Sabarimala case

Also called: Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala · Topic: Secularism: Western and Indian Models · NCERT: Beyond NCERT

Meaning

The Sabarimala case (Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, 28 September 2018, 4:1) is the Supreme Court judgment that said keeping women aged 10-50 out of the Sabarimala Ayyappa temple in Kerala violated equality and religious freedom, including women's own right to worship under Article 25. It matters because the 2019 review (Kantaru Rajeevaru, 3:2) sent wider questions on religious freedom to a larger bench. A nine-judge bench is now deciding these questions, and its answer will apply to temples, mosques, Parsi fire temples and Dawoodi Bohra practices.

Explanation

The dispute and the 2018 judgment

• The practice: Women aged 10-50 (roughly the years in which women menstruate) were not allowed to enter the Sabarimala Ayyappa temple in Kerala.
• The legal basis: Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules 1965 allowed women to be kept out on grounds of custom.
• Holding (4:1): The exclusion violated equality and religious freedom, and Rule 3(b) was struck down.
• Main findings:
• Ayyappa devotees are not a separate religious denomination. A religious denomination is a group with a common faith, a common organisation and a distinct name.
• Since the devotees are not a denomination, Article 26 (a denomination's right to manage its own religious affairs) did not protect the practice.
• Women have their own right to worship under Article 25.

The separate opinions

• Chandrachud J. went further:
• He said the exclusion rested on ideas of "purity and pollution".
• So he treated it as a form of untouchability, which Article 17 forbids "in any form".

• He also proposed the anti-exclusion principle. Courts should not ask whether a practice is "essential". They should ask whether it excludes or humiliates people. If it does, it must give way to fundamental rights.

• Indu Malhotra J. (dissent):

• Courts should not impose rationality on faith (they should not judge belief by the standards of logic).
• In a plural country, the worshippers of a deity should decide what their religion requires.

The review and the nine-judge reference

• Kantaru Rajeevaru v. IYLA (14 November 2019, 3:2): This was Review Petition (Civil) No. 3358 of 2018 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 373 of 2006 [2].
• The majority did not decide the review. It sent four wider questions to a larger bench:
• how Article 25 and Article 26 work together;
• how wide the essential religious practices (ERP) test is, and how far judicial review (the court's power to check whether an action is constitutional) can go;
• what "constitutional morality" means (testing a practice against core constitutional values such as equality, liberty, dignity and fraternity, not against majority social views);

• whether an outsider to a faith has standing (the right to bring a case) to challenge its practice.

• Other cases tied to these questions:

• entry of Muslim women into mosques;
• entry of Parsi women married outside the faith into the fire temple (agiary);
• female genital cutting (khafz) among Dawoodi Bohras;

• Dawoodi Bohra excommunication, added in 2023. This reopens Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin (1962), which protected the power to excommunicate.

• February 2020: A nine-judge bench framed the questions. It held that a bench hearing a review can refer questions of law to a larger bench.

• April-May 2026: The nine-judge bench heard arguments, with transcripts recorded for 28 April and 13 May 2026 [1][2].
• In court, the bench was described as thinking about religion as a concept, not just deciding one case [2].

• Counsel argued that a practice must be both essential and an integral part of a religion. Otherwise, purely secular practices could be passed off as religious ones to claim protection [1].

• Status: The judgment is still awaited (verify current).

In the Constitution and practice

• Article 25(1): Every person has freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion. This right is limited by public order, morality and health and by the other rights in Part III.
• Article 25(2)(b): The state may make laws for social welfare and reform. It may also open Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. This is the main constitutional basis for temple-entry claims.
• Article 26: A religious denomination may manage its own affairs in matters of religion. Sabarimala failed this test because the devotees were held not to be a denomination.
• Article 17: Abolishes untouchability. Chandrachud J. used it in Sabarimala.
• The ERP doctrine behind the case:
• Shirur Mutt (1954, seven judges): "Religion" includes rituals and modes of worship, not only belief. What is essential is judged by the religion's own tenets (its own doctrines and texts).

• Durgah Committee, Ajmer (1961): Only essential and integral practices are protected. Practices that come from "superstitious beliefs" are not. In effect, the court became the judge of what a faith truly requires.

• Indian secularism in action:

• The Western model keeps religion and state strictly apart (mutual exclusion).
• Indian secularism follows principled distance. The state may step in to end intra-religious domination, which means one group inside a religion oppressing another, such as women being barred from temples.

• Sabarimala is a leading example of this approach.

• Related cases now tied to the same questions:

• Shayara Bano (2017, 3:2): set aside instant triple talaq [3];
• Aishat Shifa (2022, 1:1): the hijab case, also sent to a larger bench (verify current).

Don't confuse with

• Shayara Bano (2017, triple talaq): That was also a 3:2 case about women's rights in religion. But it struck down talaq-e-biddat (instant triple talaq) in Muslim personal law. Sabarimala (4:1) concerned temple entry.
• Kantaru Rajeevaru (2019) vs IYLA (2018): IYLA is the 4:1 judgment on the merits. Kantaru Rajeevaru is the 3:2 review order. It did not overturn IYLA. It sent wider questions to a larger bench.
• Essential religious practices test vs anti-exclusion principle: The ERP test asks whether a practice is essential to the religion. The anti-exclusion principle (Chandrachud J., IYLA 2018) asks whether the practice excludes or humiliates people.
• Article 25 vs Article 26: Article 25 protects every individual's religious freedom. Article 26 protects a religious denomination's right to manage its religious affairs. Sabarimala turned on the finding that Ayyappa devotees are not a denomination.

Prelims Hooks

• IYLA (28 September 2018) was 4:1. The only dissent came from Indu Malhotra J., the only woman on the bench.
• Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules 1965 was struck down. Ayyappa devotees were held not to be a separate religious denomination.
• Trap: Chandrachud J. linked the exclusion of women to Article 17 (untouchability) because of "purity and pollution" ideas. He did not rely only on Article 14.
• Kantaru Rajeevaru (14 November 2019) was 3:2. It referred questions on women's entry into mosques, Parsi women in the agiary and Dawoodi Bohra FGC. Bohra excommunication was added in 2023.
• February 2020: A nine-judge bench held that a review bench can refer questions of law to a larger bench. It heard arguments in April-May 2026 [1][2].
• Origin of the ERP test: Shirur Mutt (1954). The "superstitious beliefs" exclusion comes from Durgah Committee, Ajmer (1961).

Mains Points

• Courts as theologians vs courts as guardians of rights:
• The ERP test makes judges read scripture and decide what a faith requires. This sits badly with Article 26 autonomy and personal faith.
• Chandrachud J.'s anti-exclusion test and the constitutional morality test focus on dignity and equality instead.

• The risk is that these tests give judges even wider discretion. Indu Malhotra J.'s dissent warns against imposing rationality on faith.

• Group autonomy vs individual equality:

• The Sabarimala, Parsi and Bohra cases all set a group's right to manage its religion against a woman's equality inside her own faith.

• The nine-judge bench's answer, still awaited, will set the rule for all of them [2].

• Principled distance in practice:

• Under Article 25(2), the Indian state and courts may step in to end intra-religious domination, as they did in Sabarimala.
• Under the Western model of strict separation, they would stay out.
• This shows how Indian secularism treats reform within religion as a constitutional goal.

Related concepts

• Essential religious practices doctrine
• Ismail Faruqui case
• Hijab case

Read more

• Essential religious practices and the courts