America’s new-age military populism takes shape

1. At a Glance

• "Military populism" here means the second Trump administration's overhaul of the US armed forces, which mixes technological reform with populist politics [1].
• The most visible symbol is the renaming of the Department of Defense (DoD) as the Department of War (DoW), which was its original historical name [1].
• The authors read the renaming as a small-scale picture of the administration's wider effort to "redraw the arc of America" [1].
• UPSC relevance: changes in US security institutions and doctrine affect the India–US strategic partnership, defence cooperation and the wider debate on how populism shapes institutions (GS-II: International Relations).

2. Why in the News

• On 30 September this year, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth gave a "State of the Force" address at Marine Corps Base Quantico [1].
• In the speech he attacked diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) in military programmes and institutions and set out his own replacement values [1].
• He "doubled down" on the speech he gave to an assembly of commanders in 2025 [1].
• Harsh V. Pant and Vivek Mishra of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) analysed the speech in The Hindu (6 October 2026, p. 8, International edition) [1].

3. Background & Evolution

• The second Trump administration is approaching the midpoint of its term. The authors describe the country as "a rapidly changing America" [1].
• Change is happening on two fronts:
• External: foreign-policy shifts that force other countries and regions to recalibrate [1].

• Internal: changes that are "beginning to shake the old structures of governance, security and finance" [1].

• Sequence of events, as reported in the article:

• The administration attacked its predecessor's DEI agenda across programmes and institutions [1].
• Hegseth gave a speech to assembled military leadership in 2025 [1].
• The DoD was renamed the Department of War [1].

• Hegseth gave the "State of the Force" address at Quantico on 30 September [1].

• Historical precedent: "Department of War" was the department's original name, so the change is presented as a return to the past rather than a new invention [1].

• Not in the retrieved sources; verify before exam use: the US War Department was created in 1789. The National Security Act, 1947 and its 1949 amendments reorganised it into the National Military Establishment and then the Department of Defense.

4. Core Static Facts

Item	Fact
Renamed body	Department of Defense (DoD) → Department of War (DoW) [1]
Nature of the name	DoW was the original historical name [1]
Head of department	Pete Hegseth, Secretary of War [1]
Address	"State of the Force", 30 September [1]
Venue	Marine Corps Base Quantico [1]
Main ideological target	Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) [1]
Political context	Second Trump administration, near the midpoint of its term [1]
Analysts	Harsh V. Pant (Vice President, ORF); Vivek Mishra (Deputy Director, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF) [1]
Article	The Hindu, 6 October 2026, Page 8, International [1]

Key terms:

• Military populism: using the armed forces, their symbols and their values to advance a populist political agenda, often framed as a fight against existing institutions and elites.
• DEI: diversity, equity and inclusion policies [1].

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Geopolitical / Strategic

• Washington's foreign-policy shifts are forcing recalibrations across countries and regions [1].
• The name "Department of War" signals a stance focused on fighting wars rather than defence or deterrence. Partners such as India need to reassess how predictable and committed the US is.
• India's defence ties with the US are institutionalised, so any change in US military priorities affects them directly.

Ethical / Governance

• Removing DEI from military programmes [1] raises questions about merit versus representation and about keeping the military politically neutral.
• A political appointee setting out the military's values in a public address blurs the line between the civilian government and a professional, non-partisan military.

Historical

• Bringing back the original name [1] is a form of symbolic politics: an appeal to a nostalgic idea of "restoring" past national strength.

Institutional / Administrative

• The authors argue that internal changes are reshaping the structures of governance, security and finance, not just foreign policy [1].
• The authors' central claim is that technological reform is being tied to populist political messaging [1].

Social

• Rolling back DEI affects how the military recruits and retains women and minorities, and how it presents itself to them [1].

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

• 2025: Hegseth's speech to an assembly of senior military leaders [1].
• The Department of Defense was renamed the Department of War [1].
• 30 September (current year): "State of the Force" address at Quantico, renewing the attack on DEI [1].
• The administration is near the midpoint of its second term, and the DoW renaming is the most visible symbol of its military overhaul [1].

