B.P. Singhal case

Also called: B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) · Topic: State Government: Governor, Chief Minister, State Legislature and Union Territories · NCERT: Beyond NCERT

Meaning

B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (7 May 2010) is a five-judge Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court. It held that the President, acting on the Union government's advice, can remove a Governor at any time. But the removal cannot be arbitrary, and it must rest on valid and compelling reasons [1].

• Why it matters: the Constitution itself gives no grounds for removing a Governor. This case is the main legal limit on the Union's power to remove Governors.
• Exam use: it sits at the centre of the debate over whether the Governor is a neutral constitutional head or an agent of the Centre.

Explanation

Background: why the case arose

• Art. 156(1): the Governor holds office "during the pleasure of the President". The pleasure doctrine means a person stays in office only as long as the appointing authority wishes.
• The Constitution sets no fixed term that protects the Governor. There is no impeachment, and no grounds for removal are listed.

• Under Art. 74, the President acts on the advice of the Union Council of Ministers. So in effect, the Union government decides both appointment and removal [1].

• The trigger: the government at the Centre changed in 2004. After that, the Governors of Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana and Goa were removed [1].

• The challenge: a public interest petition (a case filed for the public good, not for a personal injury) questioned these removals. It reached a five-judge Constitution Bench.

What the Court held

• The power exists.
• The Union can remove a Governor at any time.

• It does not have to give reasons, and it does not have to give the Governor a hearing [1].

• But the power has limits.

• It cannot be used arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably. "Capriciously" means on a whim [1].

• It should be used only in rare and exceptional circumstances, for valid and compelling reasons [1].

• Grounds that are NOT valid [1]:

• The Governor is out of step with the Union's policies or ideology.
• The Union has lost confidence in the Governor.
• The party in power at the Centre has changed.

How a removed Governor can challenge it

• Limited judicial review is available. Judicial review means the courts' power to check whether a government action is legal [1].

• Steps: 1. The removed Governor goes to court. 2. The Governor must first show a prima facie case of arbitrariness. This means the claim must look valid at first sight [1]. 3. Only then does the court look more closely at the removal.

• Limit: the review is narrow. The court does not decide whether removing the Governor was a wise choice. It checks only whether the removal was arbitrary.

In the Constitution and practice

• Constitutional base:
• Art. 155: the President appoints the Governor by warrant under his hand and seal (a formal written order).
• Art. 156(1): the Governor serves during the pleasure of the President.

• Art. 156(3): the Governor has a five-year term and stays in office until a successor takes charge [4]. The five years is still subject to the President's pleasure.

• Constituent Assembly, 31 May 1949 [4]:

• One member warned that the "pleasure" wording would make the Governor "a creature of the President", open to arbitrary removal.
• An amendment tried to limit removal to treason, threats to the Union's security, incapacity, bribery or corruption. It was rejected as unnecessary.
• The pleasure clause was adopted the same day.

• B.P. Singhal brought back, through the courts, some of the protection this amendment had tried to give.

• Earlier case it builds on: Hargovind Pant v. Raghukul Tilak (1979) held that the Governor holds an independent constitutional office and is not an employee or servant of the Union government.

• The ruling in practice:
• Governors were still changed in large numbers after the changes of government at the Centre in 2004 and 2014.

• The judgment protects Governors on paper more than in practice.

• Reform proposals with the same aim:

• Sarkaria Commission (1988): Governors should finish the 5-year term except in rare and compelling cases. They should be told the grounds for removal and given a chance to explain [1][2].
• NCRWC (2002): consult the CM before removing a Governor early [1].
• Punchhi Commission (2010): delete "during the pleasure of the President" from the Constitution. Remove a Governor only by a resolution of the state legislature [1][3].
• None of these has become law, and none binds the Union [3].

Don't confuse with

• Hargovind Pant v. Raghukul Tilak (1979): this case is about the Governor's status: the Governor is not a Union employee. B.P. Singhal (2010) is about removal: the Governor cannot be removed arbitrarily.
• Impeachment of the President (Art. 61): the President can be removed only through this formal process in Parliament. The Governor has no impeachment procedure. B.P. Singhal did not create one. It only added the condition that removal must not be arbitrary, checked through limited judicial review.
• Punchhi Commission (2010): both date from 2010, but they are different. Punchhi recommended deleting the pleasure clause and letting the state legislature remove the Governor; this has not been enacted [1][3]. B.P. Singhal kept the pleasure clause and only limited how it can be used.
• Sarkaria Commission (1988): it gave advice that does not bind the government [1][2]. B.P. Singhal is a Supreme Court judgment that binds as law.

Prelims Hooks

• B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) → five-judge Constitution Bench → a Governor can be removed at any time, but not arbitrarily [1].
• Trap: a change of party in power at the Centre, a policy or ideology difference, or loss of confidence is not a valid ground for removing a Governor [1].
• Trap: the Union does not have to give reasons or a hearing before removal. Limited judicial review is available, but only after the Governor shows a prima facie case of arbitrariness [1].
• Art. 156(1) → "during the pleasure of the President". The Constitution has no impeachment for Governors and lists no grounds for removal.
• Background removals (2004) → Governors of UP, Gujarat, Haryana and Goa [1].
• Punchhi (2010) → removal by resolution of the state legislature. Contrast with B.P. Singhal, which kept the pleasure clause [1][3].

Mains Points

• Agent of the Centre or constitutional head?
• Arts. 155-156, read with Art. 74, put both appointment and removal in the Union's hands.
• B.P. Singhal set limits on removal, but judicial review stays narrow, and Governors were still replaced in large numbers after 2004 and 2014.

• Argue that security of tenure is needed for an impartial Governor. This matters more at state level because the Governor has more discretion than the President.

• Turn the judgment into law.

• Sarkaria (1988): a full 5-year term and a chance to explain before removal [1][2]. NCRWC (2002): consult the CM before early removal [1]. Punchhi (2010): remove the pleasure clause [1][3].

• None has been enacted. The Inter-State Council's Standing Committee has finished discussing all 273 Punchhi recommendations [5]. A constitutional amendment or a statutory process could put the B.P. Singhal limits into the Constitution or an Act.

• Federalism angle.

• Removing Governors for partisan reasons weakens cooperative federalism, the idea that the Union and states work together as partners.
• Applying the B.P. Singhal rule (no removal just because the government at the Centre changed) would help rebuild trust between the Union and the states.

Related concepts

• Governor
• Qualifications of the Governor

Read more

• The state executive and the office of Governor