ASEAN-INDIA MARITIME EXERCISE (AIME-2026) COMMENCES IN SUBIC BAY, PHILIPPINES

1. At a Glance

• AIME is a multilateral naval exercise between the Indian Navy and the maritime forces of ASEAN Member States. The second edition (AIME‑2026) began at Subic Bay, Philippines on 28 Sep 2026 [1].
• The exercise is conducted "in furtherance of India's Act East Policy" and the vision of MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) [1].
• It is the military (hard‑security) side of 2026 – ASEAN‑India Year of Maritime Cooperation, which was declared at the 22nd ASEAN‑India Summit [4].
• UPSC relevance: it links Indo‑Pacific strategy, India–ASEAN relations, the SAGAR→MAHASAGAR shift and naval diplomacy. Both the name and the edition sequence are easy Prelims material.

2. Why in the News

• 30 Sep 2026: the Ministry of Defence (PIB) announced that AIME‑2026 had begun at Subic Bay on 28 Sep 2026 with INS Sahyadri and INS Kulish taking part [1].
• Theme: "Anchored in Trust, United at Sea" [1].
• Guest of Honour at the Opening Ceremony: Shri Harsh Kumar Jain, Ambassador of India to the Philippines [1].

3. Background & Evolution

• Rationale: mutual understanding, cooperation and interoperability through professional, operational and social engagement [1].
• Milestones in order:
• ASEAN‑India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP): Joint Statement published by MEA [7]. The year is not verified in the sources used here; check it on mea.gov.in.
• ASEAN‑India Joint Statement on Maritime Cooperation [8]. Its focus areas are maritime security, blue economy, sustainable fisheries, marine environmental protection, marine biodiversity and climate change [8].
• 29 Nov 2023: the Indian Navy held the maiden "MAHASAGAR" high‑level virtual interaction with Indian Ocean Region navies (Bangladesh, Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Tanzania) [6]. This is a different thing from the 2025 doctrine of the same name (see §10).
• May 2023, AIME‑2023 (inaugural edition), Singapore: INS Satpura and INS Delhi under RAdm Gurcharan Singh reached Singapore on 01 May 2023. The exercise ran 02–08 May 2023 [2].
  • Harbour Phase at Changi Naval Base, 02–04 May.
  • Sea Phase in the South China Sea, 07–08 May [3].
• Joint Statement linking the CSP to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo‑Pacific (AOIP), "with the support of India's Act East Policy" [9].
• March 2025: PM launched the MAHASAGAR doctrine in Mauritius. It builds on SAGAR ("Security and Growth for All in the Region"), which was first set out in Mauritius about ten years earlier [5].
• 26 Oct 2025, 22nd ASEAN‑India Summit (Kuala Lumpur):
  • 2026 designated ASEAN‑India Year of Maritime Cooperation [4].
  • India proposed a Second ASEAN‑India Maritime Exercise and a Second ASEAN‑India Defence Ministers' Meeting [4].
  • Support extended for the ASEAN‑India Plan of Action (2026–2030) [4].
• 28 Sep 2026: AIME‑2026 begins at Subic Bay [1].

4. Core Static Facts

• Implementing body: Ministry of Defence / Indian Navy. The release was issued by PIB Delhi under MoD [1].
• Structure of the exercise [1]:
• Harbour Phase: Subject Matter Expert Exchanges, sports and cultural activities, community engagement and Operational Synchronisation, ending with a Pre‑Sail Brief.

• Sea Phase: coordinated maritime exercises and operational serials.

• Statutory basis: none. This is an executive, diplomatic and military activity.

5. Multi‑Dimensional Analysis

Geopolitical / Strategic

• The inaugural sea phase was held in the South China Sea [3]. The 2026 host is the Philippines [1]. Together these signal India's presence in contested Western Pacific waters.
• The exercise puts ASEAN centrality into practice, since India ties the partnership to the AOIP [9].
• Hosting has moved from Singapore to the Philippines [2][1], so the exercise now rotates across ASEAN venues.

Security / Defence Diplomacy

• The stated aims are interoperability and operational coordination [1].
• It is paired with the proposed 2nd ASEAN‑India Defence Ministers' Meeting, which shows defence cooperation being institutionalised [4].

Economic (Blue Economy)

• The Year of Maritime Cooperation 2026 is meant to "forge partnerships in blue economy" [4].
• Maritime cooperation also covers sustainable fisheries and the marine environment [8].

Policy / Doctrinal

• The shift from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR widens India's maritime outlook "across regions" [5]. AIME‑2026 explicitly cites MAHASAGAR, which extends the vision beyond the Indian Ocean to Southeast Asia [1].
• MAHASAGAR covers trade for development, capacity building for sustainable growth, and mutual security [5].

Soft Power / Social

• The Harbour Phase includes cultural, sporting and community engagement, which builds people‑to‑people ties [1].

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

• March 2025: MAHASAGAR doctrine launched in Mauritius [5].
• 26 Oct 2025: 22nd ASEAN‑India Summit declares 2026 the Year of Maritime Cooperation and proposes AIME‑2 and ADMM‑2 [4].
• 2026: ASEAN‑India Plan of Action 2026–2030 begins [4].
• 28 Sep 2026: AIME‑2026 starts at Subic Bay [1].
• 30 Sep 2026: PIB release (Release ID 2317206) [1].

7. Prelims Hooks

• AIME‑2026 is the 2nd edition of the ASEAN‑India Maritime Exercise [1].
• Venue of AIME‑2026: Subic Bay, Philippines [1].
• Start date: 28 September 2026 [1].
• Indian ships in AIME‑2026: INS Sahyadri and INS Kulish [1].
• Theme: "Anchored in Trust, United at Sea" [1].
• Inaugural AIME: 2023, hosted by Singapore, Harbour Phase at Changi Naval Base [2][3].
• AIME‑2023 Indian ships: INS Satpura and INS Delhi [2].
• AIME‑2023 Sea Phase: South China Sea, ~1,400 personnel on 9 ships [3].
• Seven ASEAN navies joined AIME‑2023: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam [3].
• MAHASAGAR = Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions, launched in Mauritius, March 2025 [5].
• SAGAR = Security and Growth for All in the Region, also first set out in Mauritius [5].
• 2026 = ASEAN‑India Year of Maritime Cooperation, declared at the 22nd ASEAN‑India Summit, Kuala Lumpur (26 Oct 2025) [4].
• ASEAN‑India Plan of Action period: 2026–2030 [4].
• INS Sahyadri earlier took part in the maiden India‑Indonesia‑Australia trilateral maritime exercise [10].

8. Why Two Ships Every Three Years Is Still a Small Signal

• The exercise is still small
• In 2023, about 1,400 personnel on 9 ships took part. That is the Indian Navy and seven ASEAN navies put together [3].
• India sent only 2 ships in 2023 (Satpura, Delhi) [2], and again only 2 in 2026 (Sahyadri, Kulish) [1].

• The 2026 release gives no count of ships or personnel [1]. So nobody can yet say whether the exercise has grown.

• Three years passed between the first and second editions

• Edition 1 was in May 2023 [2]. Edition 2 was held only after India proposed it again at the 22nd Summit in October 2025 [4].
• An exercise that has to be proposed again at summit level each time is not yet "institutionalised" (a fixed, regular event that runs on its own).

• Interoperability (navies being able to work together smoothly at sea) needs regular practice. Once every three years does not build it.

• Most of the programme happens in harbour

• The Harbour Phase covers expert exchanges, sports, culture and community events [1].
• The Sea Phase is described only as "coordinated maritime exercises and operational serials" [1]. No specific skills are named, such as anti-submarine work or search-and-rescue.
• So the exercise does more for diplomacy than it does for fighting ability.

