tier 4)
• [S3] "Governor versus state: Why tensions are rising again" — PRS India — https://prsindia.org/articles-by-prs-team/governor-versus-state-why-tensions-are-rising-again — (Tier 1)
• [S4] "Removal of Governors: What does the law say?" — PRS India — https://prsindia.org/theprsblog/removal-of-governors-what-does-the-law-say — (Tier 1)