Department-Related Standing Committees are the backbone of parliamentary oversight, yet their composition depends on conventions rather than rules. Critically examine.

India's 24 Department-Related Standing Committees (DRSCs) were set up in 1993. They examine ministries' Demands for Grants, Bills and policies away from the party battles of the floor. Yet who chairs them depends on the presiding officer's nomination and inter-party convention, not on a written formula. The October 2026 Trinamool dispute has exposed this gap [1].

DRSCs as the backbone of oversight

• Detailed financial scrutiny: each 31-member committee (21 Lok Sabha, 10 Rajya Sabha) examines Demands for Grants ministry by ministry. The House cannot do this in its limited sitting days.
• Better laws: Bills referred to committees get expert evidence and clause-by-clause study. 60% of Bills went to committees in the 14th Lok Sabha and 71% in the 15th [2].
• Consensus over confrontation: sittings are closed-door, there is no party whip and ministers cannot be members, so cross-party reports are possible.
• Agenda-setting: committees choose their own subjects, so Opposition chairs help decide what gets examined.

Weaknesses of convention-based composition

• Discretion without criteria: the Speaker or Chairman nominates chairs. Sharing them by party strength is only a convention. The AITC says it was denied a chair even in 2019, when it was the third-largest party [1].
• Pre-judging defection cases: rebel MP Kakoli Ghosh Dastidar was named chair of the Chemicals and Fertilizers committee on the basis of a contested "merger." Tenth Schedule petitions against her are still pending. The Mamata-led AITC got no chair at all [1].
• Conflict of roles: the same office decides disqualification, and the Schedule sets no deadline. The Supreme Court's three-month direction is not written into law. In Telangana, petitions against 26 MLAs who defected were never decided [3].
• Fewer Bills referred: referral is also discretionary. The share of Bills sent to committees fell to 26% in the 16th Lok Sabha [2] and 16% in the 17th [4].

DRSCs remain Parliament's strongest tool for holding the executive to account, but discretionary composition and referral weaken them. Parliament should write chair-sharing by party strength into the Rules of Procedure. Members facing pending defection petitions should not be counted for any party until the case is decided. The three-month deadline should go into the Tenth Schedule, and major Bills should be referred to committees by default. Rule-bound oversight would strengthen the executive's collective responsibility to the Lok Sabha under Article 75(3).