How do ASEAN-centric mechanisms such as ADMM-Plus help India's pursuit of a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific? Discuss their limitations.

At the first ASEAN-India Defence Think Tank Forum in October 2026, the Defence Minister said Act East, SAGAR and MAHASAGAR fit with the ASEAN-led mechanisms that are central to India's Indo-Pacific approach [1]. Platforms such as ADMM-Plus give India an inclusive way to work for a rules-based order. However, ASEAN's internal divisions limit what they can achieve.

How ASEAN-centric mechanisms help India

• Legitimacy without blocs: India backs ASEAN centrality, respect for international law and the right of every state, big or small, to make independent choices [1]. This offers a non-alliance option that ASEAN states, which avoid taking sides, can accept.
• Structured practical cooperation: ADMM-Plus runs seven areas of practical cooperation, including maritime security. India co-chairs the Experts' Working Group on Counter-Terrorism with Malaysia (2024–27) [3].
• Operational interoperability: The first ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise (2023) brought together nine ships and about 1,400 personnel and ended in the South China Sea [2]. It showed India's presence in contested waters.
• Upgraded political framework: The ties became a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2022, which gave defence cooperation political cover [4].
• Track 1.5 layering: Think-tank forums put forward ideas on maritime domain awareness and underwater surveillance [1].

Limitations

• Consensus paralysis: ASEAN decides by consensus, so one reluctant member can dilute any joint step. Mechanisms can therefore move only as fast as the slowest member.
• Partial participation: Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar did not take part in AIME [2]. "ASEAN-wide" cooperation is really cooperation with a willing subset.
• Non-binding outcomes: The forum's goals have no budget, deadline or agreement attached [1]. These platforms cannot enforce UNCLOS in South China Sea disputes.
• China inside the tent: ADMM-Plus includes China. India's BrahMos export to the Philippines [6], which was its first, can look like taking sides.
• Real depth stays bilateral: Joint R&D and industrial links are moving faster in bilateral formats, such as the India-Indonesia Defence Ministers' Dialogue [5]. There, Indonesia welcomed India's proposal for a Joint Defence Industry Cooperation Committee.

ASEAN-centric mechanisms give India legitimacy and an entry point, but they cannot carry the whole effort. India should make AIME a regular exercise and feed think-tank ideas into the ADMM-Plus working groups. It should also use bilateral co-production to give these platforms more substance. Combined in this way, the MAHASAGAR vision can deliver an open, rules-based Indo-Pacific in line with SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions).