The 91st Constitutional Amendment sought to curb jumbo ministries. Assess its effectiveness, and consider whether delimitation-linked expansion of the Lok Sabha should automatically enlarge the Council of Ministers.

The 91st Constitutional Amendment, 2003 inserted Articles 75(1A) and 164(1A). These cap the Council of Ministers, including the PM or CM, at 15% of the Lower House, with a minimum of 12 ministers in States [1]. The cap has stopped unlimited ministries, but it has only partly achieved its aim of a lean executive.

Effectiveness: Gains

• Fixed legal ceiling: The Union ministry cannot exceed 81 (15% of 543) [4]. This ended the earlier practice of offering berths without limit to hold coalitions together.
• Courts can enforce it: In Aires Rodrigues v. State of Goa (2009), the Bombay High Court held that Parliamentary Secretaries with Cabinet rank violate Article 164(1A) [3].

Effectiveness: Limitations

• Looser than recommended: The NCRWC proposed a 10% ceiling [2]. At the Union level, 15% allows about 27 more ministers.
• A ceiling used as a target: Nothing in the Constitution asks how many ministers governance actually needs.
• Workarounds: States created posts outside the cap. Punjab appointed 20 and Haryana 11 Chief Parliamentary Secretaries [3]. The HP High Court (2005) quashed such posts [3], but they have been challenged case by case.
• Small States: A 40-member Assembly must allow 12 ministers, which is 30% of the House.

Should a bigger Lok Sabha automatically mean a bigger ministry?

• For: With 815 seats, the cap would rise to 122 [4]. More constituencies would want regional and social representation in government, and the 2003 ratio would stay the same.
• Against:
• The work of government depends on the number of departments, not the number of MPs. The US Cabinet has just 22 department and agency heads [5].
• Weaker scrutiny of the executive: Collective responsibility binds every minister to government decisions. In a larger House, ordinary MPs would also get less speaking time and fewer chances in the question ballot [5].
• An accident of formula: The rise from 81 to 122 happens only because the cap is a percentage.

Verdict: Enlargement should not be automatic. The 131st Amendment Bill was negatived in April 2026 [4], but any future delimitation should set the ministry size deliberately.

Overall, the 91st Amendment set a limit but did not ensure a lean executive. Two steps would complete it: setting the cap on a needs-based or absolute basis (10% of 815 is about 81, today's size), and bringing all posts with ministerial rank under it. This would strengthen accountability to Parliament under Article 75(3) and the NCRWC's vision of a lean, accountable government.