9. Why ASEAN Does Not Sail as One Bloc

• Three of the ten ASEAN members did not join in 2023
• Only seven navies took part: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam [3].
• Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar were absent. All ten ASEAN members do sit at the trade table with India [12].

• So "ASEAN–India" at sea really means India plus the ASEAN members that choose to come.

• ASEAN decides by consensus, which slows the security track

• India and ASEAN have jointly asked for full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) [13]. The DOC is a non-binding promise from 2002 that countries will behave peacefully in the sea.
• They still ask for it because it has not been fully put into practice [13].

• India ties its partnership to ASEAN centrality (the idea that ASEAN, not outside powers, should lead regional arrangements) and to the AOIP [9]. This means India cannot move faster than the slowest ASEAN member is willing to go.

• The 2026 participant list is not public yet

• The release says only "ASEAN Member States" [1].
• Watch this list. More navies joining would show the exercise is gaining trust. Fewer would show the region is split.

10. Where India Stands on the South China Sea — and Where It Stops

• India backs the law, not a side
• India supports freedom of navigation (the right of any ship to pass through international waters) and overflight [11].
• It says sovereignty disputes must be settled peacefully under UNCLOS 1982 (the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the treaty that sets rules for sea zones) [11].

• India does not say which country owns which island or reef.

• The 2016 arbitration award is the legal background

• An UNCLOS tribunal found that China's claims based on history and its "nine-dash line" had no legal basis. This view was stated in an MEA-hosted lecture [13]. The case was brought by the Philippines, the 2026 host.

• India issued an official statement on the award [14]. In the exam, write that India backs UNCLOS. Do not write that India backed the Philippine claim.

• Why the host matters

• The 2023 Sea Phase was in the South China Sea [3]. The 2026 host is the Philippines [1], the country that won the 2016 case.
• Holding the exercise there makes India's support for UNCLOS visible. India still avoids taking a direct stand on who owns what, which keeps the risk low.

11. The Navy Is Moving Faster Than the Trade Deal

• The trade treaty is still under review
• AITIGA (the ASEAN–India Trade in Goods Agreement, the free trade deal for goods) is being reviewed to make it more effective and easier to use [12].
• The 13th Joint Committee met in New Delhi on 6–10 July 2026, and negotiations were still going on [12].

• ASEAN accounts for about 11% of India's total trade, around USD 128 billion in 2025–26 [12].

• Why this gap matters

• The Year of Maritime Cooperation is meant to build blue economy partnerships [4]. The blue economy means the jobs and income that come from the sea: fishing, shipping, ports.
• The Maritime Cooperation statement lists fisheries and the marine environment as focus areas [8]. But the 2026 exercise release covers only naval activity [1].
• ASEAN states judge India on markets as much as on warships. If the trade review drags on, the naval signal looks less convincing.

12. The Case That AIME Is More Show Than Strength

• The strongest objection
• The exercise is small (2 Indian ships) [1][2]. It is not held often (2023, then 2026) [2][1]. It is heavy on ceremony (sports, culture, community events) [1].

• On this view it signals interest without adding real naval strength, and it may irritate China at little gain.

• What is right about this objection

• On fighting ability, the objection mostly holds. Nothing in the public record shows that joint combat or surveillance skills have improved [1].

• India avoids taking positions on sovereignty [11]. So the exercise cannot promise any ASEAN state practical help in a dispute.

• Why it still matters

• The purpose is trust before capability. The theme, "Anchored in Trust, United at Sea", says so directly [1].
• It is one part of a larger package: a proposed second Defence Ministers' Meeting and a Plan of Action for 2026–30 [4]. Taken together, the package matters more than any single exercise.
• Signalling at low risk, under UNCLOS [11] and led by ASEAN [9], is a deliberate choice. It keeps India acceptable to all ten members, including those that stayed away in 2023 [3].

13. What India and ASEAN Should Fix Before the Third Edition

• The Indian Navy and ASEAN defence ministers should fix a regular schedule
• At present each edition depends on a new summit proposal [4].