7. Prelims Hooks

• The US Department of Defense has been renamed the Department of War, its original historical name [1].
• The head of the renamed department is the Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth [1].
• The "State of the Force" address was given at Marine Corps Base Quantico [1].
• Date of the address: 30 September [1].
• The address mainly targeted DEI policies [1].
• The analysis comes from the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), a think tank based in New Delhi [1].
• Harsh V. Pant is Vice President of ORF [1].
• Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director of ORF's Strategic Studies Programme [1].
• The theme is "new-age military populism": technological reform combined with populist politics [1].
• The authors call the renaming a "microcosm" of the administration's attempt to redraw America's arc [1].

8. Renamed in Speeches, Not Yet in Law

• The new name is only a second title so far
• Trump's 2025 executive order (an order signed by the President alone) lets the Department of Defense also be called the Department of War [3].

• The official name is still the Department of Defense. Changing it needs approval from Congress, the US Parliament [2].

• Why the President cannot do it alone

• The US Constitution gives Congress the power to create government departments [2].
• The name "Department of Defense" was set by a law Congress passed. An executive order cannot overrule a law [2].

• Trump's allies in Congress have brought a bill to make the name permanent [3].

• What this means in practice

• The order makes other federal agencies use the new name in letters and in nonstatutory documents (papers that are not laws) [3].

• So the name is used every day but stands on weak legal ground. A future President could drop it unless Congress passes the bill.

• Exam point: the rename is a good example of symbolic change that runs ahead of legal change. Do not write that the department has been "legally renamed".

9. The Bigger Change Is Who Gets to Lead the Military

• The 2026 speech went beyond words to removing senior officers
• In the Quantico "State of the Force" address, Hegseth announced a 20% cut in the number of US generals and admirals [4].

• He said any general or admiral "involved in" DEI "has got to go" [4].

• Why this matters for a professional military

• Officers are being cut partly for following the previous government's policy, not for failing in battle [4].

• Senior officers who watch this may stop giving honest advice that the political leadership does not want to hear. This is the core risk to civilian control of the military (elected leaders direct the forces, but the forces stay non-partisan).

• The damage is slow to repair

• Some members of Congress called the cuts a "purge" that will take years to rebuild [4].

• A general takes decades to train. Experience lost in one round of firing cannot be hired back quickly.

• The audience was also new

• The 2026 address was given to junior officers and enlisted leaders (the lower ranks) [4], unlike the 2025 meeting of senior commanders [1].
• Speaking directly to the lower ranks about the leaders above them is the populist part of "military populism": the people against the elite, inside the army itself.

10. The Case for the Overhaul, and Where It Falls Short

• The strongest argument in its favour
• The US military is top-heavy. Cutting 20% of generals and admirals reduces layers of command [4].
• The same speech set up a new drone command, a real step towards modern warfare [4]. This is the "technological reform" half of the authors' argument [1].

• The name "War" is at least honest: the US has been fighting a war with Iran. Hegseth put its cost at about $37.5 billion [6], and the Pentagon has asked Congress for roughly $80 billion, mostly to pay for it [7].

• What this argument gets right

• Drones and smaller command chains are real needs. A critic who rejects the whole package rejects these too.

• Where it falls short

• Making the military leaner does not require choosing whom to remove by political test. Linking the cuts to DEI turns an efficiency reform into a loyalty check [4].
• A war costing tens of billions [6][7] is exactly when a country most needs experienced commanders, and that is when experience is being removed.
• So the two halves the authors describe — technology reform and populist politics [1] — can work against each other. The populist half weakens the institution the technology half is trying to modernise.

11. What India Should Watch in Its Own Defence Ties

• India signed a long-term deal with this same leadership
• On 31 October 2025, Rajnath Singh and Hegseth signed a 10-year India–US defence framework (2025–2035) in Kuala Lumpur [5].

• It covers technology cooperation, linking defence supply chains, interoperability (forces able to work together) and joint exercises [5].

