"ASEAN centrality and India's Indo‑Pacific strategy converge at sea." Analyse in the context of the ASEAN‑India Year of Maritime Cooperation 2026.

ASEAN centrality is the principle that ASEAN, not outside powers, should lead regional arrangements. India has placed this principle at the core of its Indo‑Pacific approach by linking the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo‑Pacific (AOIP) [2]. At the 22nd ASEAN‑India Summit, 2026 was declared the Year of Maritime Cooperation [3]. This makes the sea the main place where the two visions meet, but they meet more fully on principles than on capability.

Strands of convergence

• Doctrinal: The move from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR extends India's maritime vision "across regions" [4]. AIME‑2026 at Subic Bay is framed explicitly under Act East and MAHASAGAR [1].
• Security: AIME's stated aim is interoperability [1]. The inaugural edition's sea phase was held in the South China Sea with about 1,400 personnel on 9 ships [5]. India has also proposed a second ASEAN‑India Defence Ministers' Meeting [3].
• Normative: India backs freedom of navigation and peaceful settlement of disputes under UNCLOS 1982 without taking sides on sovereignty [6]. This fits ASEAN's preference for an inclusive regional order rather than rival blocs.
• Economic: The Year aims to build blue economy partnerships [3]. The Joint Statement on Maritime Cooperation adds fisheries, the marine environment and climate change [7].
• Institutional: The two sides have committed to cooperation between the AOIP and India's Indo‑Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) [2].

Limits to convergence

• Uneven participation: Only 7 of the 10 ASEAN navies joined AIME‑2023. Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar did not take part [5].
• Low frequency: Three years passed between the first and second editions (2023 and 2026) [5][1]. The exercise has not yet become a regular fixture, and it was held again only after a fresh proposal at summit level [3].
• Consensus drag: Because India defers to ASEAN centrality [2], its security cooperation can only move as fast as the most hesitant ASEAN member allows.
• Trade lag: The AITIGA review was still under negotiation in July 2026, even though trade reached USD 128 billion in 2025–26 [8]. The economic side of the partnership is behind the naval side.

Synthesis: The two visions converge fully on norms and diplomacy, but only partly on operational capability.

Overall, India's maritime engagement in 2026 puts ASEAN centrality into practice rather than competing with it. The next steps are to:

• fix a regular AIME schedule through the Defence Ministers' track;
• add search‑and‑rescue, disaster‑relief and illegal‑fishing drills under the Plan of Action 2026–30 [3], which could attract the members that stayed away;
• conclude the AITIGA review.

Together, these steps would turn convergence at sea into a lasting, rules‑based partnership in line with SDG 14 (life below water).