• The proposed second ASEAN–India Defence Ministers' Meeting [4] could set a fixed gap between editions and a rotation of hosts. The exercise would then no longer depend on summits.

• Use the Plan of Action 2026–30 to add non-combat drills

• The Plan of Action (2026–2030) [4] and the Maritime Cooperation statement [8] both cover fisheries and marine environment protection.

• Adding search-and-rescue, disaster relief or illegal-fishing drills to the Sea Phase would give hesitant members like Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar [3] a reason to join. These drills do not look aimed at China.

• MEA and the Commerce Ministry should finish the AITIGA review

• The review was still going on in July 2026 [12].
• Finishing it would give the Year of Maritime Cooperation the economic side it promised [4].

14. Anchors for Answers

• Data: AIME‑2023 had ~1,400 personnel on 9 ships from India and 7 of the 10 ASEAN states [3]
• Data: ASEAN makes up about 11% of India's global trade, ~USD 128 bn in 2025–26 [12]
• Report/Committee: ASEAN–India Plan of Action 2026–2030 [4]; 13th AITIGA Joint Committee, July 2026 [12]
• Law/Case: UNCLOS 1982, which India cites for freedom of navigation and peaceful settlement [11]; South China Sea Arbitral Award, 2016 [14][13]; Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) [13]
• Scheme: SAGAR → MAHASAGAR, the doctrine that stretches India's maritime vision from the Indian Ocean to Southeast Asia [5]

15. Mains Relevance

• GS‑II: India and its neighbourhood; bilateral, regional and global groupings involving India (ASEAN, Act East, Indo‑Pacific).
• GS‑III: Security challenges and their management in border areas; maritime security; blue economy.
• Question stems: 1. "Institutionalised multilateral naval exercises such as AIME mark India's transition from a 'Look East' to an 'Act East' security posture." Critically examine. 2. Discuss how the evolution from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR reshapes India's maritime engagement with Southeast Asia. What are the constraints? 3. "ASEAN centrality and India's Indo‑Pacific strategy converge at sea." Analyse in the context of the ASEAN‑India Year of Maritime Cooperation 2026.

16. Related Topics to Study Next

• Act East Policy vs Look East Policy: the policy that AIME‑2026 explicitly advances [1].
• SAGAR → MAHASAGAR: the doctrinal frame cited in the release [5].
• ASEAN Outlook on the Indo‑Pacific (AOIP): the framework India aligns the CSP with [9].
• ASEAN‑India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and Plan of Action 2026–30 [4][7].
• ASEAN‑India Joint Statement on Maritime Cooperation: blue economy and maritime security agenda [8].
• ADMM / ADMM‑Plus and the ASEAN‑India Defence Ministers' Meeting: the parallel defence track [4].
• South China Sea disputes and UNCLOS: the strategic setting of AIME's sea phases [3].
• Other Indian Navy exercises with Southeast Asia (e.g. the India‑Indonesia‑Australia trilateral) [10].

17. Common Errors / Trap Areas

• Two different "MAHASAGAR"s:
• The 2025 doctrine is the policy vision launched by the PM in Mauritius [5].

• The Indian Navy's "MAHASAGAR" virtual interaction (first held 29 Nov 2023) is an outreach event with IOR navies [6].

• Edition and host confusion: 1st edition = 2023, Singapore; 2nd = 2026, Philippines. Aspirants often assume the exercise is annual or always hosted in Singapore [2][1].

• Ship swap: Satpura/Delhi were in 2023; Sahyadri/Kulish are in 2026 [2][1].
• "Year of Maritime Cooperation" is 2026. It was declared in October 2025 at the 22nd Summit, which was held in Kuala Lumpur, not in India [4].
• Ministry: the exercise comes under MoD / Indian Navy. The ASEAN summit outcomes come from MEA/PMO releases. Do not mix them up.
• Not verified in the whitelisted sources, so check before relying on them:
• the ship classes of Sahyadri and Kulish;
• the list of ASEAN states taking part in 2026;
• the year the CSP was upgraded.