The anti-defection law's merger exception has become a route to legitimise defections. Discuss in light of recent splits in regional parties, and suggest reforms.

The Tenth Schedule disqualifies legislators who defect. Under Paragraph 4, however, they are exempt if two-thirds of a legislature party agree to merge with another party [1]. The one-third "split" exception was repealed in 2003, so this merger route now carries the mass defections the law was meant to stop [1].

How the merger exception legitimises defection

• Numbers over principle: a larger party can lawfully absorb two-thirds of a smaller party's legislators [2]. A lone defector is punished, but a large enough group is protected.
• Deemed merger: the Bombay High Court held that two-thirds of the legislature party agreeing to a merger is different from the original party itself merging [1]. So the party organisation outside the House need not merge at all.
• Partisan umpire: the Speaker decides disqualification, and the Schedule sets no time limit [1]. Defectors keep their seats and posts while the petitions wait.

Evidence from regional-party splits

• Shiv Sena (2022): 40 of 55 MLAs left and formed a government with the BJP. They did not merge with any party; instead, both factions claimed to be the real Shiv Sena [1].
• Telangana and Andhra Pradesh: 26 opposition MLAs joined the ruling TRS, and no petition was decided before the Assembly was dissolved. In Andhra Pradesh, 23 YSRCP MLAs joined the TDP, and four became ministers [1].
• AITC (2026): rebel MP Kakoli Ghosh Dastidar claims to belong to the NCPI through a "purported merger". While disqualification proceedings against her are still pending, she has been made chair of the Standing Committee on Chemicals and Fertilizers [3].

The other side

• Some mergers reflect genuine political realignment. A two-thirds threshold is also a higher bar than the repealed one-third split rule [1].

Suggested reforms

• Repeal the merger exemption, as the Law Commission's 170th Report (1999) recommended: a member who leaves the party should also leave the House [1].
• Neutral adjudicator: the President or Governor should decide, on the Election Commission's advice (Law Commission, 2015) [1].
• Codify the Supreme Court's 2020 direction that petitions be decided within three months [1].
• Time-bound judicial review: a challenge to Sharad Yadav's 2017 disqualification stayed pending in the Delhi High Court for years [2].
• Limit disqualification for defying the whip to confidence and money votes (Dinesh Goswami Committee, 1990) [1].

Recent splits in regional parties show the merger exception working as a loophole, not a safeguard. Closing it and making adjudication neutral and time-bound would protect the voter's mandate, which the NCRWC saw as the law's purpose [1]. That would strengthen representative democracy.