• Why US internal changes reach India

• Each of these goals depends on stable US institutions and experienced officers to carry them out [5].
• When senior ranks are cut and reshuffled [4], the people who run partnership programmes also change. Projects can slow down even if the agreement stays on paper.

• The deal was signed during a period of tariff tension between the two countries [5]. This shows defence ties and trade ties can pull in different directions.

• Money and attention may shift to West Asia

• The Iran war's cost [6] and the $80 billion request [7] mean US budgets and focus are tied up away from the Indo-Pacific.

• What India can do

• Ministry of Defence: use the 10-year framework's set channels — exercises, supply-chain and technology work [5] — so cooperation runs on institutions, not on personal ties with one Secretary.
• Ministry of Defence: spread risk across partners. Rajnath Singh has already set out a 10-year defence diplomacy roadmap for wider global partnerships [8].

12. Anchors for Answers

• Data: 20% cut in the number of US generals and admirals, announced at Quantico [4]; US war with Iran cost about $37.5 billion (Hegseth) [6]; Pentagon request of about $80 billion to Congress, mostly for the Iran war [7]
• Law/Case: The US Constitution gives Congress the power to create departments. The DoD name is set by law, so the 2025 executive order gives only a "secondary title" [2][3]
• Comparison: India–US 10-year defence framework (2025–2035), signed 31 Oct 2025 at Kuala Lumpur, covering technology, supply chains and interoperability [5]
• Scheme: India's 10-year defence diplomacy roadmap for global partnerships — a way to reduce dependence on any single partner [8]

13. Mains Relevance

• GS-II: "Effect of policies and politics of developed countries on India's interests"; "Bilateral relations involving India".
• GS-III: "Security challenges and their management", for comparing how civilian authorities control militaries.
• GS-IV: ethics of a politically neutral military, and institutional integrity.
• Possible question stems: 1. "Renaming the US Department of Defense as the Department of War is more than symbolism." Discuss the implications for global security and for India–US defence ties. 2. What is "military populism"? Examine how populist politics is reshaping military institutions in democracies. 3. The US is shifting its priorities both internally and externally. How should India recalibrate its strategic partnership with the US?

14. Related Topics to Study Next

• India–US defence frameworks (for example, the foundational agreements): to judge how exposed India is to changes in US military policy.
• Quad and Indo-Pacific strategy: these are shaped by Washington's foreign-policy shifts [1].
• Populism and democratic institutions: the wider theory behind the article's thesis.
• Civilian control of the military: a comparison of the US with India's own model.
• Military technology and AI in warfare: the "technological reform" half of the authors' argument [1].
• US tariff and trade policy: the other internal changes to "finance" structures the authors mention [1].
• NATO burden-sharing debates: an example of other regions being forced to recalibrate [1].

15. NCERT Concepts to Revise

• Politics (Polity): Populism is a style of politics; understanding how societies make collective decisions helps explain the article's thesis.
• Partisanship (Polity): A political appointee pushing a partisan agenda on the military raises the question of a neutral, non-partisan force.
• Governance (Polity): The authors say internal changes are shaking old structures of governance, security and finance.
• Equity (Geography): Hegseth's attack on diversity, equity and inclusion makes equal access to opportunity a core idea to understand.
• Executive (Polity): Renaming the department and setting military values are executive actions, so civilian control of the armed forces is central.
• Developed countries (Economy): The US is a developed country, and exam questions ask how developed countries' policies affect India's interests.

16. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• The rename is a revival, not a new name. "Department of War" was the department's original historical name [1].
• Wrong title for Hegseth. Use "Secretary of War" [1], not "Secretary of Defense", when writing about the current period.
• Mixing up the two speeches. The 30 September "State of the Force" address is separate from the 2025 speech it built on [1].
• Wrong affiliation for the authors. Pant and Mishra are with ORF, not a government body [1].
• Unverified dates. The founding and reorganisation dates (1789; National Security Act 1947/1949) and the legal basis of the rename (executive order or Act of Congress) were not confirmed by the retrieved sources. Check them before relying on them.